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The purpose of this thesis to analyze the effects of the end of the Cold 
War and the collapse of communism on Turkey's long-standing regional and 
international strategic role/importance and its foreign and security policies. 
After providing the reader with the background information about the 
foundation of the republic and the evolution of its foreign and security policies 
throughout the Cold War years, the thesis asserts that Turkey has attempted 
to adjust to the changes that the end of Cold War introduced into international 
relations by pursuing two complementary objectives: (1) to preserve and 
further strengthen the old ties and relationships that it built during the Cold 
War years with the West, which meant largely Western Europe and the United 
States; (2) to limit the damage that regional conflicts might eventually inflict 
on its own domestic stability and welfare. Following the analysis of whether or 
not Turkey has been able to achieve its objectives, this thesis concludes that 
Turkey does not see either Central Asia or the Middle East as a real 
alternative to the West despite all the exclusionary signs that it receives from 
Europe and the strained relations with the United States, and that Turkey still 
needs the military, economic and political cooperation and assistance of the 
West to overcome the challenges that are awaiting it in the next decade which 
will carry it into the 21st century. And the West has compelling reasons to 
provide the assistance and cooperation that Turkey seeks. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Turkey has been one of those countries that has been 
deeply affected by the sweeping changes that the passing of 
the Cold War and bipolarity have introduced into international 
relations. With the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization 
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the communist 
threat of the Cold War era has vanished, creating a completely 
new security environment. The initial optimism for a more 
peaceful international order and hopes for lasting peace 
quickly proved to be short-lived as conflicts and wars have 
broken out even in the center of Europe. In this new security 
environment, it can be said that Turkey has become a unique 
country in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
because no other ally is surrounded by three of the world's 
unstable and conflict-ridden regions at the same time: i.e., 
the Balkans, the Transcaucasus and the Middle East. Therefore, 
the primary purpose of this thesis is to analyze: (1) how the 
end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism have 
affected Turkey's long-standing regional and international 
strategic role/importance; (2) the changes that the passing of 
the bipolarity has introduced into Turkey's foreign and 
security policies. 
This thesis asserts that Turkey has attempted to adjust 
to this new external environment and the changes that the end 
of the Cold War introduced into international relations by 
pursuing two complementary objectives. Turkey's first 
objective has been to preserve and further strengthen the old 
ties and relationships that it built during the Cold War years 
with the West. With the above-mentioned dramatic changes, 
Turkey's security and foreign policies have also evolved to 
take a far greater account of regional consideration and, 
thus, Turkey's second objective has been to limit the damage 
that regional conflicts might eventually inflict on its own 
domestic stability and welfare. In the pursuit of this 
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objective, Turkey has undertaken broadly linked political, 
cultural and economic initiatives to spread Turkish influence 
and win many points of influence or leverage in the conflict- 
ridden regions stretching from eastern and southern Europe 
through the Black Sea region to Central Asia. 
Before moving to the analysis of Turkey's position in the 
post-Cold era, the study also aims at providing the reader 
with background information about the foundation of the 
republic with particular emphasis on the evolution of Turkish 
foreign and security policies throughout the Cold War years. 
Therefore, the next part of the thesis, Chapter II, is devoted 
to a discussion of the evolution of Turkey's foreign and 
security policies over a time period stretching from the 
foundation of the republic in 1923 to the late 1980s, which 
witnessed the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, under Mikhail 
Gorbachev, from the military and ideological competition with 
the West and the consequent demise of the Cold War. After 
providing the reader with information about Turkey's foreign 
and security policies throughout the Cold War years, Chapter 
III focuses on the evolution of Turkey's relations with West 
in the post-Cold War era, and gives an assessment of whether 
or not Turkey's first policy objective, elevating the 
relations with the West, has been realized. Particular 
attention shall be given to Turkey's relations with the 
European Union (EU) and the United States in this chapter. 
Considering the geostrategic position of Turkey and its 
centrality to the volatile and instable regions such as the 
Balkans and the Transcaucasus, Turkey's relations with the two 
collective security organizations that have great importance 
in Turkey's security calculations, i.e., NATO and the Western 
European Union (WEU), are also discussed in Chapter III. 
Chapter IV is devoted to an assessment of the regional 
policies that Turkey has pursued toward Central Asia, the 
Transcaucasus, the Middle East and the Balkans. 
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It is a fact that the ability of Turkey to achieve both 
of the objectives that it has pursued in the post-Cold War 
era, depends not only on external factors, such as the 
evolution of the American and Western Europeans policies 
toward Turkey, but also on domestic factors such as the 
continuation of the ability of Turkey's mainstream secular 
parties, which have governed the country since the foundation 
of the republic, to mobilize the Turkish society along Western 
ideas and ideals. Therefore, Chapter III also analyzes 
domestic situation of Turkey in order to understand the 
compatibilities and incompatibilities between Turkey's policy 
options and the country's internal environment. Particular 
attention is given to the following issues: the transformation 
that the Turkish economy underwent throughout the 1980s and 
the structural problems of the economy which caused Turkey to 
fall into a severe economic crisis in 1994 despite the 
unprecedented economic growth of 1980s; the place of Islam in 
domestic politics and the recent success of the Welfare Party, 
the main political movement of the religious right, in the 
March 1994 general elections, exacerbating the fears of rising 
Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey; and Turkey's prolonged 
Kurdish problem, which became a serious threat not only to the 
territorial integrity and domestic stability of Turkey, but 
also to its overall objective of elevating relations with its 
Western allies. 
The topics covered throughout this study are selected and 
discussed in a manner that will provide, hopefully, the reader 
with an understanding of the most important challenges that 
are waiting for Turkey in the next decade that will carry it 
into the 21st century and answer the guestion that began to be 
widely discussed upon the 1989 rejection of Turkey's 
membership application to the EU and the emergence of the 
Central Asian republics on the international scene with a vast 
territory inhabited by some 150 million fellow Muslim Turkic- 
speakers: Will Turkey turn its back on Europe and focus on 
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developing relations in Central Asia and the Middle East? This 
thesis concludes, in Chapter V, that Turkey does not see 
either Central Asia or the Middle East as a real alternative 
to the West, but rather a complementary factor to further its 
national interests, and that it still needs the military, 
economic and political cooperation and assistance of the West 
in order to overcome the challenges that are waiting for it in 
the next decade that will carry it into the 21st century, of 
which the most important one is to maintain the Turkish 
people's commitment to the basic goals of modernization and 
their loyalty to the Western ideas and ideals. 
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II.  TURKEY'S TRADITIONAL FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES 
A.  BACKGROUND 
The Republic of Turkey was found on October 29, 1923 under 
the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, known as Ataturk-the Father 
Turk1. The republic was proclaimed following the four-year 
War of Independence (1919-1922) which had been fought against 
the World War I Allied powers that wanted to partition the 
Ottoman Empire. 
After its entry into World War I on November 5, 1914, on 
the side of the Central Powers, the Ottoman army of 800,000 
men was engaged in a four-front war with the Allied troops. 
[Ref l:p.40] Facing the Allied offensives in multiple fronts, 
Ottoman resistance was exhausted in the Autumn of 1918 and an 
Allied-dictated armistice was signed by the Ottoman government 
on October 30, 1918 at Mudros. [Ref 2:p.31] Following the 
Mudros armistice, Allied warships passed through the 
Dardanelles and anchored off Constantinople (present day 
Istanbul) on November 1918. [Ref l:p.42] The Allied plans for 
the partitioning of Anatolia or Asia Minor, the only 
remaining homeland for Turks from vast territories of the 
Ottoman Empire, was put into implementation.2 
In the meantime, a Turkish nationalist movement was being 
organized in Anatolia by Mustafa Kemal, who recognized the 
intentions of the Allied Powers under the terms and conditions 
of the armistice. A national congress that convened in the 
Anatolian cities of Erzurum and, later, in Sivas in 1919, 
adopted the National Pact, the political document that defined 
the task of national resistance movement led by Mustafa Kemal: 
1
 "Ataturk" is the surname given to Mustafa Kemal by the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly in 1934 following the adoption of Law of Surnames 
2
 Under the conditions of the armistice, Allied Powers were free to intervene in areas 
where their interests appeared to be threatened 
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Preserving all of the Ottoman territory that lay within the 
armistice lines of 1918, as an independent Turkish state. 
[Ref 2:p.31] Upon dismissal of Ottoman parliament following 
the occupation of public buildings in Istanbul by Allied 
troops in January 1920, nationalist congress again convened in 
Ankara under the name of "Grand National Assembly" ("Buyuk 
Millet Meclisi") and elected Mustafa Kemal as the first 
president of assembly in April 23, 1920. 
The National Pact that was adopted in Sivas, did not only 
define and declare the territorial boundaries of the new 
political entity that Mustafa Kemal was determined to found 
but, it also implied the renunciation of the Arab provinces, 
inherited from the Ottoman Empire and of the policies of Pan- 
Islamism and Pan-Turanianism (envisioning to unite all the 
Turkic people in the world in one state). Mustafa Kemal, 
referring to Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism, said: 
Instead of increasing the pressure of our enemies by 
pursuing these ideals, which we never achieved and 
never could achieve, let us be sensible. Let us know 
our limitations. [Ref 2:p.31] 
He narrowed the focus of his nationalist movement to the 
Turks of Turkey and the territorial principles of the 
National Pact were established largely on the basis of 
Turkish-speaking population concentrations in Anatolia. Thus, 
the War of Independence was a struggle for the survival of the 
Turkish nation, and of the Anatolia -the Turkish homeland that 
was under the threat of occupation by the Allied Powers under 
the terms of the Sevres Peace Treaty of 1920, signed between 
Ottoman Empire and the Allies. In an attempt to mobilize the 
popular support for the struggle against the external enemy 
and to consolidate the power of the Grand National Assembly in 
Ankara against the legacy of the Ottoman past, Mustafa Kemal 
employed Turkish nationalism as the instrument for building 
the new and modern Turkish state. 
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Following the four-year War of Independence in which 
Turkish nationalist army succeeded in driving the French, 
Italian and Greek occupation forces out of Anatolia, an 
international peace conference was convened in Lausanne in 
November 1922. [Ref l:p.48] After seven months of negotiations 
between Allied and Turkish governments, the Treaty of Lausanne 
was signed on 24 July 1923, delineating and codifying the 
territorial boundaries of the new Turkish state. [Ref l:p.49] 
The Grand National Assembly, on October 29, 1923, proclaimed 
the Republic of Turkey and Mustafa Kemal was elected by the 
assembly as the first president of the republic on the same 
day. 
Under the Lausanne Treaty, the territorial goals outlined 
in the National Pact were largely attained. Only two districts 
lying within the 1918 armistice lines were withheld from 
Turkey. The question of Mosul-Kirkuk, one of these two 
territories, was taken to the League of Nations, but in the 
face of continuous British opposition against Turkish claims, 
this territory was awarded to Iraq by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice's decision in 1926. [Ref 3:p.22] The 
other territory, the Sanjak of Hatay, acceded to Turkey in 
1939, a process facilitated by France, then League of Nations 
mandatory power for Syria. 
Both issues, that caused bitter controversy at the time, 
continue to be a source of resentment and suspicion against 
Turkey on the part of these two Arab states. 
B.  KEMALIST IDEOLOGY AMD THE EARLY YEARS 
When the new Turkish state came into being on October 29, 
1923 it was encircled by the states, whose memories were 
dominated with hostility toward Turks -their former rulers. 
The wide range of potential sources of conflict with 
neighboring countries inherited from the Ottoman past, like 
territorial issues and continuing historical enemy images, 
made it impossible for Turkey to relegate the question of 
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physical security to background. Therefore, since its 
foundation as a modern state in 192 3 on the ruins of the 
Ottoman Empire, the paramount goal of Turkey has been the 
protection of the country against potential or actual threats 
endangering or violating its territorial integrity and 
independence, especially those originating in the immediate 
surroundings. For this task to be achieved, Mustafa Kemal 
offered peace. The principle formulated by Mustafa Kemal: 
"Peace at home, peace abroad" became the cornerstone of 
Turkey's conduct in external relations. This implied a policy 
based on the maintenance of the status quo, established by the 
Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, and on the survival of a 
relatively homogeneous nation state with a clear Turkish 
identity. [Ref 4:p. 294] 
Turkish foreign policy in the formative years of the 1920s 
and 1930s relied heavily on diplomatic and political tools to 
foster a secure environment based on neutralism, and committed 
itself to correct diplomatic relations with European powers 
and to the establishment of friendly relations with its 
neighbors, including the Soviet Union. By the end of 1925, 
friendship treaties had been negotiated with 15 states. [Ref 
l:p. 53] In 1925 Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship and 
Non-aggression with the Soviet Union, in 1930 it initiated a 
successful process of reconciliation with Greece, known in 
both countries as Ataturk-Venizelos period of friendship, 
toward the settlement of several outstanding issues. [Ref 
5:p. 11] 
Domestic concerns also affected this choice of particular 
attention to build friendly relations with neighbors. Mustafa 
Kemal had focussed on the modernization of the Turkish society 
along the lines of the West as its second most important goal. 
On assuming office of the Presidency, he ended the link 
between the Turkish state and the notional leadership of the 
world Islamic community, symbolized by the abolition of the 
Caliphate in 1924. Mustafa Kemal introduced, from above, a 
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series of radical reforms in the country's economic, political 
and social life to build a new, modern society along the lines 
of the West. The ideological foundation of Mustafa Kemal's 
reform program, an abrupt and comprehensive break with the 
past, especially with Islam and its substitution with an 
ideology of westernization, became known as Kemalism. After a 
four-year War of Independence that exhausted country's 
economic and human resources, Turkey was bound to give 
priority to internal construction if Mustafa Kemal's radical 
reforms were to take root. This required a neutralism in 
foreign policy that excluded alliances and external 
commitments of any kind. [Ref 5:p. 11] 
Departures from Turkish neutralism of the formative years 
occurred in the. turbulent environment of the mid-1930s. For 
Turkey, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 was a 
dramatic warning of "gathering storm" in Europe, not far from 
its borders. [Ref 5:p. 12] In the face of increasingly 
aggressive policy of Italy under Mussolini and potential 
Bulgarian alignment with Nazi Germany, Turkey concluded the 
Balkan Pact with Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania in 1934, an 
action aimed at maintaining stability in the Balkans. [Ref 
l:p. 53] In 1936 Turkey, facing an increasing threat to 
European security, requested revision of Lausannne Straits 
Convention to allow Turkish control and remilitarization of 
the Turkish straits, Bosphorus and Dardanelles. [Ref l:p. 53] 
Upon Turkey's request and approval of signatory powers of 
Treaty of Lausanne, the Lausanne Straits Convention was 
replaced by the Montreux Convention. Under the new convention, 
Turkey was authorized to militarize the Straits area, and by 
unilateral decision, to close the Straits to war vessels when 
it deemed that there was an immediate threat of war 
jeopardizing its safety. In 1937 Turkey entered into the 
Saadabat Pact with Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq. [Ref 4:p. 294] 
Following the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk on November 
10, 1938, Ismet Inonu, Ataturk's chief lieutenant was elected 
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as the second president of the Republic of Turkey. Inonu was 
determined to keep the country neutral in the event of a war 
in Europe. However, the threat posed by German-Soviet Non- 
Aggression Treaty of August 1939, which paved the way for the 
invasion of Poland and the start of World War II, prompted 
Turkey to sign a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with London and 
Paris in October 1939. [Ref 6:p. 87] An important clause of 
this treaty provided that no action would be required of 
Turkey that would result in its involvement in war with the 
Soviet Union. [Ref l:p. 54] Turkey also signed a nonaggression 
treaty with Germany on June 18, 1941, but despite heavy German 
pressure, did not permit passage of German troops over Turkey 
and ships through the Straits area. 
Turkish neutrality during World War II survived until 
1944. In August 1944, Turkey broke off relations with Nazi 
Germany which was, at that time, on the verge of defeat, and 
declared war on February 23, 1945, against Germany whose 
defeat was then considered imminent. [Ref 2:p. 33] Joining the 
Allied side in the last months of the war enabled Turkey to 
participate in the San Francisco Conference in April 1945 and 
become one of the founding members of the United Nations 
(UN). [Ref 7:p. 63] 
In the aftermath of the War of Independence, Turkey's 
foreign and security policies, based on Kemalist motto of 
"Peace in the World, peace at home", had been relied heavily 
on diplomatic, political tools to foster a secure environment 
in which friendly relations were established in every 
direction including the Soviet Union. This had been achieved 
without sacrificing Ataturk's long term goal of 
Westernization. Even Turkey's independence war was, in 
essence, not against the European system of values, but for 
the creation of a secular state on the European model. This 
harmony kept Turkey within the European society of nations and 
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In the post-World War II era, new circumstances forced 
Turkey to adopt exclusively Western oriented policy, not only 
in terms of ideology, but also in security and defense 
matters. 
C.  ALLIANCE WITH THE WEST 
At the end of World War II, Turkey felt threatened both 
territorially and ideologically by the Soviet Union, which 
emerged from the war as one of the two most powerful victors, 
with political and military control over the eastern half of 
Europe. Turkey's neutrality during interwar years had made 
its future status ambiguous and its territories a tempting 
target for Stalin. In March 1945, the Soviet Union notified 
Turkey that it had no intention of extending the Treaty of 
Friendship and Non-aggression of 1925 which was due to expire 
in November 1945 on the grounds that it required revision to 
reflect changes brought by the war. [Ref 5:p. 12] Throughout 
1945 and 1946, the Soviet Union pressured Turkey for the 
revision of the Montreux Convention for the joint control and 
defense of the Straits area which would, in effect, turn the 
straits into joint Turkish-Soviet territorial waters. Finally, 
Stalin's demands during the same period for territorial 
concessions from Turkey, particularly for Kars and Ardahan 
regions (Turkey's northeastern provinces) which were annexed 
from the Ottoman Empire by the Russian Empire in 1878 and 
given back to Turkey under the terms of The Treaty of Mutual 
Friendship of 1921 between Turkey and the Soviet Union, 
revealed the real intentions of the Soviet Union with respect 
to Turkey. The prime concern of Turkish strategy, namely 
territorial integrity, seemed to be under imminent threat. 
Turkey, which did not possess the qualitative and 
quantitative military power adequate to deter the revived 
Soviet power from threatening its territorial integrity, 
turned to the United States, by far the richest and most 
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advanced capitalist society with a military power capable of 
encountering this emerging power of the Soviet Union. 
Soviet activities in the Near East in 1946, such as 
communist Tudeh Party's attempt to establish The Democratic 
Republic of Azerbaijan in the northern parts of Iran, forced 
the United States to extend the deterrence Turkey was looking 
for.[Ref 8:p. 216] First the United States sent a naval force 
to the eastern Mediterranean to demonstrate it would resist, 
with all means at its disposal, against the Soviet expansion 
in the area and then proclaimed the "Truman Doctrine" in 1947. 
In announcing his doctrine to a joint session of the 
House and Senate in March 1947, President Harry S. Truman 
said: 
. . . One way of life is based on upon the will of the 
majority . . . The second way of life is based upon 
the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the 
majority. . . I believe that it must be the policy of 
the United States to support free peoples who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities 
or by outside pressure. I believe that we must assist 
free peoples to work out their own destinies in their 
own way ... I, therefore, ask the Congress to 
provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey. 
[Ref 6:p. 89] 
In support of the Doctrine, the United States and Turkey 
signed, on July 12, 1947, the Military Assistance Agreement. 
Following the ratification of this agreement by the Turkish 
Parliament on September 1, 1947, American military personnel 
and material flowed into Turkey and the Turkish army was 
reorganized along American lines. American strategists drafted 
plans for a network of bases and other facilities, including 
the combat airbase at Incirlik near Adana/Turkey. The Pentagon 
was preparing in Turkey the infrastructure to serve as an 
outpost for containment of the Soviet Union and projecting 
power into the Middle East. [Ref 9:p. 5] Step by step, Turkey 
drew  closer  to  the Western  alliance  and  joined the 
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Organization of European Economic Cooperation which later 
became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). Turkey subsequently participated in the 
European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan), which was designed 
under the sponsorship of the United States to provide 
economic assistance in rebuilding Europe. [Ref l:p. 63] With 
its admission to Council of Europe in 1950, Turkey's postwar 
strategy of tying the young republic to the democracies of the 
West and joining a security alliance with them was almost 
fully in place. Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) was the final objective to be achieved in 
this direction. 
In the period following the end of the World War II, 
France, England and the Low Countries (Belgium, Holland and 
Luxembourg) had signed the Brussels Treaty to form a 
defensive alliance against an expectedly re-emergent Germany. 
[Ref 10:p. 77] Almost immediately, however, the Brussels 
Treaty of 1948 was overtaken by the signature, in April 
1949, of the Washington Treaty which united the United States 
and eleven other nations under the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. Because it was not geographically located in 
the immediate Atlantic area, Turkey was not invited to become 
a charter member of the organization. This fact was not viewed 
with pleasure by Turkey for it was feared it would cause a 
reduction in the military and economic aid coming from the 
United States and, might induce the Soviet Union to increase 
pressure on Turkey, which was left outside the protective 
umbrella of the new treaty. 
In the following years, Turkey lobbied hard to be admitted 
to NATO in the face of a group of northern European countries 
which demonstrated reluctance toward extending the area of 
NATO's defense responsibilities to include Turkey (and 
Greece), based on the grounds that inclusion of Turkey would 
increase the danger of war with the Soviet Union, Turkey's 
northern neighbor, and would spread NATO too thin, adding to 
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the armament burden. [Ref 4:p. 296] British government, more 
interested in the establishment of a separate Middle Eastern 
defense alliance than supporting Turkey's NATO application, 
proposed an Eastern Mediterranean Command, covering Greece, 
Turkey, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, under 
a British Supreme Commander. [Ref 11:p. 6 ] Turkey resisted 
this tendency which regarded it peripheral to European 
security, and argued that a policy of containment in the 
southern flank would be weakened in the absence of Turkey, 
and that Soviet expansion in the area would not only threaten 
the security of the Middle East, but would also endanger 
Western European security. Claiming that it was an integral 
and inseparable part of the Europe facing the Soviet Union, 
Turkey insisted that its forces should join the Supreme Allied 
Command, Europe (SACEUR). [Ref ll:p. 6] 
The Korean War provided Turkey with the opportunity to 
join NATO. Following the invasion of South Korea by North 
Korea in 1950, the UN Security Council decided, in the absence 
of the Soviet Union, which was protesting the exclusion of 
Communist China, to invite the organization's members to repel 
the armed attack of North Korea. [Ref 12:p. 120] In response 
to this request, the new Turkish government that took the 
office with a landslide victory in May 1950 general elections 
under the leadership of Adnan Menderes decided to send a mixed 
brigade of 4,500 men to the area of conflict. The Turkish 
contingent sent to participate in the conflict was the third 
largest force in this UN action, after the American and 
South Korean forces. 
To make use of the advantage provided by the Turkish 
government's positive response to the UN Security Council and 
the distinguished actions of its troops in Korea, Turkey 
made a formal request to join NATO. In addition to showing its 
allegiance to the West by sending troops to Korea, Turkey had 
initiated a process of democratization in its political 
system by introducing the multiparty politics and May 1950 
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general election had given Menderes' Democrat Party a victory 
over Republican People's Party which had been in power since 
the foundation of the republic under single-party rule. These 
developments, combined with the United States' argument that 
Turkey's 18 army divisions would divert a substantial amount 
of Soviet forces to the south and thus, make the defense of 
the Central Front easier in the event of a war, moderated the 
initially unenthusiastic views of Europeans. This was also 
compatible with NATO's initial forward strategy of September 
1950 -to defend as far east as possible- which required large 
conventional build-up in Europe. [Ref 5:p. 20] Thus, Turkey 
was formally admitted to NATO as a full member on February 
18, 1952. Following the entry of Turkey into NATO, the United 
States and Turkey signed two major bilateral agreements in 
June 1954. The first was the Status of Forces Agreement and 
the second was the Military Facilities Agreement. Incirlik 
airbase near Adana joined the United States global network of 
Strategic Air Command Bases.  [Ref 9:p. 5] 
With the membership in NATO, protection of the territorial 
and ideological integrity of the country against the Soviet 
Union was secured. Protection against the Soviet Union was, 
of course, not the only reason for Turkey's membership in 
NATO. Turkey had entered the post-World War II era not only 
with an unshakable determination to become a multiparty 
democracy but also with structural and pressing economic 
difficulties. Recognizing the fact that the former could not 
be realized without the solution of the latter, successive 
Turkish governments sought foreign aid and investment which 
could only come from the United States and Western Europe. It 
was also thought in Turkey that the establishment and more 
importantly the improvement of democratic institutions rested 
on close structural relationships with the Western 
democracies. Thus, membership in NATO was an important 
achievement in relation with Turkey's desire to develop its 
economy both within a democratic  system and within the 
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framework of Western institutions. Furthermore, following 
World War II, Turkey had come to the frightening realization 
that its armed forces were ill-equipped and in urgent need of 
modernization. Failing to allocate internal resources to 
military purposes in an extensive way due to the powerful 
drive toward economic and democratic development, the 
remaining road to take was to modernize the Turkish armed 
forces through military aid from the West. Therefore, 
membership in NATO, from a Turkish viewpoint, has served the 
triple purpose of (1) defending the country's territorial 
integrity and the strategic position on the straits area 
against possible Soviet encroachment; (2) development and 
modernization of its armed forces; and (3) economic and 
democratic development while asserting and deepening Turkey's 
European ident ity. 
These three persistent themes which made themselves felt 
in post-World War II era only strengthened the existing 
Western oriented foreign policy of the republic since its 
foundation in 1923 and still play important role in its 
general foreign policy orientation today. 
Turkey's main assignment in NATO initially centered on 
attempts to prevent Soviet access to the Mediterranean through 
the control of Turkish straits, to tie down a considerable 
number of Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces, some of which 
otherwise could be deployed on the Central Front, and to 
serve as an outpost for NATO. In the subsequent years, 
American policy makers wished to take advantage of Turkey's 
commitment to the collective defense of the Alliance by 
integrating Turkey into security plans for the Balkans and the 
Middle East. [Ref 6:p. 91] With the encouragement of 
Washington, Turkey and Greece concluded the Balkan Defense 
Pact with Yugoslavia in 1954. [Ref 4:p.295] In 1953, Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles, who saw a direct link between 
the security of the Middle East and the defense of Western 
Europe, laid the groundwork for a new defense arrangement for 
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the Middle East, and Turkey, as a member of NATO, had a 
significant role to play in maintaining the security of the 
region. The United States, Basic National Security Policy of 
1953 stated that: 
In the Middle East, a strong regional grouping is not 
now feasible. In order to assure during peacetime for 
the United States and its allies the resources 
(specially oil) and the strategic positions of the 
area and their denial to the Soviet bloc, the United 
States should build on Turkey, Pakistan and, if 
possible, Iran . . . [Ref 11:p. 9] 
Washington's "Northern Tier" strategy was based on an 
alliance of nations of the area, specifically Turkey, 
Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. Turkey signed a pact of mutual 
cooperation with Iraq in February 1955 and this alliance was 
the nucleus of Baghdad Pact which was enlarged to include 
Britain, Iran and Pakistan later the same year. [Ref 3:p.25] 
The United States, although not a signatory, became a member 
of several important committees of the Baghdad Pact and later 
made individual bilateral defense agreements with the members 
of the Pact. In effect, this Pact extended defense lines of 
NATO to include the borders of Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. 
Turkey's importance to the West was greatly increased as a 
country establishing the "Northern Tier" against Soviet 
penetration into the Middle East and linking NATO to the 
Baghdad Pact. 
The Baghdad Pact did not survive long due to deep splits 
between countries of the Middle East. Colonel Gamel Abdel 
Nassser of Egypt, after overthrowing the monarchy in the 
military coup of "Free Officers" in 1952, embarked on a 
program which came to proclaim anti-imperialism and non- 
alignment in foreign policy.[Ref 10:p. 119] He strongly 
opposed the Baghdad Pact, labeled it as imperialist, and 
pressured Iraq for withdrawal from it. Syria sided with Egypt 
and both countries turned to the Soviet Union for military and 
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economic aid. This polarization led Britain, the United States 
and the World Bank to withdraw from the construction project 
of Egypt's Ashwan High Dam, an action that resulted in 
Nasser's retaliation by the nationalization of Suez Canal 
Company and the ensuing international crisis. [Ref 10:p.l20] 
Iraq left the Baghdad Pact in July 1958 after the Iraqi 
monarchy was overthrown by a bloody coup in which Nasserist 
officers participated. Following the withdrawal of Iraq, the 
pact was renamed as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). 
The Suez Crisis of November 1956 had important effects on 
the future policies of the United States toward the Middle 
East. The United States decided that the time had come to 
declare a direct commitment to the Middle East and 
disassociate the United States, at least publicly, from 
Britain and France in the region. Therefore, the Eisenhower 
Doctrine of January 1957 was an American effort to shape a 
unilateral approach to the region and sidestep the European 
allies. [Ref ll:p. 11] During the spring of 1958, strife 
inside Lebanon brought the ruling government close to being 
overthrown in a revolutionary uprising. The Lebanese 
government brought the crisis to the UN based on the grounds 
that Egypt and Syria were intervening in the internal affairs 
of Lebanon. [Ref 12:p. 142] After receiving no effective 
assistance from the UN, the Lebanese government sent a 
request to the United States for aid to help end the crisis. 
Washington, approving the request, sent forces from units in 
Europe and the Sixth Fleet. Incirlik airbase was used as a 
staging point for these forces. 
In the face of growing instabilities of the Middle Eastern 
countries, the Eisenhower administration had found that there 
was no better alternative in time of regional crisis than a 
conventionally well-equipped Turkey, coupled with arrangements 
for prestocking and staging of American forces at 
strategically located Turkish bases. Washington's response to 
the crisis in Lebanon was an example of flexibility afforded 
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by access to Turkish bases for non-NATO contingencies or low 
level regional conflicts for which NATO's doctrine of "massive 
retaliation" was inappropriate. [Ref 11:p. 23] 
Therefore, while membership in NATO, from a Turkish 
viewpoint, was to serve the triple purpose of economic, 
democratic and military development, Turkey's role in the 
Alliance in 1940s and 1950s, as seen by the West and 
especially by the United States, was twofold: (1) Defense of 
NATO's Southern Flank; (2) Defense of the Middle East, both 
directly and by providing basing and staging sites for the 
American units, against the danger of Soviet penetration 
into the region. In other words, underpinning Turkey's early 
role in NATO, as Bruce Kuniholm put it, "was the principle of 
reciprocity: Turkey would play an important part in the 
defense of the West, and make its facilities available, while 
the West would provide Turkey with a deterrent against Soviet 
attack, as well as military and economic assistance." [Ref 
13:p. 34] 
D.  NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY 
With the developments that took place after 1960, this 
comfortable strategic environment changed and gave way to a 
more complicated relationship between Turkey and NATO. In the 
1960s and 1970s, with the fundamental developments in the 
international system, the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance 
was subjected to a series of tests seriously affecting Turkey, 
which also began to witness specific and regional problems 
beyond the Soviet threat. The specific developments that led 
Turkey very cautiously to new pursuits in search of security 
and to put greater emphasis on its regional interests can be 
enumerated as follows; 
1. Withdrawal of the Jupiter Missiles from Turkey 
In October 1962, the world was brought to the brink of a 
nuclear war. This situation was caused by the Cuban missile 
crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union after 
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American reconnaissance airplanes revealed that the Soviet 
Union had begun to install nuclear missiles on Cuba. Turkey, 
although not directly involved in the crisis, was drawn into 
it because of one of its earlier commitments to the Alliance. 
Evidece appearing in 1957 that the Soviet Union was close 
to acquiring an Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 
capability, had increased the United State's vulnerability and 
led it to offer deployment of Jupiter and Thor Intermediate- 
range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) in Europe as a counter 
measure.[Ref 5:p. 20] Following the NATO Council meeting in 
December 1957, Turkey, together with Italy, consented to the 
deployment of Jupiter missiles on its soil. Actual 
installation of Jupiter missiles on Turkish soil began in 
1959. By the time their installation was completed, Jupiter 
missiles were already considered to be obsolete and their 
withdrawal from Turkey and Italy had been planned by the 
Kennedy administration. However, since Turkish government 
regarded these nuclear weapons based on its soil as an 
important deterrent against Soviet moves, Jupiter missiles 
were still in Turkey when the Cuban missile crisis broke out. 
One week after American reconnaissance airplanes brought 
photographs of missile sites in Cuba, President John F. 
Kennedy announced a naval quarantine of Cuba. After a few 
anxious days of public posturing and secret negotiations, 
Khrushchev, in return for a face-saving compromise involving 
eventual withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey, ordered 
the Soviet missiles in Cuba to be dismantled and shipped back. 
[Ref 14:p. 205] 
The decision for the removal of Jupiter missiles from 
Turkey was announced in January 1963, only three months after 
the crisis, and had a shock effect in Turkey. The Turkish 
public had been repeatedly told that these weapons represented 
an allied force under the joint control of the governments of 
Turkey and the United States. It appeared, from Turkey's 
viewpoint, that the United States and the Soviet Union had 
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made some sort of secret deal that directly affected the 
security and defense of Turkey without prior consultation with 
Turkey. This incident allowed Turkish policy makers and the 
Turkish public to consider that the United Sates might take 
unilateral decisions without prior consultation with Turkey 
even in cases where Turkish security was directly involved. 
[Ref 4:p. 318] 
Turkey's vulnerability to unilateral decisions by the 
United States was further emphasized during the Cyprus crisis 
of 1963-1964. 
2. The Cyprus Problem 
Cyprus is an eastern Mediterranean island of 3,572 square 
miles, roughly the size of Delaware and Rhode Island combined, 
located less than 50 miles from the southern coast of Turkey 
and 60 miles from the Syrian coast. [Ref 15:p. 107] 
The size of Cyprus and its proximity to the Turkish 
mainland make it particularly important for Turkish security. 
The island lies at the entrance of the Gulf of Iskenderun, 
the innermost corner of the north-eastern Mediterranean, and 
is large enough for any hostile power to deploy sufficient 
military force for an air, naval or amphibious operation 
against Turkey and dominate the eastern Mediterranean. 
Largely because of its strategic location, Cyprus has been 
an attractive island for successive empires. Settled by 
Greek colonizers in its earliest recorded history, the island 
was ruled by successively by the Assyrians, Egyptians, 
Romans, Arabs, Byzantines, Lusignans, Venetinas, and from 1571 
to 1878 by the Ottoman Empire. [Ref 16:p. 19] Beginning in the 
19th. century, Britain had started to show interest to Cyprus 
in search of security for its trade routes to India. In 1878, 
Britain had been granted by the Ottoman Empire, the 
administration of the island in return for helping check 
Russia's expansionist ambitions. Following the entry of the 
Ottoman Empire into World War I on Germany's side, the island 
was annexed to Britain in 1914, ending the period of Turkish 
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sovereignty. The new Turkish republic, founded in the 
aftermath of the Treaty of Lausanne, sought to develop close 
relations with Britain and viewed continued British rule to be 
compatible with its security interests. The situation on the 
island remained relatively static until the 1950s. 
When, in 1955, Greek Cypriot sentiment in favor of 
uniting the island with Greece began to meet unyielding 
British resistance, the demand for "enosis" -union of Cyprus 
with Greece- turned from a political slogan into a battle cry 
under a terrorism and sabotage campaign, launched against 
British rule by a clandestine guerrilla organization, EOKA 
(whose Greek initials stand for the National Organization of 
Cypriot Fighters). [Ref 15:p. 25] 
The Greek War of Independence in 1821 against the Ottoman 
Empire had led to the establishment of an independent Greek 
state. After gaining independence, Greece pursued a 
Panhellenic policy, known as the "Megali Idea" -the Great 
Idea- that aimed at unification of all Greeks and the revival 
of Byzantine-Greek Empire centered on Constantinople. The 
Megali Idea, failing to recover Istanbul (Constantinople) and 
western Anatolia in the face the War of Independence of 
Turkish nationalist movement, had continued to stir Greek 
passions, and in 1955 some Greeks saw the prospect of Cyprus' 
union with Greece as a partial fulfillment of this great 
national dream. In the worlds of a Greek politician: 
... no selfrespecting Greek politician could afford 
to show scorn or even neglect [for Megali Idea] . . . 
the union of Cyprus with Greece appeared to the masses 
to be a step toward the realization of Megali Idea. To 
be against it was tantamount to being against the idea 
of Greece itself, and could spell one's extinction . 
. . [Ref 16:p.33] 
Britain countered demands for "enosis" by arguing that the 
strategic location of Cyprus necessitated the continuation of 
British rule on the island for the fulfillment of its defense 
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obligations in the Middle East. However, for Britain, the 
turning point came with the Suez crisis of 1956 when British, 
French and Israeli forces withdrew from the occupied Egyptian 
territories under pressure from the United States. The Suez 
crisis revealed the extend to which British power had 
weakened in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. For 
Britain, the strategic rationale for keeping Cyprus under 
control had ceased to be decisive. [Ref 15:p. 27] The question 
of Cyprus's future arose immediately. 
In order to resolve the problem, Turkey, Greece and 
Britain signed, in 1959, a set of accords, known as Zurich- 
London Accords, which included the Treaty of Guarantee. 
Zurich-London Accords declared Cyprus an independent state 
without partition as of February 1960, and the Treaty of 
Guarantee authorized Britain, Greece and Turkey to station 
troops on the island and to intervene, jointly or 
unilaterally, if the constitutional status quo of the island 
was violated. The island was to have a legislature with 
separate representation for Greek and Turkish communities; an 
elected Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice 
president. [Ref 6:p.94] Since then, the desire of the Greek 
Cypriots to unite with Greece has led to major unrest between 
the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The delicate arrangements laid 
down in Zurich-London Accords broke down within a few months. 
In late 1963, this unrest reached the point where Cyprus was 
divided into two by a civil war. Turkey, in a vain attempt to 
put an end to the fighting in the island, appealed to both 
Greece and Britain to intervene jointly. In December 1963, the 
scale of fighting on the island surpassed all previous 
experiences of intercommunal violence. Turkish Cypriots, 
outnumbered and outgunned, suffered heavy losses. In order to 
end the escalating conflict, the UN Security Council 
authorized, the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), to be sent to 
the island. UNFICYP which became operational in 1964, 
initially managed to defuse potential conflicts and prevent a 
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large number of local disputes from escalating. However, it 
was unable to prevent the flare-up large-scale fighting and 
further loss of life. [Ref 16:p. 62] Following a series of 
defeats for Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish government decided 
to intervene in Cyprus unilaterally under the provisions of 
the Treaty of Guarantee. While several Turkish naval units 
were being transferred from the port of Istanbul to the port 
of Mersin on the Mediterranean coast, the Turkish Prime 
Minister, Ismet Inonu, informed the United States of his 
government's decision to intervene in Cyprus. 
The American response from President Lyndon B. Johnson to 
Premier Inonu was a watershed in Turkey's relationship with 
the United States. This response, contained in a letter 
drafted by the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, was 
delivered to Inonu on June 5, 1964 and became known as the 
"Johnson Letter". [Ref 15:p.39] President Johnson, attempting 
to prevent Turkish government from landing troops in Cyprus, 
made in its letter clear that Turkey did not have permission 
to use American equipment in a military operation against 
Cyprus. He also warned that the United States and NATO might 
not feel obliged to defend Turkey in the event of Soviet 
retaliatory action against it because of its intervention in 
Cyprus. Specifically the letter stated: 
. . . Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus 
by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the 
Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your 
NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether 
they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the 
Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in 
Soviet intervention without the full consent and 
understanding of its NATO Allies.3 
3
 The full text of President Johnson's letter is reprinted in "Defending the Upper Gulf 
by Marcy Agmon, EAI Paper, No.6, p.27-30 
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This statement, along with the restriction that "the 
United States can't agree to the use of any United States 
supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in 
Cyprus under the present conditions" led to the abandonment 
of Turkish plan for landing troops on the island. 
The Johnson letter, in the eyes of Turkish leaders and 
public opinion, significantly undermined the credibility of 
the whole Alliance and brought into question the entire 
basis of Turkey's relationship with NATO and particularly with 
the United States. When the letter's text was leaked to the 
Turkish press, the damage to American-Turkish relations was 
severe. Only a decade earlier, Turkey had eagerly sent the 
third largest military force to Korea to help the United 
States fight communism; now President Johnson's letter 
amounted to threatening Turkey with the common Soviet enemy. 
The feeling of betrayal in Turkey was widespread. [Ref 6:p. 
95] 
In his letter of reply, dated June 14, 1964, to President 
Johnson, Turkish Prime Minister Inonu stated that: 
. . . The part of your message expressing doubts as to 
the obligation of NATO allies to protect Turkey in 
case she becomes directly involved with the USSR as a 
result of an action initiated in Cyprus, gives me the 
impression that there are as between us wide 
divergence of views as to the nature and basic 
principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. I must 
confess that this has been to us the source of great 
sorrow and grave concern. If NATO's structure is so 
weak as to give credit to the aggressor's allegations, 
then it means that this defect of NATO needs really 
to be remedied ... If NATO members should start 
discussing the right and wrong of the situation of 
their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, 
whether this aggression was provoked or not and if 
the decision on whether they have an obligation to 
assist the member should be made to depend on the 
issue of such discussion, the very foundations of the 
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Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its 
meaning4 
The bilateral relations which had born with the Truman 
Doctrine of 1947 and eventually led to Turkey's membership in 
NATO, were severely damaged. 
The Cyprus problem, which raised serious doubts about the 
reliability of the United States as an ally of Turkey first in 
1963-1964, further damaged the confidence and trust between 
two countries in the second half of the 1970s as a result of 
Turkey military intervention in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 
and the ensuing American arms embargo against Turkey. 
Since 1973, there had been signs of active opposition 
among the Greek Cypriots against the Archbishop Makarios' 
government in Cyprus. This opposition was given support by the 
Greek junta leader Brigadier Ioannidis. In July 1974, 
Makarios, in a letter to Ioannidis, accused his military 
government of conspiring to overthrow the Government of Cyprus 
and demanded the recall of 650 Greek officers who were serving 
as advisors to the Cyprus National Guard. [Ref 12:p. 254] 
Instead of replying to Makarios, the Ioannidis junta ordered 
the National Guard to overthrow him. In a bloody coup that 
began on July 5, the National Guard seized the presidential 
place and appointed as the new president of Cyprus, Nicos 
Sampson an ex-EOKA terrorist with a reputation as a Turk- 
killer. In Turkey, fears of enosis and concerns about the 
security of the Turkish Cypriot immediately grew. 
Following the failure of its attempts to persuade Britain 
to undertake joint intervention in the island under the 
provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey announced that 
it felt free to act unilaterally to protect the Turkish 
Cypriots under the treaty provision. When the Undersecretary 
4
 The full text of Premier Ismet Inonu's response to President Johnson is reprinted in 
"Defending the Upper Gulf" by Marcy Agmon, EAI Paper, No.6, p.30-38 
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of State Joseph Sisco came to Ankara in order to persuade 
Turkey not to intervene in the island, Turkish Prime Minister, 
Bulent Ecevit told him: 
Ten years ago . . . you committed an error and so 
did we. Your mistake was to tie our hands and stop us. 
Our mistake was that we listened to you. We will not 
commit the same error as ten years ago. [Ref 17:p. 
95] 
On July 20, 1974, Turkey landed 6,000 troops in the 
northern coasts of Cyprus. The UN Security Council Resolution 
353 called for a cease-fire and the initiation of 
negotiations. [Ref 5:p. 24] However, international 
negotiations in Geneva failed to provide a permanent solution 
to the Cyprus problem. Upon the break down of the 
negotiations, on August 14, Turkey launched a three-day second 
offensive to consolidate vulnerable Turkish positions in the 
northern part of Cyprus. 
This second offensive precipitated an American arms 
embargo against Turkey. On December 10, 1974, the United 
States Congress ratified the decision with a provision that 
the ban on military arms shipments to Turkey come into effect 
on February 5, 1975. [Ref 17:p .3] The Congress had used the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Military Sales Act of 
1968 as the basis of its decision since both of these laws 
stipulated that American military equipment were only provided 
to recipient countries for self-defense. [Ref 16:p. 105] 
The impact of the American arms embargo (it was lifted in 
September 1978 by President Jimmy Carter) on Turkey was 
profound. Like the "Johnson Letter" of 1964, Turkey once more 
realized that its defense capability was extremely vulnerable 
to external manipulation. From the viewpoint of the Turkish 
public, Turkey was being punished by the United States, its 
chief ally, for having intervened in Cyprus to protect its 
national interests.  Furthermore, in persuading Congress to 
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impose the arms embargo, the Greek lobby in the United States 
had played an important role, creating serious doubts in 
Turkey about the extent of reliance that could be placed on 
the United States, where legislative body decisions were 
highly affected by pressure from the special interest groups. 
In response to the arms embargo, Turkey, in July 1975, 
abrogated the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement between two 
countries and announced that it would take the control of all 
American bases, mostly intelligence and communications 
facilities, on its soil with the exception of NATO bases. [Ref 
9:p. 8] . 
3. Change In NATO's Strategy 
NATO's initial forward strategy of September 1950—to 
defend as far east as possible—was replaced by the strategy 
of "massive retaliation" in 1954. In the rest of 1950s and for 
much of the 1960s, NATO was protected, in the words of Henry 
Kissinger, "by a preponderance in American strategic striking 
power which was capable of disarming the Soviet Union, and by 
a vast American superiority in theater nuclear forces ." [Ref 
18:p.5] 
With the attainment of strategic parity by the Soviet 
Union, which built up their own nuclear strike capability in 
the late 1960s, the strategy of "massive retaliation" lost 
ground as a credible deterrent against the Soviet Union. Thus, 
the most immediate concern for the Kennedy administration was 
the formulation of credible strategic doctrine to replace the 
doctrine of "massive retaliation." The doctrine of "flexible 
response and forward defense," presented by General Maxwell 
Taylor in 1959, was adopted as the new doctrine of NATO in 
1967 after France, which rejected the implied risk of 
incalculable nuclear escalation, had left NATO's military 
structure. [Ref 19:p. 23] 
"Flexible response and forward defense" sought above all 
to deter any possible attack ranging from minor incursions to 
all-out  nuclear war and provided a range of appropriate 
28 
pose  s bargo,  ree     unit  st t  
 l   portant l , r t  r s ubts  
ur  ut  t t f a  t l   l   
 u it  s t s, here i l t   eci s ere 
i l    r r  o   ecial t r st r ps. 
 s    s bargo, urkey,  l  75, 
r at    efe s  ooperati  gre ent   
untri    t  oul    ntr l f ll 
meric  ases, ostl  lige   municati ns 
ili ,  il it  pti  f ases. ef 
: . ] . 
. hange  TO'  s  
TO's i l ate  f t ber --t  
st ble-- as  a e  
f assi io 4. t f s 
uc f 0s, as r t t , or s f enr  
issi er, r eri ik n
er hi as l ar viet ni n,
st eri eri ri t cl r f
: . ]
wit tainm t ri viet
ni n, hi ilt i cl r ik abili
0s, rateg assi a io t
 i t t i st vi t u i . us,
ost ediat e inistr t as
ul t i r e ct
t assi io ct e
esp orw , eneral axwell
l , a t t  
, hi e e l s
n l l t , TO' ili
ru . : .
i esp orw t
o tac an n rom i n o
l-o l  an r ri
responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of 
aggression with the ultimate deterrent of mutually assured 
destruction inherent in the devastating second-strike 
capability of either side. [Ref 19:p. 23] The military 
planning for this new doctrine implied that conventional 
capability of all NATO states would have to be strengthened in 
order to frustrate conventional aggression by Warsaw Pact and 
to increase length of time before nuclear weapons would have 
to be used. 
In Turkey, these developments contributed to a concern 
that NATO would not atomically launch an attack in "massive 
retaliation" in the event of a Soviet aggression against 
Turkey and Turkish territory might be traded for time since 
NATO would favor its Central Front over its flanks. [Ref 
8:p.218] Meanwhile, the new doctrine underlined Turkey's 
need for a mobile and modern military with increased 
conventional capability, only possible with increased American 
military aid. However, with the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and 
other crises in Laos and South Vietnam, NATO's attention had 
shifted from the Southern Flank to the Central Front and 
Southeast Asia in the early 1960s. Thus, military aid to 
Turkey was increasingly viewed as burdensome especially in the 
aftermath of the detoriation of relations between Turkey and 
the United States due to the Cyprus crisis of 1964, leaving 
modernization requirements of the Turkish armed forces 
unfulfilled. [Ref ll:p.l9] 
4. The Result Of These Developments 
During late 1940s and 1950s, Turkish policy makers felt 
highly confident with the security provided by NATO and 
established close relations with the United States. The Soviet 
threat, during this period, represented the exclusive concern 
that Turkish strategy was designed to contain. Relations with 
the Middle East and other Third World countries were 
approached from the unidimensional perspective of East-West 
tension.[Ref 4:p. 296] 
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With the developments described above, Turkish policy 
makers felt compelled to produce new perspectives to security 
and to take a far greater account of regional considerations. 
Extensive reliance on NATO and the United States especially 
was no longer realistic and could be dangerous for Turkey. The 
highly liberal constitution of 1961 had allowed for the 
expression and organization of all kinds of ideas and 
ideologies, and the consensus on foreign policy had given way 
to a heated debate on Turkey's future orientation. Meanwhile, 
considerable state intervention and protectionist import- 
substituting policies of the formative years of the republic 
had pushed the Turkish economy into a deep recession, 
struggling with balance of payment deficits, unemployment and 
rising inflation especially in the second half of 1970s which 
witnessed two oil crisis. For Turkey it would be more secure 
also economically to find alternative sources of cooperation 
and to diversify connections of its economy. Thus, the 1960s 
and 1970s witnessed the reorientation of Turkish foreign 
policy toward the Soviet Union and the Middle East. The milder 
climate of "detente" in East-West relations allowed Turkey to 
normalize its relations with the Soviet Union, to develop 
political and economic relations with the Middle East, and to 
pursue a more self-oriented foreign policy, all of which had 
not been possible in the early years of the Cold War era. 
The policy of rapprochement initiated by Turkey toward the 
Soviet Union led to a visit to Ankara by the Soviet 
President Nikolai Podgorni in January 1965. In a speech to 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly, he acknowledged that 
Stalin's claims to the straits area and Turkish territory 
was "incorrect and inappropriate" and had served no purpose 
other than casting shadow over Turko-Soviet relations.[Ref 
8:p. 219] Following the visit of Turkish Prime Minister 
Suleyman Demirel to Moscow in 1967, relations between the two 
countries steadily improved especially in the economic field 
and the Soviet Union became the major supplier of technology 
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and investment funds to Turkey. In 1967 the Soviet Union 
agreed to help finance six major industrial projects in 
Turkey. While loan agreements from 1967 to 1975 totalled 
around $700 million, a protocol of 1979 announced agreement on 
Soviet technology and further credits for 20 projects in 
Turkey at an amount of $4 billion, making Turkey one of the 
major recipients of the Soviet credits made available to 
developing countries. [Ref 5:p.32] 
Restoration of confidence between two countries, which 
began with the transfer of technology and investment funds, 
was necessary also from the Soviets' viewpoint. Turkish 
membership in NATO had complicated Soviet defenses and 
strategy by exposing large regions in the Soviet Union to 
Western monitoring in times of peace and to Western arms in 
times of arms. [Ref 4:p. 291] The Soviets hoped that as result 
of improved bilateral relations Turkey would no longer allow 
its soil to be used as a launching base for strategic weapons 
and would limit the number of American military personnel and 
bases in Turkey. Technology transfer and economic aid would 
also reduce Turkey's dependence on the West and help alleviate 
the "Fear of the Bear" which has overshadowed Turkish foreign 
policy during the entire existence of the republic. Ultimate 
objective of the improved bilateral relations, from the Soviet 
Union's viewpoint, was, as Khrushchev put it, Turkish 
neutrality. 
Although the normalization process initiated by President 
Podgorni's visit to Turkey in 1965 led the two countries to 
sign, in June 1978, the political document on The Principles 
of Good Neighbourly and Friendly Cooperation during Premier 
Ecevit's visit to Moscow, Turkey's relationship with the 
Soviet Union has never culminated in a political-military 
rapprochement incompatible with Turkey's western orientation 
and its NATO membership. Thus, the political document that the 
two countries signed in 1978, was far from being a non- 
aggression pact and was confined to a reiteration of the 
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principles of the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), while stating that 
it did not affect the rights and obligations of the parties 
under other agreements. [Ref 5:p.33] 
Turkey's attempt to establishing friendly relationship 
with the countries of the Middle East was not an easy task as 
it was in the case of the Soviet Union. First of all, since 
the foundation of the republic, Turkey had pursued a Western 
oriented policy. Ataturk's reform program which aimed at the 
westernization of Turkey and his attack on Islam as an 
obstacle to these reforms caused Turkey and Arabs to drift 
apart. Secondly, the main concern for Turkey was the Soviet 
Union and the threat of communism. Through its membership in 
NATO, Turkey had opted for alliance with West to fight this 
enemy. However, most of the Arab countries' main concern and 
occupation was the struggle against Israel and the West. 
Finally, memories of the many Middle Eastern states were 
dominated by misgiving or hostility against Turkey due to the 
Ottoman past. In this uneasy environment, Turkey tried to 
improve its bilateral relations with the countries of the 
region mainly by distancing its foreign policy from that of 
the United States and by changing its stand on Arab-Israeli 
conflict while strictly adhering to the principle of non- 
interference in the domestic politics and interstate conflicts 
of the countries of the region. 
First, during the Six-Day Arab Israeli War of June 1967 
Turkey tried to reflect changes in its foreign policy toward 
the region. In 1958, Turkey had allowed the United States to 
use Incirlik airbase in Turkey for intervention in Lebanon. 
However, this time Ankara did not allow the United States to 
use the American bases on its soil for refueling and providing 
logistic support for Israel. Turkey's refusal of granting the 
United States use of the bases was an attempt by Turkey to 
consolidate its position with respect to Cyprus by not siding 
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with the West and thus by pulling Arab and other Muslim 
countries on its side, especially in the UN General Assembly. 
In the aftermath of the war, the balance of influence in 
the region shifted from the radicalism of Nasser to the 
wealthy and pro-Western patriarchates of the Arab world. [Ref 
10:p. 122] This change further eased the tensions between the 
Arab states and Turkey. During the October War of 1973, while 
Soviet overflights of Turkish airspace were being tolerated, 
Ankara again refused to allow American use of Turkish basis to 
resupply Israel. 
The second Cyprus crisis of 1974 which resulted in 
Turkey's intervention on the island and the ensuing American 
arms embargo against Turkey, consolidated Turkish policy 
makers1 decision to further relations with the Muslim world. 
Following Turkey's intervention on the island, Turkish 
Cypriots, seeking to establish a bicommunal, bizonal federal 
system for the island, had proclaimed the establishment of the 
Turkish Federal State of Cyprus in 1975. [Ref 16:p.ll3] 
However, Greek Cypriots, objecting to the concept of bizonal 
federation, had secured many resolutions at the UN and at 
conferences of the non-aligned countries calling for the 
departure of Turkish forces from the island and urging for 
return to the pre-1974 status quo in Cyprus. In the same year, 
Ankara, realizing that it would be possible only in Islamic 
forums to secure pro-Turkish resolutions and the 
representation of the Turkish Federal State of Cyprus, decided 
to upgrade its membership in the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) in order to play a more active role. [Ref 
20:p. 76] Ankara also established bilateral relations with the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) early in 1975. The OCI 
subsequently invited the President of the Turkish Federal 
State of Cyprus, Rauf Denktas, to its meeting to provide 
information on the Cyprus issue, and gave the Turkish Federal 
State of Cyprus observer status. Following these developments, 
Turkey voted in the UN General Assembly for the resolution 
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declaring Zionism a form of racism on November 10, 1975. [Ref 
20:p. 80] At the seventh meeting of the OIC, held in 1976 in 
Istanbul, Turkey also allowed the PLO to set up an office 
in Ankara. 
For Turkey, with the sharp increases in oil prices in 
1973-1974 and again in 1979, the development of economic 
relations with the countries of the Middle East became as 
important as gaining their support with respect to the Cyprus 
problem. Recession in Europe due to the oil crisis of 1973- 
1974 had caused sharp reduction in the amount of remittances 
originating from the Turkish workers there, and the total cost 
of Turkey's oil bill had risen from $124 in 1972 to $1.2 
billion in 1977. [Ref 8:p. 222] As a result of these 
developments, in the second half of the 1970s, the Turkish 
economy found itself in an economic crisis, struggling with 
severe balance of payment difficulties coupled with rising 
inflation. The American arms embargo was also exerting severe 
pressure on the foreign exchange reserves of Turkey. With the 
second sharp rise in the oil prices after the fall Shah 
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, inflation and unemployment 
rates in Turkey soared. Turkey, desperately seeking affordable 
oil and foreign capital, was compelled to turn to the Middle 
East countries as alternative sources of economic cooperation. 
The main objectives for Turkey were to secure oil, if possible 
on easy payment terms, to attract booming petrodollars of 
oil exporting countries for investment projects in Turkey to 
fight unemployment at home, and to increase exports to the 
Middle East in order to improve Turkey^ balance of payment 
difficulties. [Ref 5:p. 37] While Turkish construction firms 
began undertaking various construction projects in the region, 
manufacturers of consumption goods reoriented their marketing 
efforts toward the Middle East for export opportunities, 
resulting in an unprecedented export boom in the early 1980s 
by both international and domestic standards. It was also 
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during this period, a 1,000 kilometer oil pipeline was put 
into operation between Mosul in Iraq and Iskenderun in Turkey. 
As it is seen, Turkey's isolation in the international 
forums because of its stand on the Cyprus problem and the 
deterioration of the conditions of its economy had compelled 
it to develop its political and economic interactions with the 
Middle Eastern countries and this, in turn, had paved the way 
for a greater political pressure on Turkey exerted by the 
countries of the region. Turkey responded to these pressures 
positively, but only to the extent required for the protection 
of its national interests. In other words, like in the case of 
process of normalization of relations between Turkey and the 
Soviet Union, the self-oriented and more autonomous policy 
that Turkey pursued toward the Middle East in the 1960s and 
1970s did not aim at shifting Turkey's pro-Western orientation 
but rather to enhance its security by increasing political 
interaction with the countries of the region, and to find 
alternative sources of economic cooperation when the West was 
not willing to provide this security and cooperation to 
Turkey. 
The developments that took place in the Near East during 
the late 1970s again focused the attention of the United 
States on Turkey. With the Iranian Islamic Revolution that led 
to the fall of Shah Pahlavi in 1979, an anti-American 
government had come to the power in Iran and American 
intelligence facilities, critical for monitoring the southern 
regions of the Soviet Union, were forced to be closed. At the 
same time, negotiations were taking place on the Strategic 
Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT II) and these Iranian sites 
were going to be used to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT 
I and the pending SALT II agreements. [Ref 5:p. 21] Following 
the fall of the Shah, the United States turned to Turkey for 
the use of American bases on Turkish soil for this purpose and 
pressed the Turkish government to allow U-2 spy planes to 
overfly  the  Soviet  territory  from  Turkish  bases. 
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Disintegration of CENTO upon withdrawal of Iran and then 
Pakistan and Turkey, in March 1979 and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979 put pressure on both countries to 
renew the Defense Cooperation Agreement which was abrogated by 
the Turkish government in 1975 upon imposition of the American 
arms embargo against Turkey. 
On March 29, 1980, Turkey and the United States signed the 
Defense-Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) authorizing the 
United States to participate in joint defense measures at 
specified Turkish armed forces installations. The DECA also 
specified the activities that the American forces would be 
allowed to carry out, and allowed the United States to 
modernize these installations to compensate for the neglect of 
the 1970s and the loss of intelligence facilities in Iran. 
[Ref 9:p. 8] 
For the rest of the 1980s, at least until the late 1980s 
which witnessed the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, 
Turkey's main occupation was the implementation of structural 
changes in the country's economic and political systems, which 
had collapsed in an environment of social unrest, terrorism, 
economic crisis and political instability. 
E.  1980s:  STRUCTURAL  CHANGES  IN  TURKEY'S  ECONOMIC  AND 
POLITICAL  SYSTEMS 
Between 1974 and 1980, Turkish society experienced what 
was perhaps its worst crisis since the War of Independence. 
The institutional framework instituted by the relatively 
liberal constitution of 1961, along with fragmented party 
system, had created a political disorder and the effects of 
sharp increase in the oil prices in 1974 had been felt in the 
form of reduced remittances from Turkish workers working 
abroad, problems in marketing Turkish exports in recession-r 
bound Europe, and an oil bill at an amount higher than 
Turkey's total exports. Turkey resorted to short term 
borrowing through the OECD and the International Monetary Fund 
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(IMF) which put the country, in the following years, into an 
international debt crisis. With the second increase in the oil 
prices in 1979, inflation gathered momentum and reached an 
unprecedented triple-digit rate in 1980, while unemployment 
rate soared to 14.8 percent. [Ref 21:p. 44] 
Unstable coalition governments rapidly succeeded one 
another while failing to address the country's pressing 
social, economic and political problems. Between 1973 and 1980 
eight governments assumed office and only five of these 
governments represented majorities in the Grand National 
Assembly while the other three governments were "national 
unity, above-party" governments; technocratic governments of 
civil servants, diplomats and professors selected to overcome 
parliamentary deadlocks and to supervise general elections. 
[Ref 6:p. 70-71] Economic crisis and political instability 
created an environment conductive to terrorism which in turn, 
served to undermine the economic reform attempts of 
governments that came to power. Stabilizing and adjustment 
programs introduced on 24 January 1980, under the 
recommendations of the IMF and the OECD, to curb inflation 
and alleviate balance of payment difficulties were undermined 
by the opposition of labor unions and the ensuing sharp drop 
in industrial production. As political life became 
increasingly tense, political groups kept on fighting each 
other and carried out terrorist attacks against the 
representatives of the established order and opposing groups. 
The coalition governments, too weak to maintain order, stood 
by while the country was being pulled into conditions 
resembling civil war. 
On September 6, 1980 in a massive rally at Konya, 
organized as a "Day of Liberating Jerusalem" by the National 
Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan, religious 
fundamentalists demanded the reestablishment of Islamic law 
(Sharia) in Turkey, the severing of ties with the West and 
showed disrespect for the Turkish flag and the national 
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anthem. These acts were regarded as an open renunciation of 
Kemalism and a direct challenge to the military. The 
military's perception of a growing threat of fundamentalism 
and anti-Westernism, helped precipitate the military coup. [Ref 
22:p. 81] During the night of September 11-12, Turkish armed 
forces seized the control of the country. There was no 
organized resistance to the coup and most of the population 
welcomed it as the only alternative to anarchy. On September 
12, 1980 General Kenan Evren, Chief of the Turkish General 
Staff, explained to the Turkish public that military takeover 
was a response to the terror and anarchy that had claimed 
5,241 dead and 14,152 injured during the preceding two years, 
and aimed at restructuring Turkish politics to strengthen the 
state.[Ref 22:p. 68] 
The military junta confirmed the Turkish commitment to the 
Western alliance and to the economic stabilization program 
announced inJanuary 1980. However, the restoration of 
political stability and order in the country was its main 
priority. Immediately after taking the power, the commanders 
of the armed forces formed the National Security Council 
(NSC), headed by General Evren, and dissolved both the 
government and the parliament. The NSC banned all political 
activity, extended martial law throughout the country and took 
severe measures to disable Marxist-Leninist, fascist and 
religious fundamentalist militants that turned the country 
into a battleground in their struggle to establish their own 
"liberated zones" closed off to other ideological factions and 
state security forces. Between September 12, 1980 and February 
1983, 60,841 persons, suspected of terrorism and illegal 
political activity, were arrested. [Ref 22:p. 88] Meanwhile, 
West European governments appealed to the military regime to 
restore parliamentary rule and in the face of severe 
criticism, Turkey withdrew from the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe. The OECD withheld a portion of the 
relief package for Turkey, the European Economic Community 
38 
. hes  t  er      nciat  f 
e ali   i t l    ilit r . he 
ilit r ' r t  f i  t f ental s
t - est , l r ci it t   ilit  p. ef 
: . ] uri  i t f t ber - 2, urki   
 ntr l f  ntr . her  as  
i  a   ost f  pulat  
el e  l  t   r y. t ber 
,  eneral ena vren, hief f  . urkis  eneral 
t ff, l ur i  bli  t ili r
as ~ t im  
,  r i  ars,
t ur i  lit  ren  
 [ ef : . ]
ili t  rm  ur i  it ent 
west ian i  i o  a  
0. owever, o f
lit l il r t as ai
ri ri . ediatel er, anders
rm ati al curit ouncil
), h eneral vren, t
ent r a ent. ll lit l
t i , arti l a o t t
easur l arxist- eninist, i t
igio entalist ili t t cc t
 legrou i ru l l i
ib r l i l o
ri . t ber , r
, ·, s, t rorism le l
lit l t i , er . f : . ] eanwhile,
est r ent l ili e im
iam t
ticism, r i ew rom r ia t s bl
ouncil r e. it l  rt
r , r i munit
(EEC) froze relations with Ankara and suspended financial 
assistance to Turkey. 
At the time of the coup, European Community (EC)-Turkish 
relations had already entered into a period of strain due to 
the massive migration of Turkish workers to Europe following 
the EC-Turkish Association Agreement of 1963. The relations 
were further strained by Turkey's decision in 1978 to freeze 
the terms of the Association Agreement and stop reducing 
tarriffs on EEC goods in the face of strong opposition of 
Turkish industrialists. Furthermore, geopolitical 
considerations, which had dominated European attitudes to 
Turkey at the height of the Cold War, had begun to lose their 
importance to Europe in 1970s as Europe began to prioritize 
the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy issue. [Ref 
23 :p. 31] Thus, the 1980 military intervention further 
complicated the EC-Turkish relations, adding a political 
dimension to the souring economic relations. While relations 
with European countries were undergoing a period of strain, 
the United States provided uncritical support and played a 
primary role in the economic assistance program established 
by the IMF and the World Bank. 
The NSC, after restoring public order, focused its 
attention on improving the overall economic situation. It 
combined the economic stabilization measures with reforms of 
trade liberalization and export promotion. These policies 
marked a radical break with the inward-looking, import- 
substituting strategies and the beginning of a export-led 
growth based on a industrial economy. While the West European 
states were continuing to restrict Turkish imports and to 
criticize its human rights record, Turkey again turned on the 
Middle East. 
Exports to the Middle East soared as Turkey took advantage 
of the Islamic revolution, which cut off Iran from its major 
suppliers, the Iran-Iraq war which led both countries to 
demand more Turkish products in terms of both quantity and 
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will based on its Islamic identity. [Ref 22:p. 109] Between 
1980 and 1983, Turkey's total exports rapidly rose from $2.9 
billion to $5.8 billion. During the same period, the share of 
the European Community countries in Turkey's total exports 
dropped from 44.7 percent to 31.4 percent while that of the 
Islamic countries increased from 22.5 percent in 1980 to 48.2 
percent in 1983. [Ref 23:p. 136-137] Turkish construction 
activity in the Middle East boomed, going from $4 billion in 
1979 to $12 billion in 1981 and rising to $14 billion in 1983. 
[Ref 22:p. 109] By the end of 1982, the number of workers and 
technicians working in the region reached approximately 
250,000. [Ref 8:p. 226] 
After overcoming the most pressing economic problems, the 
NSC supervised the drafting of a new constitution and 
electoral laws designed to eliminate the perceived defects of 
Turkey's fragmented political system and the constitution of 
1961 by limiting the role of smaller parties and 
strengthening the power of President, Prime Minister and the 
party that won the majority in parliamentary elections. The 
new constitution was put into public referendum on 7 November 
1982 and approved by more than 91 percent of the votes. Having 
established a new political framework, the NSC gradually 
relaxed restrictions on political life and following the 
general elections held in November 1983, civilian government 
was restored again. 
European-Turkish relations improved following the 
transition to democratic rule with the 1983 general elections. 
Although there was considerable concern in Western Europe over 
the status of civil rights in Turkey, early in 1984 the 
Council of Europe voted to readmit the Turkish parliamentary 
delegation to its Parliamentary Assembly and in November 1986, 
Turkey began a six month presidency of the Council of Europe. 
[Ref l:p. 292] In September 1986, the EEC-Turkey Association 
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Council held its first meeting since the 1980 military- 
intervention. 
Meanwhile, Turkey's exports to the Middle East, which 
boomed between 1980 and 1982, severely suffered mainly from 
the prolonged Iran-Iraq war as these countries' oil revenues 
declined. Within a few years Turkish construction firms 
understood the impossibility of making long term business 
planning in the face of political instability of the region. 
Turkey, realizing the importance of access to stable markets 
for its drive toward an industrial economy and export-led 
growth, turned to the more stable and thus reliable European 
markets. The share of the EC countries in Turkey's total 
exports increased from 31.4 percent in 1982 to 43.8 percent in 
1986 while that of the Islamic countries decreased from 48.2 
percent to 35.0 percent during the same period. [Ref 23:p. 
136-137] In the subsequent years, Turgut Ozal and his 
administration, that came to power in the 1983 elections, 
regarded full membership in the EC as one the most important 
foreign policy objectives, leading to Turkey's official 
application, on April 14, 1987, to the EC for full membership. 
Turkey's application for membership in the EC was not 
simply a logical consequence of Turkey's Western orientation. 
First of all, with the EC's "Southern Enlargement", Greece had 
become a member in 1981 and this was followed by the full 
membership of Spain and Portugal in 1986. The accession of 
these three countries whose export products are similar to 
that of Türkey, created trade difficulties for Turkey because 
of the quotas imposed on Turkish exports by the EC. Following 
its membership in the EC, the opposition of Greece to Turkey's 
integration with the EC also became increasingly effective. 
Greece did not only obtain a competitive advantage over Turkey 
by receiving funds through the Community's regional and social 
policies, but also blocked the release of assistance funds 
allocated to Turkey by the Community. [Ref 23:p.35] While in 
1970s Turkish industrialists and governmental institutions 
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were divided over membership issue, with the developments 
mentioned above, both policy makers and industrialists viewed 
the full membership in the EC as a source that would provide 
an inflow of foreign funds into the country and new export 
opportunities to Europe. 
Second, Turkey's increased economic interaction with the 
countries of the Middle East during the 1970s and early 1980s, 
and subsequent reorientation of Turkish foreign policy toward 
greater political cooperation with Arab and other Muslim 
countries, had not only resulted in the greater visibility of 
Islam in Turkish politics, but also strained its relations 
with West, its traditional ally. These relations were further 
strained due to the 1980 military coup and the issues of 
restoration of democracy and human rights, contributing to 
Turkey's drift from the mainstream of European political and 
economic processes. On the other hand, Greece had obtained 
advantage over Turkey in furthering its policies in Cyprus by 
being inside the EC. [Ref 23 :p. 35] Close economic and 
political association with the Middle East and isolation of 
Turkey from the West were greeted with an increasingly 
greater concern by the country's secularist intelligentsia, 
adding an impetus to the application for membership which was 
expected to bring back the political respectibility of Turkey 
and strenght Turkey's commitment to Westernization against the 
rising potential of Islam in domestic politics. 
Third, geopolitical consideration which had dominated 
European attitudes toward Turkey during 1950s and 1960s had 
gradually lost their importance as Europe began prioritizing 
the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy issue, and 
distancing itself from the United States. [Ref 23:p. 31] 
Although this fact was apprehended by many Turkish policy 
makers, and it was argued that extensive reliance on the 
United States without developing political relations with 
Europeans, could leave Turkey out in the cold when bipolarity 
ended, Turkey's strategic position had, once more, compelled 
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it to establish close relations with the United States in 
early 1980s in the aftermath of events in Iran and 
Afgahanistan. While Greece, Spain and Portugal were adopting 
multidimensional foreign policies and placing greater emphasis 
on their relations with Brussels, Turkey's rapproachment with 
the United States was signaling its marginalization in Europe, 
and application for membership was an attempt by Turkey to 
pull back the country into European mainstream. 
Finally, with the "Southern Enlargement" of 1980s, the 
pace of economic an political integration of the EC had 
considerably slowed down and the Community, in an attempt to 
create a more integrated structure, speed up the integration 
process and protect its competitive edge over the United 
States and Japan, had adopted the Single European Act in 
1986. The Single European Act, with which the EC countries 
accepted creation of a common market within Europe by the end 
of 1992, helped Turkey realize that it had to hurry in order 
to catch the train and apply for membership as soon as 
possible despite the heavy pressure exerted by the governments 
of the EC countries, urging Ankara to delay its application 
until well into the 1990s. 
It took the Commission of the European Community more 
than two and a half years to prepare its "Opinion Report" on 
Turkey's request for accession to the Community. In its report 
dated 20 December 1989, the Commission concluded that: 
. . . it would be inappropriate for the Community - 
which is itself undergoing major changes while the 
whole of Europe is in a state of flux- to become 
involved in new accession negotiations at this stage. 
Furthermore, the political and economic situationin 
Turkey leads the Commission to believe that it would 
not be useful to open accession negotiations with 
Turkey straight away. [Ref 24:p. 8] 
The EC's rejection of Turkish application for membership 
occurred at almost exactly the same time with the withdrawal 
43 
t t  st li  l s  l t s it  t  unit  tat s i  
arl  80s i  t  f at  f ents i  I  d 
fgahanistan. hile reece, pai   ort gal ere opti  
ulti i ensional  oli i s  l i  reater phasis 
 ir l  it  ru sels, urkey's r ent it  
 unit  t t s as l   arginalizati   urope, 
 pli t  r embership as  t e pt  ur e  t  
ull   ntr  t  ur ea  ainstr . 
i a l , it   ut er  nl ent" f 80s,  
 f ic  oliti l r t  f   
si r l  o     o munity,   e pt  
t  ore  t re,    t  
r ss  r t ct  peti    er  nit  
t t   ,  t   i l  ur  ct  
6.  i l  r  ct, it  hi   untri  
t t  f o arket it i  ur     
f 2, r l t r r 
l embershi   
ssi l s it r ents
ntri s, nkar l li t
til ell 0s.
o mi si r munit or
 l r r pi i eport
r ey' st munity. rt
e ber , mi si t:
. • • oul n r pri t munit
hi ts aj r hil
ol  lu o
n v o oti o .
r ore, h li i tu io
lea h missi e l
t o o ti o i
raig . [ : .
' e io r i l io e bers i
lm st t th sam tim i h i l
 
of the Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev, from the 
military and ideological competition with the West and the 
consequent demise of the Cold War. 
Against this background, Turkey entered into the 1990s 
that witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end 
of bipolar world, compelling Turkey to take a look at 
assumptions and calculations on which its foreign and security 
policies had been based since World War II. 
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III.  TURKEY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
With the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) 
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the once massive 
communist threat of the Cold War era vanished. However, the 
end of the Cold War and the uncertainties caused by the 
passing away of the bipolarity created a completely new 
security environment. The initial optimism for a more peaceful 
international order and hopes for lasting peace guickly proved 
to be short-lived as conflicts and wars broke out even in the 
center of Europe. 
Turkey has been one of those countries that has been 
deeply affected by the sweeping changes that the passing away 
of the Cold War and bipolarity have introduced into 
international relations. In this new security environment, it 
can be said that Turkey is a unique country in NATO because no 
other ally is surrounded by three of the word's unstable and 
conflict-ridden regions at the same time: i.e., the Balkans, 
the Transcaucasus and the Middle East. 
The Gulf War of 1990-1991, during which Turkey departed 
from its traditional policy of non-involvement in the inter- 
Arab conflicts, brought the danger of war immediately to 
Turkey's doorstep, while no other NATO ally faced the threat 
so frontally. Turkey was a frontline state during the war as 
it took a firm stance on the side of the allied coalition 
against Iraq in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM; It swiftly 
moved to implement the UN sanctions by shutting off the oil 
pipeline that carried Iraqi oil into the Mediterranean, 
consented to the use of the Incirlik Airbase by the United 
States Air Force to carry out bombing sorties into Iraq, and 
as a part of coalition strategy in the war, deployed 100,000 
troops along the border with Iraq, diverting a substantial 
amount of Iraqi forces to the north. 
Turkey continues to provide bases for the enforcement of 
the 'no-fly' zone over northern Iraq (Operation POISED HAMMER) 
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and to enforce economic sanctions against Baghdad. Today, the 
highly armed and authoritarian regimes of Iran, Iraq and 
Syria, which have been long disturbed by Turkey's traditional 
pro-Western orientation and its democratic, secular regime, 
also look on Turkey as a Trojan Horse which serves the United 
States and NATO in the establishment of a permanent Western 
presence in the region. 
In the east, although the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union has removed the threat of a massive Soviet invasion of 
Turkey, the newly independent republics in the Transcaucasus 
region—Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan—represent 
considerable instability on Turkey's eastern borders. In an 
attempt to end the Armeno-Azerbaijani war over the Nagorno- 
Karabakh region, Turkey has participated in the mediation 
process which began in 1992 under the auspices of the Minsk 
Group of CSCE, and then tried a trilateral political solution 
together with the Russian Federation and the United States, 
without any positive result toward the settlement of the 
conflict. Following the failure of the CSCE process and 
tripartite mediation efforts, Iran has been involved in the 
mediation process and its involvement has been supported by 
Russia as a counterweight to Turkey. Today, Russia and Iran, 
on one side, Turkey and Azerbaijan, on the other side, have 
been engaged in a deadlocked and very dangerous rivalry over 
the mediation process. 
Apart from the war between Armenians and Azerbaijan over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, there is a hidden regional conflict between 
Turkey's drive to build a zone of influence that will keep 
Russia away from Turkey's borders, and Russia's determination 
not to pull out from the Transcaucasus. Russia has 
successfully exploited the instability in the region and with 
overt and sometimes covert efforts has forced Georgia and 
Azerbaijan to join the CIS, and has secured agreements with 
Armenia and Georgia that allow Russia to maintain military 
basis in these countries. 
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In the Balkans, the fate of the Muslim population of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina and the territorial integrity of this 
country have been a source of grave concern for Turkey in the 
face of increasing Serb aggression. Turkey has been 
constrained from direct intervention in the Balkans in support 
of the Muslim population in Bosnia-Hercegovina, for this kind 
of involvement would irreparably set back Turkey's integration 
with Europe and severely damage its relations with Washington, 
but it has stated on various occasions that it would not 
accept any forcible changes to the borders of Bosnia- 
Hercegovina. 
In case the aggression by Serbs spreads to the Kosovo 
region of Serbia, where 90 percent of population is ethnic 
Albanian and Muslim, or to Macedonia which has large Muslim 
population as well as a considerably large Albanian minority, 
the entire Balkan Peninsula may find itself in a conflict 
which may quickly escalate to a region-wide war. Greece, 
Bulgaria and Albania may feel compelled to become directly 
involved in the conflict in order to protect their national 
interests and this may result in Turkey's direct involvement 
in support of the ethnic Turks and Muslims living in the 
region. 
The Turkish Ministry of National Defense, in its 
unclassified study of post-Cold War security issues, has 
defined this new security environment and possible sources of 
threats as follows; 
. . . The threat and risks to which Turkey is exposed 
in other words which directed to the security of 
Turkey, which is not a flank country within NATO any 
more but instead a front country, are now quite 
different than those of past. These are not only the 
military powers of the countries that would be 
potential threat as happened before but also contain 
political, economical, and social instabilities, 
social class disputes, religious, national and ethnic 
clashes, power and authority struggles in country and 
region, and religious fanatism and terrorism in these 
countries. 
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On the other hand, because her geopolitical and 
geostrategic location places Turkey in the 
neighborhood of the most unstable, uncertain and 
unpredictable region of the world, she has turned into 
a frontline state faced with multiple fronts. It is at 
all times possible for the crisis and conflicts in 
these regions to spread to and engulf Turkey. [Ref 
27:p. 23] 
Turkey has attempted to adjust to this new external 
environment and the changes that the end of the Cold War 
introduced into international relations by pursuing two 
complementary objectives. Turkey's first objective has been to 
preserve and further strengthen the old ties and relationships 
that it built during the Cold War years with the West. With 
the above-mentioned dramatic changes, Turkey's security and 
foreign policies have also evolved to take a far greater 
account of regional consideration and, thus, Turkey's second 
objective has been to limit the damage that regional conflicts 
might eventually inflict on its own domestic stability and 
welfare. In the pursuit of this objective, Turkey has 
undertaken broadly linked political, cultural and economic 
initiatives to spread Turkish influence and win many points of 
influence or leverage in the conflict-ridden regions 
stretching from eastern and southern Europe through the Black 
Sea region to Central Asia. 
The ability of Turkey to continue to pursue these 
objectives and achieve them does not depend only on external 
factors such as the evolution of the American and Western 
Europeans policies toward Turkey, but also on domestic factors 
such as the continuation of the ability of Turkey's mainstream 
secular parties, which have governed the country since the 
foundation of the republic, to mobilize the Turkish society 
along the Western ideas and ideals. Therefore it also 
necessary to analyze the domestic factors to understand the 
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compatibilities and incompatibilities between Turkey's policy 
options and the country's internal environment. 
Following a series of economic stabilization measures and 
reforms of trade liberalization, initiated in 1980, Turkish 
economy throughout the 1980s has performed impressively in 
many respect. However, economic growth of 1980s has been 
accompanied by structural difficulties that the stabilization 
measures and reforms of liberalization remained far from 
finding a long-term solution. Among the main structural 
weaknesses of the Turkish economy are the persistent high rate 
of inflation, the level of state indebtedness, a substantial 
budget deficit which largely stems from the financial burden 
of the unprofitable State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). As a 
result of these structural difficulties, combined with the 
adverse effects of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the economic 
condition of Turkey began deteriorating in the early 1990s, 
resulting in the announcement, in April 1994, of the harshest 
austerity measures in the history of the country. Wage 
earners, in both public and private sectors, with their 
families have constituted the part of the Turkish society that 
the austerity measures hit in the worst manner, exacerbating 
the existing wild income differences within Turkish society 
and thus fuelling the social unrest. Apart from equity, 
welfare, and domestic stability implications of this state of 
affairs, Turkey's inability to eliminate these structural 
difficulties and put its economy on a stable track that will 
narrow the socio-economic disparities between Turkey and other 
Western countries has also become an important impediment to 
Turkey's membership in the EU. 
Turkey's deteriorating economic condition and the social 
unrest that it brought about have also played into the hands 
of Islamic forces which pose the greatest threat to Turkey's 
pro-Western orientation. The Islamist Welfare Party (WP) , 
which has traditionally addressed itself to the petty 
bourgeoisie of small Anatolian towns disrupted by rapid 
49 
ompatibilities a d i ompatibilities bet een urkey's poli  
pti s a d t  ountry's i t r al envir ent. 
oll i  a ri s f ic t il t  easures a d 
r s f t  l r li ti n, i it  i  980, urkis  
y t out t  80s as er ed i pre si el  i  
any ect. owever, ic r t  f 80s as ee  
panie   t t ral iffi lti  t at t  t il t  
easures  s f l  r ai  r o  
 -  l ti . ong t  ai  t t ral 
eaknesses f  urki   r   ersist t i  t  
f fl t ,  el f t  t ne s, Ubstantial 
dget eficit hi  l  e s o   ci l r  
f  profit l  s  c ic nterpri s Es). s 
lt f  t r l i lti s, bi e  it   
er t  f -  ulf ar,  i  
dit  f r   t r    r  90s, 
l n c ent, pril 4, f r est
st ri easur s i f ntr . age
ers, t bli t t rs, i i
il sti rt r i i t
st ri easur i orst anner, r at
i n il nco fere it r i i
h in i l rest. part rom it ,
elf r , esti i pli t
i , r ey' il imi t r l
l t conom  a rac ill
row h io-econo i ri w
est tr s co ort t m e t
r ' e bers i in th . 
r y' in co i i o h i
th t s ay in o th
Islam forc  i  th th to r '
o- est e o  Isla i elf ( P), 
i   trad tion ly a se  its to th y
i   s al  at l a tow  srup ed  ra d
49 
industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s, has moved since 
early 1990s from being a provincial Anatolian party, and 
focused its energy on local election campaigns to obtain the 
support of masses who migrated from the country side to the 
big cities of more prosperous western Anatolia and settled in 
the ugly shantytowns surrounding these cities. These people, 
unable to make transition the transition from their 
traditional, countryside lifestyles to completely alien 
lifestyle of the big cities due to the social and economic 
difficulties that they face, have become a target that can 
easily be exploited by any ideology promising social justice, 
better living standards and the arrest of declining morality. 
The WP, which adopted a propaganda platform in which worsening 
income distribution, corruption in government and decline of 
morality in society were especially stressed, successfully 
exploited this group of people in the March local elections 
and obtained 18.8 percent of the votes, making it third the 
third party in the polls after two right-of-center parties of 
secular mainstream. 
Although it is unlikely that the WP will be able to obtain 
votes, sufficient to form a single party in the next general 
elections, it's ability to challenge Turkey's secular 
mainstream parties by winning the March 1994 elections in 26 
municipalities, including Ankara and Istanbul, has had a 
damaging impact on Western perceptions of Turkey. If the WP 
manages to repeat its success in the next general elections 
with the votes coming from people protesting the growing 
income differences and declining living standards, this will 
further damaged the Western perceptions of Turkey, burying all 
the Turkish hopes of further integration into Europe. 
Apart from the threat to the secular Turkish state from 
resurgent Islam, today Turkey's once dormant Kurdish problem 
has come to threaten the territorial integrity of Turkey as 
well as the stability of the whole state. Attempts by the 
Turkish government to build confidence between the state and 
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Turkey's Kurdish population which became increasingly- 
alienated by the earlier counter-productive government 
policies which denied the Kurdish identity, had created a 
temporary positive and hopeful atmosphere in 1991 and early 
1992. However, the hopeful atmosphere has short lived as the 
Partiya Karkere Kurdistan (PKK), afraid of marginalization of 
its organization, intensified its campaign of violence to 
spoil the newly-born hopeful atmosphere. Meanwhile, the open 
offense of some of the Kurdish deputies of the Turkish 
parliament to the symbol of the Turkish state, the death of 
Turgut Ozal, who greatly contributed to the initiation of 
policies that aimed at building confidence between the state 
and the Kurdish population, and Tansu Ciller government's 
decision to give priority to find a solution to the country's 
deteriorating economic condition have hardened the position of 
hardliners who viewed the attempts of finding a political 
middle ground for the Kurdish problem as extremely dangerous 
steps that may lead to the eventual disintegration of the 
country. As the government hardened its stance toward the 
problem, the violence has escalated within the last two year. 
The problem does not only threats the territorial 
integrity of the state, but also adversely effects Turkey's 
relations with its Western allies. Because of the sensitivity 
of the Europeans to human rights issues, the Kurdish problem 
has potential to destabilize the European Union (EU)-Turkish 
relations. While the EU and the Council of Europe's 
Parliamentary Assembly have on various occasions criticized 
the Turkish government's alleged disregard of human rights in 
its fight against the PKK, the EU has warned Turkey about the 
implications of its hardened stance toward the problem on the 
EU-Turkey integration process which reached a critical stage 
with the signing of the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement 
waiting to be ratified by the European Parliament. Similarly, 
the relations between Turkey and the United States have also 
been harmed by the prolonged Kurdish problem. The decision of 
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the United States to withheld 10 percent of the foreign aid 
earmarked for Turkey for FY95 until the Department of State 
makes certain that Turkey makes progress in human rights 
issues, particularly the Kurdish problem, has clearly shown 
the disturbance that the United States feels about the way the 
Turkish government handles the problem, while resulting in 
heavy criticism by Turkey of the United States for its ill- 
treatment of Turkey. 
While Turkey's policy objective of elevating relations 
with the West is complicated with the above mentioned factors, 
with the end of Cold War, Turkey's importance in terms of its 
military manpower and geographic proximity to the Soviet Union 
has considerably reduced in the security calculations of 
Western Europe which no longer needs to fear the East, 
resulting in the further weakening of ties between Turkey and 
the West Europe. The dissolution of the socialist regimes in 
Eastern Europe and the ending of the Cold War and the 
divisions in Europe have forced the members of the EC to focus 
on these historical changes, and gave an additional impetus to 
the Community to take control over the social, economic and 
political affairs of Europe. In this atmosphere, the West 
Europeans, who became preoccupied with issues such as German 
unification, the task of assisting the economic and political 
reconstruction of the newly liberated countries of Eastern 
Europe, the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty within the 
EU, domestic economic problems that stem from the prolonged 
recession in Europe, have given less attention to the issue of 
Turkey's membership, and found it expedient to defer the issue 
without giving a specific date. At a moment when Europe was 
moving toward union, Turkey has remained excluded from the 
European political and economic processes and interactions. 
Greece, organically linking the improvement of Turkey- 
EC/EU relations to the solution of Cyprus issue, has been able 
to draw the EC/EU into the Greek-Turkish dispute, and, thus, 
made relations between Turkey and the EC/EU more problematic. 
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The Greek aim of isolating Turkey from Europe has also been 
useful for other Europeans who have had reservations about the 
Turkey's full membership in the EU, such as Germany. At a 
time when the support and sympathy for democratic political 
systems and free societies reached its peak, Turkey's Kurdish 
problem has brought Turkey under the spotlight and made it an 
easy target for criticism by the Western Europeans, 
particularly Germany. The German-Turkish relations which have 
already become tense due to the presence and situation of 
large numbers of Turkish workers in this country, have been 
further strained as Germany hardened its stance toward Turkey 
on the Kurdish issue, further complicating the Turkish efforts 
to gain full membership in the EU. 
Turkey's exclusion from the EU has also enormous security 
implications. Turkey has recognized the rising importance of 
the Western European Union (WEU) as the defense component of 
the EU and as a means of strengthening European pillar of 
NATO, but despite all of its attempts it has been unable to 
achieve full membership in this organization. The WEU members 
try to justify their opposition to Turkey's full membership 
basically on the grounds that it is not a full member of the 
EU. In fact, Turkey's strong pro-Western stance during the 
Gulf War has resulted in its strategic role to be assessed in 
its Middle Eastern context rather than European, and the EU, 
which desires to move quickly toward a common foreign and 
security policy as envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty, has 
become increasingly unwilling to carry the borders of the EU 
and WEU to the volatile regions of the world such as the 
Middle East and the Transcaucasus, which Turkey's full 
membership in these organizations would imply. 
Turkey's concerns regarding the protection of its 
territorial integrity and independence have been further 
exacerbated as Turkey has come to the realization that it 
faces with considerable difficulties in restructuring the 
Turkish armed forces along the lines of NATO's New Strategic 
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Concept, adopted in November 1991 in the light of profound 
changes in East-West relations. Furthermore, with the end of 
Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union, the realization 
of "peace dividend" has come to the fore in the agenda of 
NATO nations, resulting in the erosion of solidarity and 
cohesion of the organization. Turkey's reguest for the 
deployment of a NATO deterrent force to eastern Turkey during 
the Gulf War had resulted in serious internal debate among the 
member countries on whether the defense of Turkey's Middle 
Eastern borders by NATO is an "in-area" or "out-of-area" 
responsibility, giving rise to the Turkish concerns that NATO 
may not extend its protective umbrella to Turkey in case it 
becomes involved in a confrontation resulting in Turkey 
invoking the defense clause of the Washington Treaty. 
A.  DOMESTIC CONTEXT 
1. Economic Condition of the Country 
After almost five decades of industrialization— 
characterized, on the one hand by considerable state 
intervention and, on the other, by protectionist import- 
substituting policies—in the early 1980s Turkey entered a new 
era of export-led economic growth with the implementation of 
a series of stabilization and structural adjustment programs 
introduced in January 24, 1980. 
The interim government, formed by the military junta which 
took over control of the country in September 1980, combined 
the economic stabilization measures with reforms of trade 
liberalization and export promotion. These policies marked a 
radical break with the inward-looking, import-substituting 
strategies and the beginning of an export-led growth based on 
a industrial economy. High export growth was pursued via 
export credits and incentives, and the removal of restrictions 
on foreign trade and capital. In addition, after a 33 percent 
devaluation of the Turkish lira, multiple-exchange rates were 
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abolished and a flexible-exchange rate regime was established. 
[Ref 21:p. 46] 
Consequently, throughout the 1980s, the Turkish economy 
has performed impressively in many aspects. However, these 
liberalization attempts and structural adjustment policies 
failed to remedy some of the most important structural 
problems of the Turkish economy, resulting in the announcement 
by the government, in April 5, 1994, of the harshest austerity 
measures in the history of the republic. 
Turkey's Gross National Product (GNP) averaged 5 percent 
per year for the 1980s, reaching its peak level of 9.4 
percent in 1990. [Ref 28:p. 28] The Gulf War led to sharply 
reduced growth of 0.4 percent in 1991, but the expansion 
recovered in 1992 and 1993 with an GNP of 6.4 and 7.3 percent 
respectively. Per capita GNP increased from $1,287 in 1980 to 
$2,687 in 1990. [Ref 28:p. 28] These economic reforms have 
also contributed to a major transformation in the structure of 
the Turkish economy. Total exports increased from $2.9 billion 
in 1980 to $12.9 billion in 1990 , an increase of 345 percent. 
Meanwhile, imports rose from $8 billion in 1980 to $22.3 
billion in 1990, an increase of 178 percent, well below the 
rate of increase of exports. [Ref 23:p. 137] The share of 
agriculture in GNP declined steadily from 22.6 percent in 1980 
to 16.3 percent in 1991, while industry accounted for 22.7 
percent of GNP in 1991 and services 55.9 percent. [Ref 29:p. 
14] While the importance of the agricultural sector declined, 
industry's share of exports increased from 36 percent in 1980 
to an impressive figure of almost 80 percent in 1990. [Ref 
23:p. 11-12] Turkey has become a country exporting primarily 
industrial products rather than agricultural produce. 
Within the framework of outward-oriented economic 
policies, legislation on foreign investment was also 
liberalized and significant developments have been witnessed 
in the fields of foreign-capital inflow and foreign 
investment. The total amount of foreign direct investment in 
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Turkey between 1980 and 1990 increased to $6.22 billion 
compared to only $228 million during the period of 1954-1980. 
Similarly, the number of foreign firms which have invested in 
Turkey, increased from only 127 in 1981 to 1,812 in 1990. [Ref 
23:p. 139] 
The government policies of export-led growth based on a 
industrial economy have not only resulted in a major 
transformation of the Turkish economy and increased 
integration with the world markets, but also increased the 
dependence of the Turkish economy on the developed economies 
of the world, especially the West European economies. The 
share of OECD countries in Turkey's total exports increased 
from 57.7 percent in 1980 to 67.9 percent in 1990. Within the 
OECD, the EC countries have become main trading partners of 
Turkey. The share of EC countries in Turkey's total exports 
increased from 44.7 percent in 1980 to 53.2 percent in 1990. 
Similarly, while the share of OECD countries in Turkey's total 
imports increased from 45.3 percent to 63.8 percent, that of 
EC countries increased from 29.8 percent to an unprecedented 
level of 41.8 during the same period of 1980-1990. [Ref 23:p. 
134-136] The EC countries' share in the total amount of 
foreign direct investment in Turkey also reached its peak 
level of $1.25 billion in 1990, accounting for the 78 percent 
of total foreign direct investment for 1990 ($1.61 billion). 
[Ref  30:p. 30] 
The 1980's also witnessed the initiation of huge 
infrastructure projects. Tele-communication, transportation, 
electricity generation and irrigation were chosen as priority 
areas for public investment. Considerable improvements have 
been achieved: highways were extended by over 2,000 
kilometers, the countryside was electrified, the communication 
system was modernized and every single village was provided 
with a direct-dialing telephone facility. It was also during 
this period that the construction work in the $32 billion 
dollar South Anatolia Project (GAP) was accelerated with the 
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transfer of almost $1 billion dollars to the project every 
year. The GAP, one of the world's biggest civil engineering 
undertakings, includes 13 sub-projects (seven on the Euphrates 
River and six on the Tigris River) consisting of a total of 19 
power stations, 22 irrigation dams and hundreds of water 
storage and distribution projects, including the world's two 
largest underground irrigation tunnels. When the project is in 
full operation, 1.7 million hectares of land will be 
irrigated, an area twice the size of Belgium, 26 billion KWH 
of electricity will be generated, representing 22 percent of 
Turkey's hydropower potential, the agricultural output of 
Turkey will be doubled, and a total of 3,324,000 additional 
jobs will be created. [Ref 31:p. 3] The construction of the 
body of the Ataturk Dam, which is the centerpiece of the GAP 
and the world sixth largest hydroelectric dam in terms of 
volume of the embarkment, was completed in 1990 after Turkey 
had spent $4 billion dollars without any foreign financing. 
[Ref 31:p. 4] 
Economic growth of 1980s has, however, been accompanied by 
structural difficulties. The most important of these has been 
inflation. Among the other structural weaknesses of the 
economy are the level of state indebtedness and a substantial 
budget deficit. 
Within the framework of the economic stabilization 
measures and the reforms of trade liberalization and export 
promotion, put into implementation in the early 1980s, the 
prices of various final and intermediate products manufactured 
by the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) have been adjusted 
upward to reduce the burden of SEEs on the government budget 
and alleviate the pressure on the Turkish Central Bank to 
finance the budget deficit through money creation. However, 
since many of the SEEs products are intermediate products used 
by private firms in the manufacturing sector as input to 
their production processes, these price increases in SEE 
products have resulted in the price hikes in the manufacturing 
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sector and contributed to inflation in general. Furthermore, 
with the establishment of a flexible-exchange rate regime 
after having abolished the multiple-exchange rates, the value 
of the Turkish lira was reduced vis-a-vis other foreign 
currencies, and because of strong dependence of Turkish 
manufacturing sector on imported inputs, depreciation of the 
Turkish lira has increased the domestic cost of these inputs. 
This increase in the input costs of the manufacturing sector 
has consequently contributed to the price hikes in the final 
products of the sector, contributing to overall inflation. 
Inflation was also fed by the high priority that the 
government gave to expansion of the infrastructure and the 
subsequent increase in the public-sector borrowing 
requirement. Therefore, inflation never dropped below 25 
percent per year during the 1980s and, in fact, crept upward 
during late 1980s to reach 69.6 percent in 1989. [Ref 23:p. 
17] The inflation rate remained at the level of 62.4 percent 
in 1992, 58.2 percent in 1993, and reached in March 1994, 
just prior to the announcement of the April 5 Austerity 
Measures, at a level equivalent to 74 percent when calculated 
on a yearly basis.  [Ref 28:p. 28] 
The 1990s have also witnessed the deterioration of 
Turkey's external debt problem and balance of payment 
difficulties. During early 1990s, exports, which increased 
from $2.9 billion in 1980 to $12.9 billion in 1990, became 
stagnant and stalled at a level of $13.6 billion in 1991, 
$14.7 billion in 1992 and $15.3 billion in 1993. Imports, on 
the other hand, increased from $21 billion in 1991 to $22.9 
billion in 1992 and $29.4 billion in 1993, resulting in an 
increasingly greater trade deficit. [Ref 28:p. 25] The 1990- 
1991 Gulf War has also adversely affected the ability of the 
government to fight the budget deficit by causing Turkey to 
incur considerable income losses. Turkish financial losses 
from the war are difficult to calculate, but include lost 
exports to Iraq, Turkey's second largest market with an export 
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potential of over $1 billion per year, lost tourism revenues, 
lost royalties for transit of Iraqi oil through the Turkish- 
Iraqi oil pipeline, suspended construction contracts, lost 
fees from transit trade, and increased oil prices. For 
example, tourism, which had generated $3.2 billion in receipt 
in 1990, was one of the sectors severely affected by the war, 
with receipts dropping to $2.6 billion in 1991. [Ref 28:p. 30] 
Turkey still incurs an income loss of $500 million per year 
in the form of lost royalties just due to the closure of 
Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline, an action taken by the Turkish 
government as a part of economic sanctions against Iraq. 
Thus, the direct cost of the war to the Turkish balance of 
payments for the period of 1991-1993 is expected to have run 
at a rate of almost $2.5 billion per year. [Ref 32:p. 684] 
While the country was incurring substantial income losses, 
the budget deficit was further exacerbated by the failure of 
the privatization program, an element of the 1980 economic 
reforms, to achieve progress in the transfer of the SEEs which 
have become a financial burden on the state budget, to private 
hands. 
The origins of the SEEs date back to the formative years 
of the Turkish republic, the "etatist" period of the 1930s. 
During the etatist industrialization campaign of the 1930s, 
the government set up many SEEs in sectors considered to be of 
great importance for increasing the nation's welfare and the 
state's prosperity or in sectors where private investors, 
limited in number at the time, hesitated to invest because 
capital requirements were too great in light of  expected 
returns.  Thus,  SEEs provided the  initial  impetus  for 
industrialization  in  Turkey,  which  involved  import 
substitution  in  basic  consumer-goods  industries,  and 
compensated for the lack of business elite, unwilling or 
unable to undertake heavy investment, at the time. [Ref 33:p. 
163] Within two decades, SEEs were established in almost all 
sectors affecting the interests of the nation as a whole. SEEs 
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included the national transportation, defense industry, 
communications, energy enterprises and banks that owned 
companies in particular branches such as textile, refining, 
mining and maritime transportation. Aside from their role in 
industrial development, SEES were charged with social goals. 
The farm-support program stabilized farmer's incomes, while 
low consumer prices for food, energy, and transportation 
helped the poor. SEEs also provided training and employed 
surplus university graduates. 
The importance of the SEEs in the Turkish economy is 
evident from their contribution to total industrial production 
and the country's severe problem of unemployment. Throughout 
the 1980s, the public sector accounted for 45 percent of fixed 
investment, around 40 percent of total value added in the 
manufacturing industry and half a million jobs, almost three 
percent of the country's civilian labor force in the 1980s. 
[Ref 23:p. 16] 
The absence of autonomy and managerial incentives, 
frequent interference from politicians and bureaucrats, the 
failure of the government to provide incentives to the 
managerial elite that would encourage increases in the 
efficiency and productivity have been the main problems of the 
SEEs, and these problems are exacerbated by the fact that the 
majority of the SEEs operated in monopolistic markets, 
protected from competitive pressure as a part of the overall 
import substitution policies, resulting in the lack of 
pressure to improve the performance. [Ref 33:p. 164] As the 
operating losses of the SEEs have grown, they have turned to 
the government to finance their operations, and this, in 
turn, has undermined the ability of government to balance the 
budget. Subsequent pressure on the Turkish Central Bank to 
finance the budget deficit through money creation and domestic 
or external borrowing has fueled the overall inflation in the 
country. Thus, despite their importance in the Turkish 
economy, since the introduction of 1980 reform program, one of 
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the aims of economic policy has been the reduction of the size 
of the state sector through the privatization of the SEEs 
which have become, since 1970s, "money eating monsters," 
undercutting the government's ability to balance the budget 
and fueling the public-sector borrowing requirement. 
However,  the  moves  toward  privatization  have  been 
controversial, and policy makers have faced tough decisions. 
Some SEE managers and unions have opposed privatization 
fearing that, once under private management, the enterprises 
might  eliminate  unprofitable  subsidiaries  or  reduce 
overstaffing. The possibility of aggressive lay off with its 
adverse effects on the country's already high unemployment 
rate has been source of  concern also for the government, 
preventing it from committing to privatization wholeheartedly. 
The sale of  state equities in two different companies  to 
foreign  investors  in  1988  within  the  framework  of 
privatization program has also generated popular opposition to 
the program, and resulted in heavy criticism of the government 
for selling the SEEs which became known as a part of  the 
heritage of the Kemalist era, to foreigners. [Ref 33:p. 169] 
The left-of-center Social Democratic Populist Party (SDP), 
then the leading opposition party, has interpreted these sales 
as a threat to national sovereignty and led the opposition. 
The SDP itself was the successor to  Ataturk's Republican 
People's Party which had originally adopted etatism as its 
official economic strategy. Thus, between 1980 and 1991, only 
five percent of the state's holding passed into private hands 
after a proportion of equities held by the state in fifteen 
companies had been privatized via stock market sales. [Ref 
23:p. 16] After the 1991 general elections, the coalition 
government of True Path Party and Social Democratict Populist 
Party has come to power, and the privatization program has 
come to a standstill. The program was going to be reactivated 
only in April 1994 within the framework of April 5 Austerity 
Measures. However, during this period the SEEs continued to 
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generate only a sixth of Turkey's exports while consuming a 
third of its imports, and to constitute almost 75 percent of 
the country's budget deficit, which grew to $8.6 billion in 
1993, double the original target and nine percent of Turkey's 
1993 GDP. [Ref 34:p. 506] 
In the face of widening budget and trade deficits, 
persistent high inflation and a mounting external debt which 
increased from $40.7 billion in 1988 to $67.3 billion in 1993, 
the government felt compelled, in April 1994, to resort to the 
harshest austerity measures in the history of the country in 
an attempt to remedy the worsening economic condition of the 
country. [Ref 34:p. 506] The austerity package which was 
announced in April 5 and became known as April 5 Austerity 
Measures, included a 28 percent devaluation of the Turkish 
lira, limited increase in the salaries of the public sector 
employees, a pledge to close unprofitable SEEs and to 
accelerate the privatization program, price increases on goods 
produced and sold by the SEEs, and one-time taxes on bank and 
corporate assets. 
Depreciation of the Turkish lira by 28 percent has given 
the desired boom to exports and Turkey's total exports have 
increased by 23.1 percent in the first nine months of 1994 
when compared to the first nine months of 1993. [Ref 28:p. 24] 
However, it has also led to an increase in the domestic cost 
of manufacturing sector's inputs, the majority of which are 
imported, and this increase has consequently contributed to 
the price hikes in the final products of the sector. These 
price increases combined with the price hikes in the 
consumption goods produced and sold by the SEEs have resulted 
in an unprecedented inflation in the country and the yearly 
inflation rate for 1994 was announced by the State Statistics 
Institute as 148 percent. [Ref 35:p. 2] Despite the high 
inflation rate, the increase in the salaries of the public 
sector employees has been kept limited to only 20-30 percent 
as required by the austerity measures, and thus the purchasing 
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power of these people has been reduced by more than 40 percent 
on average. Price hikes combined with sharp reductions in the 
purchasing power of the Turkish people has led to the 
contraction of the domestic market, and consequently the 
private sector has been squeezed between increased input costs 
and marketing difficulties. Therefore, real wages have also 
dived in the private sector, and wage earners, in both public 
and private sectors, with their families have constituted the 
part of the Turkish society that the April 5 Austerity 
Measures hit in the worst manner. 
It should also be stated that the stabilization and 
liberalization programs of the 1980s had substantial adverse 
impacts on Turkey's income distribution. This, when combined 
with the tax system which puts the tax burden on wage and 
salary earners, has led to the emergence, within the past 
decade, of wild income differences in Turkish society. For 
instance, the share of profits and rental income in the 
country's national income had risen from 49.4 percent in 1980 
to an unprecedented level of 70.2 percent in 1988 while 
during the same period the share of wages and salaries had 
declined from 26.6 percent to 14 percent. A similar collapse 
can be seen in the share of agriculture which declined from 
23.8 percent in 1980 to 15.8 percent in 1988. [Ref 21:p. 51] 
Despite the obvious collapse of wages and salaries and the 
rapid deterioration of the functional distribution of income 
in Turkey, the governments that came to power failed to reform 
the tax system, and consequently, 6.5 million wage and salary 
earners -almost 30 percent of Turkey's civilian labor force- 
who have never earned more than 27 percent of the national 
income since 1980, have paid 50 percent of the total taxes 
that the government collected in 1994. [Ref 36:p. 2] 
Unfortunately, it is a fact that while the majority of the 
Turkish people gets poorer and poorer as their purchasing 
power diminishes under the persistent high inflation, wide 
income differences and injustice in the tax system continue 
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to fuel the social unrest. Thus, the ability of Turkey's 
mainstream secular parties, which has governed the country 
since the foundation of the republic, to mobilize the Turkish 
society along the Western ideas and ideals, on which the 
socio-economic policies of these parties have been based, 
becomes increasingly questionable. 
The new harsh austerity measures, announced by the Prime 
Minister Tansu Ciller on April 5, 1994 and the prospect of 
the layoff of thousands of workers in the SEEs within the 
framework of privatization program to be reactivated have 
already resulted in hundreds of thousands of workers turning 
the May Day celebrations of 1994 into a protest against the 
government. A similar protest was held on December 20 
throughout the country by government employees who boycotted 
their jobs for one day to protest the 22.5 percent increase in 
their yearly salaries while the inflation rate for 1994 was 
announced as more than 140 percent by the government. [Ref 
37:p. 1] It seems as if 1995 will be a much more difficult 
year for these people than 1994. Within the framework of the 
"stand-by" agreement which Turkey signed with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the aftermath of the 
announcement of the Austerity Measures, the government has 
promised to privatize 15 SEEs at a worth of $5 billion until 
May 1995, to reduce the number of people working in the SEEs 
and government offices, and to freeze the salary increases in 
the public sector. [Ref 38:p. 1] Furthermore, the government 
has announced that it targeted reducing the yearly inflation 
rate from 148 percent to 70 percent for 1995 if everything 
goes as planned, signaling further diminishing of the 
purchasing power of the Turkish people at least for one more 
year. 
Apart from the equity, welfare, and domestic stability 
implications of this state of affairs, Turkey's inability to 
eliminate the structural difficulties of its economy and thus 
put the economy on a stable track that will help reduce the 
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existing socio-economic gap between Turkey and the countries 
of the Western Europe in the long run has long been 
detrimental to the Turkish efforts to gain full membership in 
the EU by giving the Europeans a legitimate ground on which 
they can justify their decision not to take Turkey's 
application for full membership into serious consideration. 
The austerity measures have helped the government reduce the 
trade deficit from $14 billion in 1993 to $6 billion in 1994, 
and the budget deficit from $8.6 billion to $4.5. [Ref 38:p. 
1] However, with a rampant inflation not expected to drop 
below 70 percent in 1995, an unemployment rate which has never 
dropped below seven percent and is expected to rise as a 
result of the contraction in the economy that the recent 
austerity package caused, and interests rates varying between 
60 and 120 percent from year to year, Turkey remains far from 
fulfilling the strict admission requirements of the EU. 
2. Islam and Domestic Politics 
Within the past decade, the threat to the secular Turkish 
state from resurgent Islam has become one of the topics of 
heavy debate, and with the recent success of the Welfare 
Party, the main political movement of the religious right, 
overtly espousing Islamist views despite existing 
constitutional and legal limitations, in the March 1994 local 
elections, the fear of rising Islamic fundamentalism has 
become widespread among the country's secularist bloc. The 
1995 general elections will be the real indicator of the 
extent to which the country's secular and democratic regime is 
threatened by radical Islam, but it should be stated that the 
cause for concern is real, and a variety of factors lie behind 
the surge of Islamic forces in Turkey. 
During the formative years of the republic, a series of 
secular reforms which aimed at making what is often referred 
to as separation of state and religion, and excluding Islam 
from an official role in the life of nation, had been 
initiated by Ataturk and radical steps such as replacing the 
65 
in io-econo i w h tr
h est h lon u lon
im t l h r i e bershi
h  n h  e tim o hi
h i o t a r ey'
l o l e bershi o si erat .
st r easur ent e
ra fi i rom i io i io ,
et fi i rom . i io . . : .
o ever, it  a a t io t t
o t , pl ent hi r
o t t  
lt t t ono t t
st ri , t · 
t rom r ar, r ai rom
l lin t iss re e t .
. l~ o esti olit
wit i st e, t l r ur i
rom t lam i
ate, it t s f elfar
art , ai lit l ove ent f g o t,
ert si a ist s s it i
nstit t l l it t s, arc  l
t s, f n a i  ental s  
e i es r  o  untry'  ularist l c. . e 
 eral  ill  l i t r f 
t t  hi   untry'  l r  ocrati    
  i l a , t  l    t  
s  cer   l,  ari t  f t r  i  
  f a i   urkey. 
uri   ati  ears f  ublic, ri  f 
l r s hi   t aki  hat  f   
  ar t  f t   l ,  l i  a  
o   ffi i l l     f ati ,   
i   tat r   i al s   l   
 
Islamic law (Sharia) with codes borrowed from European 
countries, dropping the use of Islamic calendar and Arabic 
alphabet in favor of the Western calendar and Latin alphabet, 
outlawing articles of clothing closely identified with Islamic 
traditions and requiring the Islamic call to worship to be in 
Turkish rather than Arabic, were taken in 1920s and 193 0s. The 
scope and the pace of these reforms had resulted in the 
emergence of Islamist reactionary forces in the society, 
leading Mustafa Kemal to regard a stage of personal 
authoritarian rule as necessary for securing his reforms 
before proceeding with the democratic process. Although 
Mustafa Kemal's long term goal was the establishment of a 
liberal democracy in Turkey, he temporarily gave up attempts 
at establishing multi-party politics during these formative 
years and Islam was removed from domestic politics only to 
return in 1946 when multi-party politics was restored. 
Kemalist reforms clearly aimed at eradicating religious 
influence from political, legal, educational and social 
spheres, and restrict it to personal faith and behavior. In 
this respect Turkish political scientist Feride Acar states 
that: 
the new state's policies did not take on an 
aggressive mission of neutralizing Islam at the 
individual level. A personalized, individualized and 
rather peculiarly secularized Islam was created for 
the consumption of the citizens of the Republic in the 
privacy of their homes. As a result, for Turkish 
people, religion came to represent an array of beliefs 
and practices that ranges from the almost nominal 
subscription of the Westernized urban elite to the . 
deep personal piousness of the masses. [Ref 23:p. 
225] 
With the end of single-party rule under the Republican 
People's Party (RPP) and the establishment of the multi-party 
politics, the right-of-center secular parties, which pursued 
more liberal economic policies and were more tolerant of 
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ith the end f r er t  epublican 
People's art  ( ) a ishm t  t  ulti-party 
politics, t e ri t t l r rti s, hich pursued 
more liberal ec i  li i er  or  t l rant of 
traditionalist religious and social attitudes in the 
countryside compared to the policies of the RPP, developed 
close relations with different Islamist groups, especially the 
religious orders in 1950s and 1960s. However, these close 
relations have not resulted in the takeover of these parties 
leaderships or organizations by the Islamists, and remained 
limited to "an indirect relationship via conventional pressure 
group/political party interaction." [Ref 23:p. 229] 
With the establishment of the Islamist National Order 
Party (NOP) by Necmettin Erbakan, an engineer by training and 
a professor at Istanbul Technical University, this 
relationship took the form of direct representation. Erbakan 
had been actively working in the Union of the Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry and was its president in 1969. The NOP, 
which was founded in January 1970, rapidly set up branches 
throughout the country, with most support coming from small 
towns and villages. The NOP program could not openly attack 
secularism, but made it clear that through the use of symbols 
it had an anti-Kemalist ideology, and was committed to 
Islamization of state functions. 
Erbakan, who had realized that appeal only to religiosity 
was not adequate as a basis for seeking followers and thus 
votes, attempted to exploit the disturbance that the small 
town traditional petty bourgeoisie felt from the rapid socio- 
economic changes that Turkey underwent during the 1960s. 
Turkey had witnessed an accelerated process of change with 
rapid growth and industrialization throughout the 1960s and 
early 1970s. This caused great dislocation throughout society 
marked by mass immigration from villages to the cities where 
these people settled in ugly shantytowns. A few major holding 
companies had benefited from the governments1 import 
substitution policies, undermining the competitiveness of the 
small traders and manufacturers scattered throughout the 
country. These small traders and manufacturers were opposed 
the expansion of big businesses and preferred the dominance of 
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the SEEs which had established relations with the small scale 
sector, rather than private monopolies that cut off major 
markets from Anatolian suppliers and retailers. 
The NOP's attempts of addressing itself to the petty 
bourgeoisie of small Anatolian towns, can be identified in the 
statement by Necmettin Erbakan: 
. . . The economic mechanism works in favor of the 
merchants of the big cities and the merchants of 
Anatolia are simply their step-children. The lion's 
share of import quotas is saved for the merchants of 
three or four cities. The deposits in Anatolian banks 
are made by the people of Anatolia but go as credit to 
the merchants of the bid city. The Union of Chambers 
works with completely as the instrument of a 
comprador-freemason minority. This huge organization 
is in the control of comprador commerce and industry. 
In that case, we said let's get onto the 
administrative board and turn the Union of Chambers 
into something which serves the Anatolian merchant 
and industrialist. [Ref 39:p. 14] 
In addition to criticizing Turkey's economic policies, 
Necmettin Erbakan also attempted to make use of the alienation 
and uneaseness that many Turks felt from the scope and pace of 
Western influences in their society. This was true especially 
for the rural people who immigrated from their villages to 
big, cosmopolitan cities and faced difficulty in adapting 
themselves to the completely alien lifestyle of these cities. 
From the very beginning of his political career, Erbakan had 
criticized the West and its influence over Turkish society and 
in his "Declaration to the Religious Turk," he wrote that: 
. . . Thus the European, by making us copy him blindly 
and without any understanding, trapped us in this 
monkey's cage and, as a result, forced us to abandon 
our personality and nobility. That is to say, he was 
successful in this because he used agents recruited 
from within, who felt inferior and disgusted with 
themselves, bringing to his knees the Turk who for 
centuries could not be defeated by the crusades and 
external blows. [Ref 39:p. 15] 
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Although the NOP was closed down by the Constitutional 
Court in 1971, it was reconstituted the next year as the 
National Salvation Party (NSP), again under the leadership of 
Necmettin Erbakan. The NSP entered the 1973 and 1977 general 
elections with the moral and material prosperity promises. 
However, in the 1970s it was social democracy, not Islam, that 
was the strongest ideological current in Turkey. The RPP 
obtained 3 3.3 percent and 42.4 percent of the total votes in 
the 1973 and 1977 general elections respectively while the 
percentage of votes that went to the NSP was only 11.8 in 1973 
and 8.4 in 1977, making the NSP third party in the polls in 
both elections after the Justice Party (JP), the leading 
right-of-center party. [Ref 40:p. 404] Although it is 
difficult to make definitive statements about the 
characteristics of the voters that voted for the NSP in these 
elections, Professor Binnaz Toprak of Bogazici University 
(Istanbul) explains that: 
The results of the 1973 and 1977 elections show that 
the NSP received the highest percentage of its votes 
in either the last developed, or the most rapidly 
developing, areas of the country. In the former, 
individuals who voted for the NSP likely did so as a 
result of the party's appeal to traditional Islamic 
sentiments; in the latter, however, the NSP vote 
represented some form of protest by marginal 
individuals who had lost their former place within 
economy - small traders, artisans, small shopkeepers, 
and the like. [Ref 41:p. 229] 
In the aftermath of 1973 elections, the NSP formed a 
coalition government with the RPP in 1974 and, when this 
coalition failed within a few months, it joined the 
Nationalist Front coalition governments in 1975 with the JP 
and the Ultranationalist Nationalist Action Party. Necmettin 
Erbakan and his deputies held important positions in the above 
mentioned coalition governments. However, rather than Islam, 
the establishment of "heavy industries" in Turkey was the 
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major item in the NSP's party program. Although the party 
program did not described a comprehensive economic development 
plan, Necmettin Erbakan continually put great emphasis on 
industrial advancement, and the party monopolized ministries 
dealing with the Turkish industry, technology and the State 
Economic Enterprises, in these coalition governments. Turkey 
had lost its leading position because it had failed to 
industrialize, and the NSP was promising to "accomplish 
industrial growth without passing through the traumas brought 
about by the capitalist model, with its inherent materialism." 
[Ref 41:p. 228] The NSP claimed that through the establishment 
of heavy industries and "revitalizing indigenous cultural 
values which would supply the necessary spiritual and moral 
qualities for a new work ethic," Turkey could become a great 
power again.  [Ref 42:p. 76] 
Necmettin Erbakan, while paying attention not to take 
actions that would endanger the coalition governments in which 
it participated, was also concerned that as a junior coalition 
partner to the RPP or the JP, his party was losing its 
distinctiveness. Thus, in an attempt to reestablish its own 
religious identity in the public's eye, the NSP began a 
campaign to display its independence from the dominant secular 
party of the coalition governments through issues which would 
assure controversy in the press, irritate the secularist 
intelligentsia, and appeal to the traditional values of the 
petty bourgeoisie. [Ref 42:p. 78] The following statement made 
by Necmettin Erbakan while he was Deputy Prime Minister in the 
1974 coalition government is worth quoting: 
. . . As we were in a coalition, unfortunately we 
could not get everything passed. However, we 
insisted on having the skirts of hostesses in Turkish 
Airways lengthened by 15 centimeters. So we had some 
successes and we believe that we are on the right 
path. [Ref 39:p. 16] 
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In summary, it can be said that the social and economic 
changes undergone by the country since the early 1960s, 
combined with state dominance and control over religion and 
religious institutions, had pushed the significance of Islam 
into the background. As economic and social structural factors 
gained importance both in national politics and at the 
individual level, the day-to-day political needs of Turkey had 
put certain limitation upon a purely religious approach by the 
NSP to these issues. Islam, by itself, was no longer a 
sufficient factor for mobilizing Turkish society. All of this 
was apparently understood by the voters, resulting in the 
percentage of the NSP votes in the general elections dropping 
from 11.8 percent in 1973 to 8.4 percent in 1977. [Ref 40:p. 
408-409] 
With the September 12, 1980, military intervention, the 
NSP and other political parties of the pre-coup era were 
dissolved in 1981 and all the members of the last parliament 
were prohibited from politics. When the ban on political 
activity imposed by the military junta was lifted in April 
1983, the Welfare Party (WP) was formed as the successor of 
the dissolved the NSP on more or less the same religious- 
political platform. However, due to the ban on political 
activities of Necmettin Erbakan and company, the Welfare 
Party, at its inception, was short of party leadership and the 
cadres who could mobilize the voters that traditionally 
supported the NSP. 
Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP, its 
popular name in Turkey) won the 1983 and 1987 general 
elections by obtaining more than 45 percent and 36 percent of 
the votes respectively and remained in power until November 
1991 with a clear majority in the Grand National Assembly. 
[Ref 40:p. 408-409] During this period, Turgut Ozal and his 
successor Yildirim Akbulut (November 1989 - November 1991) as 
Prime Minister, implemented certain Islamic practices and 
appointed numerous politicians with Islamic leanings to key 
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positions throughout various ministries of the Turkish 
bureaucracy under the influence of some of the former members 
of the NSP who, in the absence of Necmettin Erbakan, preferred 
to continue their political activity within the ANAP. This 
influence grew when Necmettin Erbakan officially became the 
leader of the Welfare Party in September 1987 following a 
national referendum that ended the ban on the political 
activities of the former party leaders. After this point, it 
was certainly necessary for Ozal to respond positively to the 
pressure exerted by the NSP element in his party in order to 
prevent defection of this element to the Welfare Party. 
As a result of these pressures, in the second half of 
1980s, Turkey witnessed sudden appearance of Islamist 
movements and cadres in the central political arena, and in 
the decision-making and controlling positions of the state. 
The general election held on October 20, 1991, ended the 
leading position of ANAP in the Grand National Assembly. The 
real surprise of the elections was the success of Necmettin 
Erbakan's Welfare Party. It received 16.7 percent of the votes 
and increased its number of seats in the Assembly from 10 to 
62. [Ref 40:p. 408-409] This was also an increase over the 
support that the NSP of Necmettin Erbakan obtained during the 
1973 and 1977 elections, when it received 11.8 and 8.4 percent 
of the votes and 48 and 24 parliament seats respectively. In 
his Master's Thesis, Robert Miranda makes it clear that the WP 
was not alone in capturing this 16.7 of the vote and 52 
additional seats in the Assembly. The WP ran in the election 
as a coalition partner with two other right-wing parties, the 
Nationalist Work Party and the Reformist Democratic Party. 
These two parties put forward candidates under the banner of 
the WP when they anticipated that they would not meet the 
barrier of obtaining ten percent of the votes necessary for 
legislative representation under terms of Turkey's 
proportional representation election system. The Nationalist 
Work Party is considered to be the successor of the 
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Ultranationalist, extreme right-wing Nationalist Action Party 
(NAP) of Alpaslan Turkes, one of the parties outlawed by the 
military junta that came to power in 1980. If the NAP's 
election result are reviewed from the 1960s until the 1977 
elections, it can be seen that this party had various levels 
of support as high as 14 percent in 1961, to as low as 2.2 
percent of the votes in 1965. The average support for the NAP 
in the general elections of 1969, 1973 and 1977 was 
approximately 4.26 percent. Thus, it would be a conservative 
estimate to assume that the Nationalist Work Party element of 
the WP coalition, received roughly between 2.2 percent (its 
lowest support in 1965) to 4.26 percent of the vote (its 
average between 1969 and 1977) in the 1991 elections. If this 
support for the Nationalist Work Party is subtracted from the 
16.7 percent of the vote which went to the coalition under the 
WP in 1991, then the WP only realized a scant increase of 0.82 
to 2.88 percent over its 1973 election results, when it 
received its highest percentage of votes, i.e., 11.8 percent. 
[Ref 42:p. 50-52] 
This conclusion is further supported by events that took 
place in the aftermath of the 1991 election. Nineteen of the 
52 members of the Assembly who were elected under the WP in 
1991 election later on defected from the WP to join the 
Nationalist Work Party and three other members of the WP 
reentered the Reformist Democratic Party. Thus, the number of 
seats held by the WP in the parliament dropped from 62 to 40, 
representing only 8.8 percent of the total seats in the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly. [Ref 42:p. 53] 
The inability of Necmettin Erbakan and his Islamist WP (or 
its predecessors, the NOP and the NSP) to receive more than 10 
to 15 percent of the vote in all legislative elections held 
since the 1950s and to obtain a respectable representation in 
the Assembly led the party to change its strategy and channel 
its energy into local governments in the aftermath of the 1991 
general elections. 
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The WP has moved -at least for the time being- from being 
a provincial Anatolian party addressing itself to the petty 
bourgeoisie of small Anatolian towns disrupted by rapid 
industrialization to focusing its local election campaigns on 
obtaining the support of masses, who in the hope of finding a 
new job and securing a brighter future, migrated from the 
countryside to the big cities of more prosperous western 
Anatolia and settled in the ugly shantytowns surrounding these 
cities. The WP now appeals to these shantytown-dwellers who 
have been unable to make the transition from their 
traditional, countryside lifestyle to the completely alien 
lifestyle of these big cities due to the social and economic 
difficulties that they face. 
These shantytowns continue to be constructed overnight 
illegally without the permission of city planners and 
municipal authorities and are inhabited by hundreds of 
thousands of poor migrants who flooded into big cities like 
Istanbul and Ankara at the rate of half a million a year. Most 
of the habitants of these shantytowns, especially the 
latecomers, are employed in the marginal sector, without any 
job security and with a lower pay compared to that of the 
strongly organized, relatively high-wage group of workers, 
exacerbating the existing income inequalities. Unplanned and 
rapid urbanization has prevented the municipal services from 
reaching these shantytowns sufficiently, making life much more 
difficult for these people and their families. Mass media 
exposes the lifestyle of Westernized middle and upper classes 
of these cities to poor shantytown-dwellers. Shocked by the 
differences that they see in terms of both living standards 
and moral values, these people have become a target that can 
easily be exploited by any ideology promising social justice, 
better living standards and the arrest of declining morality. 
The WP, which adopted a propaganda platform in which 
worsening income distribution, corruption in government and 
general decline of morality in society were especially 
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stressed, successfully exploited this group of people in the 
March 1994 local elections and obtained 18.8 percent of the 
votes, making it the third party in the polls after the True 
Path Party (TPP) and another right-of-center party, ANAP. 
[Ref 43:p. 46] In 26 of Turkey's 76 provinces, the candidates 
who entered the local elections under the WP, were elected as 
the city mayors, including in Ankara and Istanbul, Turkey's 
the two most populated cities and, the political and economic 
capitals respectively. 
The WP majors, denouncing corruption within the main 
secular parties and trying to widen the support base of the WP 
by promising social justice, morality and economic prosperity, 
have concentrated on improving public services in the cities 
where they have won the municipal elections. As The Economist 
puts it, for the time being they are picking up rubbish on 
time, fixing the drains and potholes quickly, providing 
subsidized, cheaper bread from their own bakeries and paying 
their employees without any delay, while carefully playing 
down their Islamic zeal. [Ref 44:p 24] The initial attempts by 
some of the WP mayors, such as trying to ban the consumption 
of alcohol in public places and segregating the municipal 
buses by sex, have been dropped in the face of severe 
criticism by the public, the governors of these provinces and 
the government. Especially the proposal by Istanbul Mayor 
Tayyip Erdogan that Istanbul's ancient walls be torn down as 
a symbol of Byzantine Christendom, has brought harsh criticism 
throughout the country and, thus, has been dropped as have 
other similar displays of religiosity. [Ref 45:p. 6] For the 
time being, rather than taking actions that will fuel the 
anxiety and concern felt by the secularists and political 
groups advocating the continuation and development of 
democracy in Turkey, the WP mayors try to pursue a very 
cautious policy and play down the Islamic principles in their 
day-to-day works. 
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It is apparent that the WP is waiting for the next general 
elections which are expected to be held in October of this 
year, one year earlier than the scheduled date, and that it 
wants to enter this election without increasing the existing 
awareness among the secularist majority of the need to 
maintain a countervailing power against the Islamists. 
Thus, the 1995 general elections will be an extremely 
important test for Turkey's right-of-center and left-of-center 
secularist parties which, since the 1950s, have always been 
able to receive more than 70 percent of the votes collectively 
in all of the general elections, in terms of revealing the 
extent to which the Islamist WP is able to become a real 
alternative in the eyes of the Turkish people to the 
secularist parties of the center, and to challenge these 
parties for obtaining the right to govern the country. 
It should be kept in mind that, the danger posed by the 
Islamists lies in the inability of Turkey's ruling secularist 
parties to handle grave economic and social problems of the 
country. Turkey's deteriorating economic conditions, 
particularly vast income inequalities fuelled by high rates of 
inflation and unemployment, have the potential for creating 
socio-economic circumstances that help the Islamists to 
establish closer relations with the poor population groups at 
an increasingly greater speed and scale. This may provide 
Islamist forces with the strong power to mobilize economic as 
well as social protest. As indicated earlier, the new harsh 
austerity measures, announced by Prime Minister Tansu Ciller 
on April 5, 1994, and the prospective layoff of thousands of 
workers in the SEEs within the framework of the privatization 
program included in these measures, have already resulted in 
hundreds of thousands of workers turning the May Day 
celebrations of 1994 into a protest against the government. A 
similar protest was held on December 20, throughout the 
country by the government employees who boycotted their jobs 
for one day to protest the 22.5 percent increase in their 
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yearly salaries while the inflation rate for 1994 was 
announced as more than 140 percent by the government. 
In the words of former Ambassador of the United States to 
Turkey Morton Abramowitz, "with the decay of ideology and the 
decline of political parties on the left and right," 
especially in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, 
"fundamentalist Islam is the only radical alternative in the 
Turkish political system," and the recent success of the WP in 
local elections, "probably rests less on its inherent 
strengths or organizational prowess than on the failure of 
mainstream parties to fulfill their promises" and provide the 
Turkish people with the benefits that they have been waiting 
for so long. [Ref 46:p. 178-179] 
Furthermore, international developments concerning 
relations between Muslim and non-Muslim populations, within 
Europe and around it, also present a threat of strengthening 
the relative power position of Islamist forces in Turkey. The 
inability of the Turkish government to pursue a policy of 
active involvement in the Armeno-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno- 
Karabakh and especially in the ongoing crisis in the Balkans 
in support of the involved Muslim population, has put Turkey 
under heavy pressure from the Muslim sphere both internally 
and externally. Turkey has been constrained from direct 
intervention in the Balkans in support of the Muslim 
population of Bosnia-Hercegovina, fearing that this kind of 
involvement would irreparably set back its integration into 
Europe and severely damage its relations with Washington, has 
tried to ease these pressures by participating in the 
enforcement of the "no-fly" zone over Bosnia-Hercegovina 
(Operation DENY FLIGHT), in the naval forces in the Adriatic 
Sea enforcing the UN sanctions against Serbia (Operation SHARP 
GUARD), and by placing 1,500 Turkish troops under the command 
of the UN forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina (UNPROFOR). However, 
despite these actions, Islamist groups have demanded a more 
active approach, including direct intervention, from the 
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Turkish government and tried to mobilize public support by- 
emphasizing the religious aspects of the situation in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, i.e., the Slav (Orthodox Christian) versus Muslim 
confrontation. For example, Necmettin Erbakan has declared 
that " if we come to power , we will do in Bosnia what we did 
in Cyprus" recalling the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 
1974, when the NSP of Erbakan was a coalition partner of the 
RPP in the government. [Ref 47:p. 19] 
Erbakan has used the tragedy in Bosnia-Hercegovina to 
discredit Turkey's Western-oriented regime and accused the 
government of having left the case of Bosnian Muslims in the 
hands of Western-dominated institutions such as the UN, NATO 
and the EU. In one of his skillful speeches, he criticized 
the government by saying: 
. Bosnia-Hercegovina became an independent 
country of 5 million people governed by the 
Muslims. In a short time the Serbs and Croats 
massacred 250,000 Muslims just because they were 
Muslims. 50,000 innocent women were raped. Two 
million people were forced to leave the country. 
The genocide in Bosnia is probably the second 
biggest one in history after the West's genocide at 
Andalusia. The Germans saved the Croats. 
Unfortunately, Turkey behaved almost like a 
spectator in the tragedy of Bosnia. In fact, by 
simply saying that 'everything that needs to be 
done has been done', Turkey implicitly reassured 
the Serbs against intervention, and, indirectly 
encouraged them to massacre the Muslims. . . As 
disclosed in the letter by British Prime Minister 
Major to Minister in Charge of Foreign Affairs 
Douglas Hurd, the goal of the West is the 
elimination of Bosnian Muslims. [Ref 48:p. 76] 
It also necessary to mention that the EU's rejection of 
Turkey's request for accession to the union has been a big 
blow to Turkey's secularist intelligentsia and the mainstream 
parties that have invested a good deal of political and 
personal capital and time toward achieving Turkey's full 
membership in the EU. Since the foundation of the republic, 
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all of the mainstream parties that came to power have pursued 
a pro-Western policy that aimed at establishing all kinds of 
economic, military and political ties with the democracies in 
the West to promote Turkey's continued economic and societal 
modernization. Within this framework, integration with Europe, 
particularly with the EU, which would also help Turkey to be 
seen and to be perceived as being European, has been one of 
the primary objectives of the Turkish governments. Necmettin 
Erbakan and company, on the other hand, have always opposed 
Turkey's association with the EU and denounced other parties 
as simply being part of a "Western Club" with a "discotheque 
mentality," urging that Turkey not join the EU. [Ref 29:p. 51] 
He has insisted that Turkey should lend greater weight to its 
ties with the Arab and other Muslim countries, and play a 
leading role in the establishment of a "Islamic Common Market" 
rather than trying join the EU where it "could only be the 
gatekeeper living in the basement while Europeans occupied the 
floors above." [Ref 39:p. 16] 
As Turkey's prospect of achieving full membership in the 
EU remains questionable despite its membership struggle which 
started more than 30 years ago with the EC-Turkey Association 
Agreement of 1963, today an increasingly greater number of 
Turkish people question the dream of Turkish entry into the EU 
and many have become convinced that once Turkey overcomes 
existing obstacles to EU membership, the EU will invite new 
ones to prevent Turkey's entry. The common perception among 
the Turkish people is that the West sees no place for Muslim 
Turkey within Europe, and that Turkey is being denied 
membership because of racial, religious or cultural 
differences between the Turkish people and the Europeans. In 
turn, this growing sense of isolation from the West undercuts 
Turkey's secularist mainstream parties' ability to continue to 
mobilize Turkish society along Western ideas, and plays into 
the hands of Islamic forces which pose the greatest threat to 
Turkey's pro-Western orientation. While former President 
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Turgut Ozal warned that Turkey's rejection by the EU would 
push Turkey away from Europe and encourage the spread of 
religious fundamentalism throughout the region, Prime 
Minister Tansu Ciller, in a conversation with U.S. News and 
World Report,   Paris Bureau Chief Fred. Colman,  said that: 
More than 90 percent of the people living in Turkey 
are for a secular and democratic country. But public 
opinion could change for two reasons; prolonged 
economic crisis and rejection by the West. We have 
tried to integrate our economy with the EU. But still 
we are rejected. Over the same period, Spain, Portugal 
and Greece entered the EU and got billions of dollars 
in aid. Our people have started questioning. [Ref 
49:p. 51-52] 
It should also be stated that today, with the emergence of 
largely Turkic- speaking republics in Central Asia onto the 
world political stage, Turkey has attempted to play the role 
of a model for the Westernization and integration of these 
republics into the world economy, and of a vanguard aiming 
at checking the threat of Islamic radicalism or of Iranian 
influence in this region. Therefore, while membership in the 
EU is expected to give Turkey a greater voice in international 
affairs and help Turkey establish its influence over the 
region, its rejection by the EU not only fuels the cause of 
Islamists in Turkey, but also undercuts its claims to be a 
fully western state and prevents Turkey from playing these 
political and economic roles effectively by making Turkey less 
attractive to these countries as a western model. 
Today, there are true signs of politically active, often 
radical, Islamist elements in Turkey. The 1995 general 
elections shall be the best indicator of whether or not the 
secular and democratic nature of the Turkish Republic is 
seriously threatened by Islamic radicalism. However, it should 
also be stated that radical Islam is unlikely to come to power 
in Turkey. Among the key obstacles to a takeover by radical 
Islamist forces in Turkey are the following: 
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First of all, with the authorization of multi-party 
politics in 1946, Turkey has established institutional 
channels for the expression of political preferences and 
social ideas in the last five decades. This has taken the 
pressure in this matter away from religion. While in the 
1950s and 1960s the right-of-center parties developed close 
associations with different Islamist groups, in the last two 
decades, unlike the earlier era, this representation has taken 
the form of direct representation of Islamist groups in the 
various levels of Islamist parties as well as right-of-center 
secular parties. The direct representation of Islamist groups 
in the competitive politics of a parliamentary democracy, when 
combined with day-to-day political needs of a relatively 
urbanized, educated and industrialized Turkey, has gradually 
pushed religious issues into background and forced these 
Islamist groups to move away from their extremist stands 
toward moderation. In other words, the extremism of Turkish 
Islam has been deradicalized by the participation of Islamist 
groups in national politics and open elections. 
Second, the radical reforms initiated by Ataturk in the 
country's political, social, and economic life has made 
religion, within the past 70 years following the foundation of 
the republic, a private matter for many in Turkish society. 
Turkey's political institutions, education system, mass media, 
economy and state bureaucracy have functioned to support this 
structure where the affairs of state are separated from 
religion's influence and where Islam is restricted to the 
private sphere. As a result, for the majority of Turkish 
people Islam today is far from being an effective regulator of 
social, economic and political life. Even in the 1970s, 
Turkey's socio-economic and political needs had put a certain 
limitation upon a purely religious approach by the NSP to 
these issues. Within the past two decades, Turkey's exposure 
to the West has increased, its technological, industrial and 
socio-economic development has acquired greater speed. Today, 
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the political and socio-economic needs of the country are much 
more complex than in the 1970s. Thus, the majority of Turkish 
people does not conceive the WP and its ideology and approach 
to the complex needs of the country as a real alternative to 
the mainstream secular parties. 
Third, the Shi'a minority in Turkey (the Alevis) which is 
estimated to comprise approximately 20 percent of Turkey's 
total population, has traditionally objected to the imposition 
of Islamic law (Sharia), which would mean Sunni religious 
domination over the Shi'a minority. The Alevis thus has 
supported political parties that are committed to the 
secularist values and protection of their rights as a 
religious minority group. The Alevis continue their tradition 
of "bloc voting" in favor of the secular parties of left-of- 
center in the general elections, a tradition which started 
with Ataturk's own secular Republican Peoples Party and still 
continues with today's secular parties of left-of-center 
generally. 
Finally, the Turkish Armed Forces which have taken on a 
role as guardians, not only of the national security and 
constitution of the republic, but also of Kemalism, constitute 
a powerful barrier to the attainment of absolute power by the 
Islamist. 
In their military education, officer candidates are 
instilled with the values of Kemalism from the very beginning. 
To a considerable degree, the military has successfully 
instilled the Kemalist spirit in its officers who proudly view 
the role of the military in protecting the democratic state 
against not only external enemies, but also the extremes of 
left and right, including radical Islam. Through its strict 
hierarchical structure and education system the military has 
maintained this distinctive outlook. Cohesiveness and 
discipline are believed to have made the officer corps immune 
to radicalism. In order to continue this cohesiveness and 
prevent the infiltration of extremism of any kind into its 
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ranks, the Turkish armed forces continually conduct 
investigations of all ranks and services, resulting in the 
dismissal of military personnel from the service in case they 
are determined to have any kind of involvement in radicalism. 
For instance, in the aftermath of a recent investigation, six 
Turkish Navy officers, including one Lieutenant and one 
Lieutenant Commander, and a Turkish Army officer were 
dismissed from the service on December 20, 1994, on the 
grounds of having been involved in fundamentalist Islamic 
activism. [Ref 37:p. 1] 
Ataturk had always insisted that the military forces, as 
a national institution above partisanship, should stay out of 
politics. However, on three occasions, in 1960, 1971 and 1980, 
the senior military have judged it necessary to intervene to 
guide Turkey's political development toward the eventual 
achievement of Ataturk's goal: a modern, secular republic. 
Especially in the case of the intervention of 1980, the 
military's perception of a growing threat of Islamic 
fundamentalism and anti-Westernism in Turkey, helped 
precipitate the military coup. 
Today, the Turkish armed forces, with their traditional 
commitment to the Kemalism and the secular constitution of the 
republic, remain as one of the most important barriers to the 
rise of Islamic radicalism at the expense of Kemalist reforms, 
and to any change of the secular and democratic principles of 
the constitution of the republic. Although it is unlikely that 
the WP will be able to obtain votes, sufficient to form a 
single-party government in the next general elections, it has 
thrown a challenge to Turkey's secular mainstream parties by 
winning the March 1994 local elections in Ankara, Istanbul and 
24 other municipalities. This has had a damaging impact on 
West European perceptions of Turkey and many Western 
commentators have started to mention Turkey with Egypt and 
Algeria as regimes threatened by Islamic fundamentalism. It is 
a fact that West Europeans have come to perceive political and 
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cultural Islam as a serious threat to their societies. The 
fears and prejudices in the West about Muslims have been 
greatly magnified under the influence of international and 
domestic developments like exposure to the unfamiliar 
lifestyles of Muslim guest workers, immigrants, refugees, 
Khomeini's Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the rise of anti- 
Western, militant Islam. The success of the WP in the local 
elections has been sufficient for Europeans to view Turkey and 
its 70-year-old secular and democratic regime as seriously 
threatened by Islamic fundamentalism. The danger is that if 
the WP manages to repeat its success in the next general 
elections with the votes coming from people protesting the 
growing income differences and declining living standards, 
and thus obtain a respectable representation in the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly, Turkey will be placed within this 
broad enemy image of the Muslim world, burying all the Turkish 
hopes of further integration into Europe and putting its 30 
years of struggle for full membership in the famous "Western 
Club" to rest. 
3. Kurdish Problem 
Over the past four years, Turkey's once-dormant Kurdish 
issue has reached an unprecedented intensity in both domestic 
and foreign affairs and become a threat to the territorial 
integrity of the Turkish state. It has also strained the 
country's relations with its Western allies who demanded a 
greater degree of respect for human rights in Turkey's 
approach to the problem. Resurgent Kurdish nationalism and 
escalating terror of the Partiya Karkere Kurdistan (PKK- 
Kurdistan Workers' Party) has also exacerbated the tensions in 
Turkey's relations with its southern and south-eastern 
neighbors willing to exploit the problem to weaken the Turkish 
state. 
The sensitivity of the Turkish people and governments on 
the problem stems from some historical facts. With the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the World 
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War I, and the Treaty of Sevres of August 10, 1920, the vast 
territories of the Empire were divided up among the victorious 
powers. Even Anatolia, the only remaining homeland for Turks 
from these vast territories, was partitioned except for a tiny 
area in Central Anatolia, deemed by the Allied Powers to be 
sufficient for a new Turkish state. The Treaty of Sevres 
called for an Armenian state in eastern Anatolia and an 
autonomous Kurdistan in south-eastern Anatolia. Regarding 
Kurdistan, the treaty stated that "a scheme of local autonomy 
for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the 
Euphrates" should be drafted, and went on to say that: 
... If within one year from the coming into force of 
the present Treaty the Kurdish people. . . show that 
a majority of the population of these areas desires 
independence from Turkey, and if the Council then 
considers that these are capable of such independence 
and recommends that it should be granted to them, 
Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, 
and to renounce all rights and title over these 
areas. [Ref 50:p. 659] 
Turkish nationalism was born as a reaction to this 
treaty, which expressed the will of the victors of the World 
War I and was agreed to by powerless Ottoman Sultan sitting in 
Istanbul. Following the four-year Turkish War of Independence 
which was fought under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the 
Treaty of Lausanne was signed between the same Allied Powers 
and the new nationalist government in Ankara in 1923, 
delineating and codifying the territorial boundaries of the 
new Turkish state while burying the Treaty of Serves with its 
plans for Kurdistan. Thus, for the Turkish people, while the 
Treaty of Sevres has come to mean the defeat of the Ottoman 
Empire by the imperialist forces and a threat to the existence 
of Turkey, the Treaty of Lausanne has come to be associated 
with the War of Independence and the victory of the Turkish 
nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal against these 
imperialist forces. 
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Turkey views any attempt, internal or external, to change 
the territorial boundaries of the Turkish Republic, as an open 
challenge to the legal, historical and political legacy of the 
War of Independence out of which the modern Turkish state 
emerged, and to the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. As long 
as the Partiya Karkere Kurdistan, claiming to be the sole 
representative of the Turkey's Kurdish population, continues 
its campaign of violence and espouses separatism toward the 
establishment of an independent Kurdistan, the Kurdish 
problem, for the Turkish people, takes on a dimension 
different from giving Turkey's Kurdish population the right to 
speak, teach or issue publications in Kurdish. 
There are an estimated eight to twelve million Kurds in 
Turkey. While originally concentrated in south-eastern region 
of the country, with the large scale migrations in the recent 
decades—estimated at more than 100,000 annually—they are 
distributed among the larger cities of Marmara, the Aegean and 
Central Anatolia, creating large Kurdish enclaves in these 
cities. The eastern and south-eastern regions of the country, 
where Kurds originally concentrated, have traditionally been 
the most underdeveloped parts of Turkey. Mountainous terrain 
and harsh climate have considerably prevented the development 
and maintenance of the infrastructure in the region, and 
despite the state's continuous attempts of encouraging the 
private sector to make investment in these parts of the 
country, the private sector, attracted by the economic 
opportunities, availability of qualified labor force and 
adequate infrastructure in the more prosperous western 
regions, has not responded positively to these incentives 
devised by the state and continue to ignore these parts of 
the country in their investment plans. With its limited 
financial resources, the state has tried to create employment 
opportunities in the region by locating production facilities 
of the various SEEs in the region, continuing to run 
unprofitable state farms and overstaffing the public offices 
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there. However, from communications to transportation, from 
health services to education and employment opportunities, 
these regions have remained the most backward, the poorest and 
the most isolated parts of the country. Hoping to find new 
employment opportunities and secure a brighter future for 
themselves and their families, millions of Kurds have migrated 
to the more prosperous western parts of the country. In those 
cities, the majority of Kurds have been integrated first with 
the work force and then steadily assimilated into the 
surrounding Turkish society. 
Kurdish unrest in south-eastern Turkey is not a new 
development. The first uprising against the state took place 
in 1925, and was led by a Kurdish religious leader, Sheikh 
Said. However, his appeal was both religious and nationalist. 
He and other dervish leaders of the Naqshbandi order, one of 
the religious orders that had been banned as part of secular 
reforms, urged their Kurdish followers to overthrow the 
"godless" government in Ankara. [Ref l:p. 52] The Sheik Said 
uprising was followed by two other uprisings of lesser 
importance in 1930 and between 1936 and 1938, all of which 
were suppressed by the Turkish military. From the suppression 
of the Kurdish revolts of the 1930s until the early 1970s, the 
Kurds of south-east Turkey were not active politically. The 
Kurdish issue re-emerged as a source of violent anti-state 
activity in the late 1970s on the back of the growth in 
radical politics in Turkey during that decade. 
During the late 1970s, the years preceding the September 
12, 1980, military intervention, the PKK emerged as a branch 
of radical left-wing student politics. The PKK, aiming at 
carving out a separate Kurdish state in the predominantly 
Kurdish areas, has engaged in an armed struggle with the 
Turkish security forces. From the early days of its inception, 
the PKK received military and logistical backing from external 
powers, primarily Syria, which has longstanding territorial 
and ideological disputes with Ankara. In the aftermath of the 
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1980 military intervention, the PKK, in the face of purge 
operations of the Turkish army, fled to Syria. While PKK 
recruits were given Syrian identity documents and taken to the 
training camps in Syrian controlled Beka'a Valley in eastern 
Lebanon, Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the PKK, was allowed to 
reside in Damascus. The PKK-led violence in south-eastern 
Turkey remained at a low intensity until 1984 under the 
martial imposed by the military junta. 
In the summer of 1984, PKK cadres divided into two 
section, smuggled themselves from northern Iraq into Turkey 
and attacked two small Turkish towns, Semdinli and Eruh. 
Turkey responded by stepping up its military campaign against 
the PKK and entering into an "hot pursuit" accord with Baghdad 
with which Saddam Hussein gave permission to Turkey enter Iraq 
in order to launch military campaign against the PKK camps in 
norther Iraq. Iran protested the agreement and accused Turkey 
of siding with Iraq in its war against Iraq. For Iran, Turkey 
was helping Iraq to police the northern parts of the country, 
and defend both Iraqi territory and the Turkish-Iraqi oil 
pipeline against Iraqi Kurdish groups backed by Iran. From 
late 1984 till the end of Iran-Iraq war, armed clashes went on 
in northern Iraq and south-east Turkey, with Syria and Iran on 
one side supporting the Kurdish rebels, and Iraq and Turkey 
seeking to repress them. 
It was during this period that the PKK engaged in 
Vietcong-style guerrilla tactics designed to frightened the 
local population, the majority of which is Kurdish, into 
supporting it. With its Marxist-Leninist philosophy completely 
alien to the local mentality of south-eastern Turkey, the PKK 
initially made little progress in winning support from the 
Kurdish population who resented the brutal PKK attacks on 
their villages. However, its other strategy, reducing the 
legitimacy of the Turkish government in the eyes of Kurdish 
population, has been more successful. Toward this aim, the PKK 
has launched night attacks to the Turkish border stations and 
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ambushed the security forces; raided the state farms, 
government buildings, production facilities of various State 
Economic Enterprises; and damaged the roads, railways, 
communication and electricity networks in the region. In the 
face of rapidly intensifying PKK attacks and growing 
casualties and material damage, the government has felt 
compelled to increase the presence of the security forces in 
the region and, in 1987, for a state of emergency to be 
extended every four months in ten provinces in the south-east 
of the country by a parliamentary vote. 
Increased military presence in the region, the 
introduction of the state of emergency, the evacuation of the 
some of the widely scattered villages for security reasons, 
government policies and practices against the expression of 
their ethnic identity by the Kurdish population, when combined 
with the traditional backwardness and isolation of the region 
from other parts of the country, have caused an increasingly 
greater number of Kurdish people to perceive the Turkish 
government to be hostile to themselves, and, thus, to held 
grievances against the Turkish state. These government 
policies had a counter-productive effect exacerbating the 
polarization of Turkish society along ethnic lines. Many 
Kurds, even those who are not involved in the violence, have 
found themselves on the defensive. The government's policies, 
by alienating the local Kurdish population, have unfortunately 
played into the hands of the PKK as planned by this group. 
While the PKK totaled a few hundreds of supporters in 1984 
when it launched its attacks in south-east Turkey, in 1992, 
according to a report prepared for the president and cited by 
the Turkish Daily News, it numbered some 10,000 to 15,000 PKK 
guerrillas scattered in the mountainous region. [Ref 51:p. 
122] Ilnur Cevik, the editor of the Turkish Daily News, states 
that "Our elephant (the Turkish forces), while trying to crush 
the fly (the PKK), seems to be missing the insect and in the 
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process is destroying everything it steps on," contributing to 
the popularity of the PKK. [Ref 51:p. 125] 
Against this background, in July 1990 the Social 
Democratic Populist Party (SDP) issued an unprecedented report 
on the south-east, recommending a number of measures that it 
envisaged would help build confidence between the state and 
Kurdish population of the south-east, and eliminate the main 
causes of the problem. Among the recommended measures were the 
abrogation of a law introduced in 1983 implicitly banning the 
use of the Kurdish language, ending the state of emergency 
declared in 1987, and abolishing the Village Guard system 
introduced in 1985 as a system of civilian militias to 
supplement the Turkish security forces in the region and help 
local villagers protect their villages from PKK attacks. While 
the public discussion on the Kurdish issue reached an 
unprecedented level with this report and the foundation of the 
People's Labor Party (HEP) by a group of Kurdish deputies of 
the Turkish parliament, the Turkish government, meeting under 
the chairmanship of President Turgut Ozal decided to abolish 
the law restricting the use of languages other than Turkish. 
In April 1991, with an extensive package of legal reforms 
approved by the Turkish parliament, Turkey's Kurdish 
population became legally free to speak Kurdish and practice 
their own customs. The performance of Kurdish music and 
singing were also permitted. The new government that came to 
power in the aftermath of October 1991 general elections 
continued to seek political solutions to the problem by 
offering language and cultural concessions. The government 
granted the Kurdish people freedom to issue publications in 
Kurdish and establish a Kurdish cultural institute. [Ref 32:p. 
689] Textbooks in Turkish on how to learn Kurdish, books in 
Kurdish on Kurdish poetry and traditional tales, books on the 
Kurdish uprisings during Ataturk's time and publications 
carrying articles with titles, such as "The Turkish State, in 
Pursuit of Expansionist Goals, Attacks Southern Kurdistan," 
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and "Kurdistan Cannot Advance an Exploitative Administration" 
have become available in the bookstores, as have newspapers 
printed in Kurdish. [Ref 29:p. 43] 
These developments marked an clear attempt by the Turkish 
governments to build confidence between the state and the 
Kurdish population which became increasingly alienated by the 
earlier counter-productive government policies, and to find a 
political middle ground for the Kurdish problem which would 
take the pressure in this matter from PKK-led violence. 
However, the positive, hopeful atmosphere that emerged in 
Turkey in 1991 and early 1992 remained far from yielding 
tangible results. The PKK, afraid of marginalization of its 
organization and methods, immediately stepped up its campaign 
of violence against the state in order to spoil the newly- 
born hopeful atmosphere. Taking advantage of the collapse of 
Saddam Hussein's power in northern Iraq, the PKK transferred 
its headquarters from Lebanon and intensified its incursions 
across the Turkish frontier. 
Intensification of the PKK-led violence also coincided 
with the open offense of the HEP deputies to the symbol of the 
Turkish state at every opportunity. The HEP, which could not 
fulfill all the stipulations of the electoral law in time to 
participate in the October 1991 general elections, had run in 
the election under the banner of SDP and obtained 22 seats in 
the Turkish parliament. During the inauguration ceremony of 
the new Turkish parliament on November 6, 1991, which was 
broadcast live by more than 15 domestic TV stations throughout 
the country and recorded by tens of foreign TV stations, HEP 
deputies Hatip Dicle and Leyla Zana, for the first time in the 
history of the republic, added separatist sentiments to their 
oath-taking in front of the whole parliament, the President, 
the Prime Minister, the Chief of Turkish General Staff, the 
Service Commanders, high level bureaucrats and millions of TV 
viewers. For example, Leyla Zana, after reading the oath of 
office, violated the rules of parliamentary conduct by making 
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certain additions, in Kurdish, to the text of the oath and 
saying, before leaving the dais, "Live Kurdish people and 
Kurdistan."[Ref 52:p. 1] Similarly, on the first day of the 
new Turkish parliament, the HEP deputies had also not 
hesitated to wear ties, handkerchiefs, or hairbands colored 
with red, yellow and green, the three colors used by the 
Kurdish separatists. 
While the government's policies toward Kurdish problem 
were complicated by the intensification of the PKK's campaign 
against the state and the repercussions of the actions taken 
by Kurdish deputies of the parliament, the crushing of the 
Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq in March and April 1991 by 
the Iraqi military and the subsequent massive flight of Iraqi 
Kurds toward the Turkish border, has added a third dimension 
to the problem, further complicating Turkey's position. The 
exodus of Iraqi Kurdish refugees towards the Turkish and 
Iranian frontiers began during the first two weeks of April 
1991, so that by the middle of the month it was reported that 
around 500,000 were massed along the frontier with Turkey. The 
Turkish Red Crescent, the army, local villagers and later on 
some international aid agencies did their best to help these 
people, but it soon became clear that the situation was 
unsustainable. The flood of refugees faced the Turkish 
government with a dilemma. On the one hand, it could not 
ignore the humanitarian dimension of the problem, on the other 
hand it was reluctant to allow the refugees to move to the 
inner parts of the country. If it did so, it would acquire the 
long-term responsibility for their care and accommodation 
which would imply a heavy burden on the state budget. 
Furthermore, the government was also concerned that, mixed 
among the Kurdish refugees, there could be PKK members and 
sympathizers who have engaged in an armed struggle with the 
state security forces for long. By the middle of April it 
became accepted that the only solution for Turkey would be to 
move refugees back to northern Iraq. However, there was no 
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Chance they would do so without protection against Iraqi 
forces. For Turkey this meant going back on what had been a 
fixed point in the Turkish policy toward Iraq; firm opposition 
to any sort of partition of Iraq, either implicit or explicit, 
which would imply acceptance of the idea of Kurdish autonomy 
in Iraq. Nevertheless, Turgut Ozal, seeing no other way out, 
suggested that the UN should take over territory in northern 
Iraq to provide a "safe heaven" for the Kurdish refugees. At 
the end of April, coalition troops in northern Iraq began 
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT by establishing a security zone of 
170,000 square miles to which the refugees could turn. [Ref 
50:p. 674] In July, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was succeeded by 
Operation POISED HAMMER in which coalition troops were 
withdrawn from Iraqi territory, but succeeded by a coalition 
force of 2,000 men from five different countries including 
Turkey, stationed at the Turkish border town of Silopi. The 
coalition force was gradually withdrawn from Silopi, but the 
special air contingent at Incirlik Airbase near Adana, 
consisting of 32 American, five French and eight British 
fighters, was retained within the framework of Operation 
POISED HAMMER. [Ref 53:p. 1] 
By proposing the formation of a "safe haven" in northern 
Iraq, Turkey has automatically contributed to Iraq's losing 
state authority over northern Iraq and to the creation of a 
political vacuum in this part of the country. This political 
vacuum was filled by the Iraqi Kurds, leading to the emergence 
in the spring of 1992 of what is, in effect, an unofficial 
Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq under the 
protection of the international force. Thus, Turkey which has 
always been concerned about any kind of influence that will 
encourage its own Kurds to seek independence, has found itself 
in a contradiction which still remains unresolved. Turkey, on 
various occasions, has declared that it opposes any partition 
of Iraq which could lead to the creation of a Kurdish state in 
northern Iraq. On the other hand, the mandate for the 
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stationing of the air contingent at Incirlik Airbase has been 
continuously renewed by the Turkish parliament in six- month 
installments since the start of Operation POISED HAMMER, 
contributing to the institutionalization of a separate Iraqi 
Kurdish identity in northern Iraq and keeping the territorial 
integrity of Iraq in doubt. 
As the Turkish government's attempts of finding a 
political middle ground for the Kurdish problem were presented 
with the complicating factors mentioned above, the Turkish 
government has found it a more secure approach to pursue a 
cautious policy toward the problem. Hardliners in both the 
government and the military have stated their concerns that 
the recent reforms such as lifting the ban on the use of 
Kurdish language and providing freedom to issue publications 
in Kurdish would lead to other demands, then leading to 
demands for autonomy, federation and eventually a separate 
Kurdish state on the Turkish land as envisaged, more than 70 
years ago, in the Treaty of Sevres. Meanwhile, the deaths of 
Turkish soldiers, which totaled 1,768 between 1992 and 1994, 
and the arrival of their coffins in various Anatolian towns 
and villages increased the anti-Kurdish feelings throughout 
the country. The resentment that was felt against the PKK 
throughout the country had reached an unprecedented level when 
a PKK squad in Bit1is ambushed and killed 35 unarmed Turkish 
soldiers in Bitlis who had completed their terms as soldiers 
and were on the way to their homes in May 1993. The radical 
and provocative statements and actions of some extremist HEP 
deputies against the Turkish state, which had openly started 
during the inauguration ceremony of the Turkish parliament on 
November 6, 1991, continued in an increasing manner, and thus 
have exacerbated- the public disturbance. The pro-Kurdish 
Democracy Party (DEP), founded by the same party cadres of HEP 
in May 1993 after the state authorities started legal 
proceedings against the HEP, held a party convention which 
turned a separatist convention and show of the PKK. In this 
94 
t o  f t  ir nti ent t I cirli  ir ase as een 
nti usl  r e  y t  urkis  arl ent i  i - onth 
l nts  t  t rt f perati  I  MER, 
ntri t  t  t  t io l t  f  arat  i 
urdis  ntit   ort r    ee i  t  rri ri l 
t rit  f   oubt. 
s  urki  ver ent's t e pts f   
oliti l iddl   r  urdis  r  ere r t  
it   plicati  t r  enti  ove,  urkis  
r ent s  ore r  r   r  
t s li  ar   r l . ardli ers  t   
ent   ilit    ir cer s t 
 t s   tin      s  f 
urdi  i  eedo   bli t  
urdi oul  t r ands,    
ands y, r t  ent all  ar t  
urdi ur i i d, or
r , r t f vres. eanwhile, t f 
r i l i rs, hi   4, 
l i f r natoli o s
i la -K r i n o t
ntr . e t t as l i st
hro t t r t l h
 itl bus i e r i
i itl plet i erm l i
er h i e a . i l
cat tatem t o o ist
ti i t h r i , hi l te
n h n r t o rem h r i iam t
ber , inu n n n anner, h
t h l turb . r i
ocr (D ), ou h a  
in  th . rit a te e
th ,  t i
turne a r ti t o show th . t
 
Convention, the DEP gave signals that it would become even 
more radical. It kept this promise when its chairman Hatip 
Dicle tried to justify a PKK bomb attack in Istanbul's Tuzla 
district against military cadets waiting at a rail station, 
which left five young soldiers dead, as a rightful action. 
In this atmosphere, which replaced the hopeful atmosphere 
of 1991 and early 1992, the PKK-led violence has continued and 
thus not given the Turkish government the chance to reduce its 
military presence in east and south-east Turkey or lift the 
state of emergency which was declared in 1987 in ten 
provinces. According to Turkish official numbers declared on 
January 2, 1995, in 7,793 PKK-related incidents that took 
place between January 1992 and December 1994, 1,768 members of 
the state security forces and 527 village guards were killed, 
and 8,811 PKK terrorists have been captured by the state 
security forces. Within these three years 2,115 villages have 
been evacuated for security reasons, 5,210 village schools 
remained closed and 192 schools were set on fire by the PKK. 
[Ref 54:p. 1] 
Today, the Turkish government needs to review its approach 
to the Kurdish problem. Some still argue for a continued 
military effort to reduce the PKK-led violence. The radical 
and provocative statements made by the deputies of pro-Kurdish 
parties, their determination to give offense to the symbols of 
the Turkish state at every opportunity, the intensification of 
the PKK-led violence throughout the country within the past a 
few years have strengthened the position of these people who 
see the Turkish government's attempts of finding a political 
middle ground for the Kurdish problem, which would take the 
pressure in this matter from the, as the first extremely 
dangerous steps toward the eventual disintegration of the 
country. Others seek to reduce the level of violence through 
political reforms that will provide the Kurdish population 
with increased cultural and educational rights, and economic 
growth in the east and south-east regions. 
95 
convention, t  EP ave si als t at it ould be e even 
ore r dical. t ept t is r ise hen it  c ai an atip 
icle t  t  j sti  a P  b t  i  I t bul's uzla 
istri t ainst ilit r  adets aiti  t a il t t , 
hich ft  ng l i rs ead, s a r tf l cti n. 
 i  t osphere, hic  l  t  opeful t osphere 
f 1  rl  92, t  K-led i l e as nti   
s ot i   urkis  er ent t  ce t  e  
ilit  r   st  t -east ur e  r t t  
t  f er e c  hi  as ecl r      
r vi ces. ccordi   urki  ffi i l bers cl   
r  , 95,  ,  K-relat  i ts t  
l   r    ec ber 94, ,  e bers f 
  rit    i  ar s er  il , 
 ri t  t     
ri s. wit i r ,  i a
at ri s,  i a ol  
ai l er t .
[ f : . ] 
ay, r i ent e
ur i . t n
ili rt -l . i l
cat tatem t a uti r i
rt , i i t bol
h r i ort nit , h c io
h -l e hrou t h t it h t  
few trengthen h si io h l  
th r i ent' tem t indin  li
i l ou th r i e , i l ak h
in th att from th th r rem
tep tow th t l inte io th
t t see to redu  th le o en throug
l reform  th il th r i l o
i h increased c an  e t rign an  econo i  
grow  in the e  and so re o  
95 
Indeed, the successive Turkish governments have always 
pursued the strategy of fostering the economic development of 
the eastern and south-eastern regions and thus reducing the 
poverty of these regions, in the belief that an improvement 
in living standards will defuse separatist ambitions. The GAP, 
which will double Turkey's total agricultural output by 
opening an additional 1.7 million hectares of land to 
irrigation, and create a total of 3,324,000 new jobs, has been 
the centerpiece of this strategy. However, due to the 
financial difficulties of the country, Turkey has been able to 
complete, after spending more than 10 years and $11 billion, 
only 40 percent of the irrigation projects and 56 percent of 
energy projects included in the GAP by the end of 1994. [Ref 
31:p. 4] Turkey still needs to spend more than $20 billions in 
order the complete the project, the final expenditure for 
which is estimated to be around $32 billion. Although bringing 
economic prosperity to the south-east and pulling down the 
high rate of unemployment in the region have acquired greater 
urgency with the intensification of the violence in the 
region, if the Turkish economy does not recover quickly from 
the crisis that it fell into recently, Turkey will not be able 
to transform the proposed benefits of the project into reality 
for at least another decade.       "*" 
Therefore, the political reforms that will provide the 
Kurdish population with increased cultural and educational 
rights remain the only alternative available to the Turkish 
government. While liberal policies toward the Kurdish problem, 
initiated in 1991 under President Turgut Ozal and Premier 
Suleyman Demirel constituted first steps in this direction, 
Tansu Ciller government that came to power with the death of 
Turgut Ozal and election of Suleyman Demirel as president, has 
refrained from taking additional steps that will further 
contribute to the attempts of building confidence between the 
state and the Kurdish population. Her inexperience in domestic 
policy matters, and the new government's decision to give 
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priority to the economic matters in an attempt to pull the 
country out of the economic crisis that it fell into, have 
strengthened the position of hardliners who wanted to deal 
with the Kurdish problem through military means rather than 
political. As the new government hardened its stance toward 
the problem, the Kurdish violence throughout Turkey has 
increased, proving once more the necessity of methods, other 
than military, to handle the problem. 
Today, the government needs to take the initiative and 
pursue political reforms that will prevent further alienation 
of the Kurdish population from the state, and rebuild the 
confidence between the state and its Kurdish population. The 
reform package of 1991 which lifted the ban on the use of 
Kurdish language and provided the freedom to issue 
publications in Kurdish, can be enlarged by lifting the ban on 
radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish. The government may 
also allow the Kurdish people to open their own schools, and 
let them teach and learn in their own schools where the medium 
of instruction is Kurdish. However, at this point, it should 
also be stated that Turkey is confronted by a terrorist 
movement which continues to claim not only the lives of state 
security forces, but also the lives of non-combatants, 
including teachers, health workers and men of religion as 
well as children. Thus, on the issue of PKK-led violence, 
determined opposition to terror remains the only alternative 
available to Turkey. Additional initiatives, like abolishing 
the law that introduced states of emergency in ten provinces 
of east and south-east Turkey or decreasing the number of 
security forces stationed in the regions of violence would, of 
course, be helpful in increasing the effectiveness of this 
kind of cultural and educational reforms in reducing the 
violence and building confidence between the state and the 
Kurdish population. The ability of the Turkish government to 
take these initiatives, depends on the evolution of the PKK's 
activities. Today it has become clear that the PKK aims at 
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creating an environment ridden by violence, which would compel 
the Turkish state to harden its attitude toward the Kurdish 
problem and thus pave the way to the polarization of society 
along ethnic lines. It should be kept in mind that the PKK 
does not represent all Kurds, and, thus, the Turkish 
government in its war against the PKK should pay attention not 
to alienate millions of Kurds totally assimilated to the 
surrounding society by forcing them to make a choice between 
the state and the PKK. This task, in the face rising levels of 
PKK-led violence, is increasingly difficult. 
Turkey would be far better off if it could put the Kurdish 
problem behind it. It has already diverted resources and 
energy away from the pursuit of other domestic and 
international goals. Operations of the Turkish security forces 
in both Turkey and northern Irag, damage to the infrastructure 
and government property, compensation payments to the 
government workers and employees working in the region, and 
housing grants to local villagers whose houses were evacuated 
for security reasons cost Turkey an estimated total of $3 to 
$4 billion every year. At a time when Turkey seeks to expand 
its role in regional and international affairs, the 
continuation of the domestic violence and instability also 
undermines Turkey's role as a stabilizing influence in the 
turbulent regions of the world. As long as the Kurdish 
conflict continues, Turkey will remain vulnerable to the 
manipulations of Syria and Iran which continue supporting the 
PKK despite Turkey's attempts of halting their support 
Syria has periodically used its support for the PKK as an 
instrument of pressure against Turkey. The longstanding 
territorial and ideological differences between Damascus and 
Ankara have played an important role in motivating Syria to 
maintain this instrument of pressure against Turkey. Turkey's 
ability to cut off the flow of the Euphrates, which is badly 
needed downstream by Syria, has been an additional concern for 
this country. The "water problem" came to the fore again in 
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January 1990 when Turkey completed the construction of the 
body of the Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates and greatly reduced 
the flow of the river for one month as it partially filled the 
reservoir behind the dam. It was only after the victory of the 
United States-led coalition forces over Iraq and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union that Syria asked the PKK to 
vacate the training camps in the Bekaa Valley in a response to 
the pressures exerted by Turkey and the United States. Despite 
its promises to end support for the PKK, Syria has continued 
to provide clandestine assistance to the PKK. Even if Syria 
stops providing assistance, it can always revive its support 
for the PKK if its interests dictate. 
Iran, on the other hand, has its own reasons for fostering 
instability in Turkey. With the end of Cold War and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, it has been engaged in a 
rivalry with Turkey in establishing influence among the newly 
independent republics of Central Asia. Iran has also been 
disturbed by Turkey's pro-Azerbaijani stand with regard to 
Armeno-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno Karabakh and the active 
role that Turkey played in the Nagorno-Karabakh mediation 
process. Furthermore, both Iran and Syria, which have been 
long disturbed by Turkey's traditional pro-Western orientation 
and its democratic, secular regime, look on Turkey as a Trojan 
Horse which serves the United States in the establishment of 
a permanent Western presence in the Middle East. 
One of the other most adverse effects of the prolonged 
Kurdish problem is the damage that it has done to Turkey's 
relation with its European allies and the United States. For 
instance, the good relations between Germany and Turkey have 
severely suffered from the problem and it does not seem to be 
easy to restore them to their previous level. The German 
government's permissive attitude toward PKK activities in 
Germany has given the PKK freedom to direct its attacks 
against Turkish government and business interests in Europe 
from German soil. Despite Turkey's heavy pressure, Germany 
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continued its permissive attitude until November 26, 1993, 
when the Federal Interior Minister Manfred Kanther announced 
that the PKK was henceforth banned in Germany. [Ref 47:p. 101] 
German-Turkish relations were further strained when Germany 
decided to suspend military aid to Turkey in 1992 because 
previously supplied equipment had been used in security 
operations in south-east Turkey. Even though the aid has been 
restored, Bonn announced that supposedly due to fiscal 
constraints associated with the unification, Germany will end 
its long-standing military aid to Turkey by the end of 1995. 
Because of the sensitivity of Europeans to human rights 
concerns, the Kurdish problem also has the potential to 
destabilize EU-Turkish relations. The EU and the Council of 
Europe's Parliamentary Assembly have on various occasions 
criticized the Turkish government's alleged disregard of human 
rights in its fight against the PKK. The closure of the DEP by 
the Constitutional Court in July 1994 and the sentencing of 
six of its former deputies to prison terms of up to 15 years 
in December 1994 by the State Security Court, have resulted in 
further straining of Turkey's relations with its Western 
allies. Turkey has, on various occasions, stated that these 
six former DEP deputies have not been convicted, as some have 
stated, of having said things the Turkish government or 
military preferred not to hear, but of having established 
organic links with the PKK and giving shelter to the PKK 
militants who tried to escape the search operations of the 
state security forces. The Turkish government has also stated 
that Turkey, submitted to the European Human Rights Convention 
and its control mechanisms, will abide by the any possible 
ruling of the European Human Rights Court on the case if the 
verdict of the State Security Court is appealed by the 
defendants to the European Human Rights Convention. These 
statements and the court evidences including the 
communications of some of these deputies with PKK leader 
Abdullah Ocalan, monitored and recorded by the National 
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Intelligence Agency, have not prevented many European 
officials from harshly criticizing Turkey and warning it about 
the implications of its actions on Turkey's integration 
process with the EU. Michael Lake, the EU's representative to 
Turkey, has gone further and stated that "currently the 
European Parliament believes that the human rights issue in 
Turkey has become serious enough to prevent Turkey's custom 
union with EU," reminding the Turkish officials of the 
necessity of the European Parliament's approval for the 
effectivity of the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement signed on 
March 6, 1995. [Ref 55:p. 3] 
The relations between the United States and Turkey have 
also been harmed by Turkey's prolonged Kurdish problem. Even 
though the United States has traditionally supported Turkey in 
its war against terrorism and provided Turkey with military 
equipment, especially AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters and S70-A 
Black Hawk General Purpose helicopters which are heavily used 
by the state security forces against the PKK, it has been 
critical of Turkey's human rights record especially with 
respect to the Kurdish population. The FY95 aid bill signed by 
President Clinton in August 1994, stipulates that 10 percent 
of the $364.5 million in direct loans earmarked for Turkey 
will be withheld until the United States Department of State, 
in consultation with Department of Defense, makes certain that 
Turkey makes progress in human rights and on the Cyprus issue. 
Furthermore, the disturbance that the United States has felt 
about the closure of the DEP and the sentencing of its six 
former deputies to prison terms of up to 15 years has been 
made clear to the Turkish government by John Shattuck, the 
Assistant Secretary for State responsible for human rights, 
during his third trip to Turkey in five months. [Ref 56:p. 1] 
The relations between Turkey and its Western allies were 
further strained when Turkey launched a military campaign in 
northern Iraq against the PKK on March 20, 1995. 35,000 
Turkish troops, supported by aircraft and artillery, crossed 
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the Iraqi border and penetrated 40 kilometers into Iraq along 
a 250 kilometer front to track down 3,000 PKK militants and 
prevent them from using northern Iraq as a base for attacks 
against Turkey. [Ref 57:p. 1] This operation, code-named 
"Operation Steel," is the sixth and the largest one among the 
military campaigns that Turkey has launched in northern Iraq 
since 1984 when Turkey entered into an "hot pursuit" accord 
with Baghdad with which Saddam Hussein gave permission to 
Turkey enter Iraq in order to launch military campaign 
against the PKK camps in the region. [Ref 58:p. 1] "Operation 
Steel" was launched in the face of increasing infiltration 
into Turkey of PKK militants, who, taking advantage of the 
fighting between the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Massoud 
Barzani and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal 
Talabani, found increased freedom of movement in northern 
Iraq. The EU has urged Turkey to keep the operation short and 
withdraw its troops as soon as possible, and warned that a 
delayed Turkish action would greatly risks the ratification of 
the EU-Turkish Customs Union Agreement by the European 
Parliament. Initially, the United States has been far less 
critical of the Turkish move than the EU has been. However, in 
the face of prolonged operation, it has increased pressure on 
Turkey for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern 
Iraq, and the United States1 concern about the lack of a firm 
timetable for the withdrawal of Turkish troops have been made 
clear to the Turkish government in a visit by Deputy Secretary 
of State Strobe Talbott and Assistant Secretary of State 
Richard C. Holbrooke to Ankara. [Ref 59:p 1] Turkey, while 
stating that its troops will be withdrawn from northern Iraq 
as soon as three PKK camps located in the region are purged of 
militants, has also expressed its concern about the security 
vacuum in the region and asked the assistance of the United 
States to bring to a halt the fighting between Kurdish 
factions in northern Iraq. The withdrawal of Turkish troops 
has begun with the return of a Turkish brigade of 3,000 men 
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and of 60 armored vehicles that provided artillery support to 
these troops from northern Iraq to Turkey on April 7-8, 1995. 
[Ref 60:p. 1] 
Unfortunately, as a result of heavy pressure exerted on 
Turkey by the United States and its European allies with 
respect to the Kurdish problem, the Turkish people has come to 
perceive a serious conflict between Turkey's national interest 
and the interests of  its Western allies. The perception of 
conflict with the West has never been so strong and widespread 
among the Turkish people since 1974 when Turkey decided to 
intervene in Cyprus militarily despite the heavy opposition 
of its Western allies. Today, there is a fear among an 
increasingly greater number of Turkish people that the West, 
in order to achieve what it could not at the end of World War 
I with the Treaty of Sevres, is trying to use Kurds in Turkey 
to divide the country. Aware of this collective concern, 
politicians such as Bulent Ecevit, Prime Minister of Turkey 
at the time of its military intervention in Cyprus, "have 
started to make pronouncements to the effect that the United 
States is currently engaged in an effort to carve out a 
Kurdish state from south-east Anatolia" as envisaged by 
President Woodrow Wilson more than 80 years ago. [Ref 61:p. 
12]  Similarly,  both Turkish President Suleyman Demirel and 
Prime Minister Tansu Ciller have stated that if Turkey's 
presence in the West means that it must be divided, then they 
would rather not see Turkey in the Western camp. This 
language, touching the legacy of the War of Independence out 
of which modern Turkey emerged, is understood very well by 
every Turk. The Turkish people believe that Turkey cannot 
afford to be more tolerant toward separatists, nor allow 
abuses of freedom of expression by those who openly advocate 
rising up against the state just to accommodate its Western 
allies. The Turkish people also believe that with the 
territorial integrity of  their country at stake, the dues 
they are expected to pay for entry into the European club seem 
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too high. The West has said and may continue to say that it 
does not want to see Turkey split up and divided in order for 
an independent Kurdish state to be established. However, the 
real problem is that this is not what an increasing number 
of Turkish people have come to believe. If this belief 
increases in Turkey, it may become much more difficult for the 
Turkish government to develop policies that are more 
acceptable to the West in the handling of the problem. 
Therefore, before being too late, the Turkish government 
should restart attempts of finding a political middle ground 
for the Kurdish problem, and try alternatives that are 
currently available to it, such as political reforms that will 
provide the Kurdish population with increased cultural and 
educational rights. Currently, Turkey has nothing to lose if 
it takes these measures. Since only time will show whether or 
not these reforms will be effective in the settlement of the 
Kurdish problem, Turkey should initiate these measures as soon 
as possible rather than letting the problem drag out, and 
accepting a serious confrontation with the West. 
B.  RELATIONS WITH THE WEST 
1. Turkey and the European Union 
Turkey's secularist intelligentsia and the mainstream 
parties have invested a good deal of political and personal 
capital and time in Turkey's full membership in the EU. Since 
the foundation of the republic, all of the mainstream parties 
that came to power have pursued a pro-Western policy aimed at 
establishing all kinds of economic, military and political 
ties with the democracies of the West to promote Turkey's 
continued economic and societal modernization. Within this 
framework, integration with the EU, which would also help 
Turkey to be seen and to be perceived as being European, has 
been one of the primary objectives of the Turkish governments, 
leading to Turkey's official application, in April 1987, to 
the EC for full membership. 
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The "Opinion Report" of the Commission of the European 
Community on Turkey's request for accession to the Community, 
which concluded that "it would be inappropriate for the 
Community—which is itself undergoing major changes while the 
whole of Europe is in a state of flux—to become involved in 
new accession negotiations at this stage," recommended that 
accession negotiations with any country should not start 
before 1993 at the earliest, except in special circumstances. 
[Ref 24:p. 4] In addition to such a general assessment, the 
Commission also stated that the specific analysis of the 
economic and political situation of Turkey showed that it 
would be hard for Turkey to cope with the adjustment 
constraints with which it would be confronted in the medium 
term if it acceded to the Community. Economic problems such as 
a persistent high rate of inflation, low level of economic 
development by EC standards in terms of GDP and GDP per 
capita, a high rate of population growth (2.5 percent 
annually, ten times the EC average) that results in sustained 
high level of unemployment despite the high economic growth 
rates that Turkey achieved throughout the 1980s, structural 
incompatibilities between the Turkish economy and the 
Community, as well as political problems such as the need to 
expand political pluralism, the ability to sustain the 
improvement in human rights, the persistence of disputes with 
Greece, and the lack of solution to the Cyprus problem were 
characterized as some of the factors which would create 
adjustment constraints for Turkey. [Ref 24:p. 4-7] 
The Commission also stated that: 
. . . These doubts are accompanied by the concern the 
Community may feel regarding the burden Turkish 
accession would impose on its own resources. The 
additional budgetary burden, notably that resulting 
from the inclusion of Turkey in the structural funds, 
would be even greater than at the time of the last 
accessions, given Turkey's size and level of 
development. Access of Turkish Labour to the Community 
Labour market, which would eventually have to come 
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The Commission's 'Opinion Report' resulted in mixed 
interpretations in Turkey, leading to controversies over 
whether or not Turkey was still eligible for full membership. 
The Commission also suggested the reactivation of the EC- 
Turkey Association Agreement of 1964 which had been dormant 
for a long time and proposed a set of measures towards 
increasing interdependence between the Community and Turkey. 
The Commission report stated that: 
. To contribute to the success of Turkey's 
modernization efforts, the Commission recommends that 
the Community propose to Turkey a series of 
substantial measures which, without casting doubt on 
its eligibility for membership of the Community, would 
enable both partners to enter now on the road towards 
increased interdependence and integration. [Ref 24:p. 
8] 
These proposals included measures in four areas: the 
completion of the customs union between Turkey and the 
Community in accordance with the provisions of the Association 
agreement, the revitalization and intensification of financial 
cooperation, the promotion of industrial and technological 
cooperation, and the strengthening of political and cultural 
links. [Ref 24:p. 8-9] 
The Council of Ministers, adopting the report of the 
Commission without any change, endorsed the reactivation of 
the Association Agreement with Turkey and requested the 
Commission to study a "package of cooperation" between the EC 
and Turkey. Announced in July 1990, this package, also known 
as the Matutes Plan, foresaw the establishment of a customs 
union for industrial products by December 31, 1995, the 
implementation of the Fourth Financial Protocol which would 
release the EC aid to Turkey in the amount of 600 million 
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European Currency Unit (ECU), and included an important 
section on cooperation between Turkey and the Community in 
various sectors including industry, agriculture, finance, 
transport, energy, science and technology. [Ref 62:p. 83] 
This "package of cooperation" which was conceived to 
reactivate the Association Agreement, met with Greek 
resistance in the Council of Ministers. Greece used its veto 
power, particularly with regard to the proposals for 
resumptions of financial cooperation and conclusion of the 
Fourth Financial Protocol which would release the EC 
assistance funds to Turkey. Since Greece was able to use the 
Community platform to voice its demands and cast its veto 
whenever cooperation between the Community and Turkey came on 
to the agenda, the EC-Turkey Association Council, the key 
organ responsible from the implementation of the "package of 
cooperation," has also become dysfunctional. Under these 
circumstances, the work toward the customs union with Turkey 
has remained the only major positive element in Community- 
Turkey relations since 1990. 
At this point Turkey's relations with Greece deserve brief 
comment because Turkish-EC/EU relations have come to be 
heavily controlled by the strategic goals of Greek foreign 
policy. Turkey and Greece have suffered poor relations for a 
long time. The list of ongoing disputes includes Turkey's 
military intervention in Cyprus, its recognition of the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and its continuing 
military presence in the island; the dispute over military and 
civil air traffic zones in Aegean Sea; alleged mistreatment of 
each other's minorities; and Turkish claims of militarization 
of Greek islands in the Aegean by Greece in violation of the 
Treaty of Lausanne. The longstanding dispute between the two 
countries over the territorial waters and continental shelf in 
Aegean Sea reached its peak level in November 1994 as the 
International Marine Law Agreement went into effect. Greece, 
withdrawing from NATO's planned "Dynamic Guard-94" naval 
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exercises in the international waters of the Aegean Sea at the 
last moment, began its own naval exercises named "Aegean 
Guard" in early October, and by carrying the exercise beyond 
its territorial waters in November, it has given impression 
that it will extend its territorial waters from 6 miles to 12 
miles in accordance with that law. [Ref 63:p. 1] Turkey, as it 
did several times in the past, declared that it will regard 
the extension of Greece's territorial waters in the Aegean to 
12 miles as an "act of war." Greece has then stated it has no 
intention of adopting the 12-mile limit for the moment. 
Greece, organically linking the improvement of Turkey- 
EC/ EU relations to the solution of Cyprus issue and the 
withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island, has been able to 
draw the EC/EU into the Greek-Turkish dispute, and, as a 
member state, utilized its status to further its position and 
make relations between Turkey and the EC/EU more problematic. 
Athens' continued opposition to Turkish entry into the EC/EU 
has not only served the Greek aim of isolating Turkey from 
Europe, but also been useful for other Europeans who have had 
reservations about Turkey's full membership in the EC/EU. 
The dissolution of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe 
and the ending of the Cold War and the divisions in Europe, 
forced the members of the European Community, which was facing 
a major economic reorganization following the adoption of its 
strategy on the Single European Market, to focus on these 
historical changes, and gave an additional impetus to the 
Community to take control over the social, economic and 
political affairs of Europe. These culminated in the 
Maastricht Intergovernmental Conference in December 1991. With 
the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, the Community members 
committed themselves to a vast array of new policy and 
institutional arrangements toward greater political and social 
integration, as well as monetary and economic union. At a 
moment when Europe was moving toward union, Turkey remained 
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excluded from the European political and economic processes 
and interactions. 
With the end of Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, Turkey's importance in terms of its military manpower 
and geographic proximity to the Soviet Union has also been 
considerably reduced in the security calculations of Western 
Europe, which no longer needs to fear the East. The 1990-1991 
Gulf War and the Turkey's strong pro-Western stance in this 
war have helped Turkey to restore its strategic importance for 
the West, but this has also resulted in the definition of its 
strategic importance largely in Middle Eastern rather than 
European terms. As a result, the EC countries, exploring the 
development of a "common foreign and security policy" as 
envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty have become "increasingly 
unwilling to accept the additional burden of a direct exposure 
in the Middle East" which Turkey's full membership in the 
Community would imply. [Ref 29:p. 104] Furthermore, with the 
demise of the Cold War and the dissolution of communist 
regimes, questions of democracy and human rights have been 
brought to the fore in the Western agenda, and at a time when 
the support and sympathy for democratic political systems, 
free societies and national self determination reached its 
peak, Turkey's Kurdish problem has brought the country under 
the international spotlight and made it an easy target for 
criticism by the Western Europeans, who have long been 
critical of Turkey's fragile democracy, interrupted by 
military interventions three times, and its poor human rights 
record. It appears that Turkey's Kurdish problem and the way 
Turkey tries to handle it have had the most damaging long term 
impact on West European perceptions of Turkey, contributing to 
further marginalization of Turkey in Europe. 
In this atmosphere, the West Europeans, who became 
preoccupied with issues such as German unification, the task 
of assisting the economic and political reconstruction of the 
newly liberated countries of Eastern Europe so that the 
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difficulties of transition do not overwhelm their fragile 
democracies and market economies, the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty and then implementation of it within the EU, 
domestic economic problems that stem from the prolonged 
recession in Europe and the increasing pressure of immigration 
throughout the Mediterranean basin from poorer countries to 
more prosperous countries of Europe, have given less attention 
to the issue of Turkey's full membership, and found it 
expedient to defer the issue without giving a specific date. 
The veto power of Greece has been useful for other members of 
the Community who have had reservations about Turkey's full 
membership, and rather than pressurizing Greece to withdraw 
its veto, they have reinforced the idea that Turkey's full 
membership was not feasible because of the Greek veto. In 
particular Germany, which exerts tremendous influence within 
the EU, has developed important reservations about Turkey's 
membership in that organization. Like the relations between 
Turkey and Greece, the German-Turkish relations also deserve 
brief comment because Turkey's relations with Germany, which 
has been viewed by Turkey, up until very recently, as the 
premier European ally of Turkey which could promote its 
application for membership in the EU, have become increasingly 
tense since the late 1980s and have further complicated the 
Turkish efforts to gain full membership in this organization. 
The principal German concern has been the prospect of 
additional Turkish immigrants in Germany if all restrictions 
on the movement of labor were to be removed as a result of 
Turkey's full membership in the EU. Since the early 1960s, 
within the framework of two separate special agreements signed 
in 1957 and 1961 between the Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Labor of the then Federal Republic 
of Germany (FRG), hundreds of thousands of Turkish workers had 
migrated from Turkey to the FRG until the imposition of an 
immigration ban in November 1973 by the FRG. [Ref 23:p. 141- 
142] The November 1973 ban did not lead to a sudden halt of 
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immigration to the FRG. Rather the composition of workers 
changed as more women and children began to participate in the 
emigration process as a result of family reunification 
policies. By the mid-1980s the number of Turkish workers in 
the FRG had exceeded 1.5 million and the size of Turkish 
population residing in this country had reached almost 1.8 
million, more than one third of all foreigners residing in the 
FRG at that time. [Ref 23 :p. 143] The issue of the immigration 
of Turkish workers started to damage the relations between 
Turkey and the FRG severely for the first time in 1986. The 
FRG, which became sensitive about the issue, developed 
important reservations about the movement of Turkish workers 
within the EC and prevented the free movement Turkish workers 
in the Community which was to be allowed as of December 1986 
in accordance with the 1963 the EC-Turkey Association 
Agreement. This issue continued to damage the relations 
between the two countries especially after unification of the 
FRG with the German Democratic Republic. With the opening of 
the Iron Curtain, thousands of East Germans flooded into the 
labor market of Germany and began competing with the Turks and 
other non-German migrants. The financial burden of unification 
on the German economy and the state budget contributed to the 
deterioration of the general climate facing the foreign 
workers in Germany.' The new Foreigners Law which went into 
effect in January 1991 clearly indicated a trend toward 
facilitating deportation of foreign workers, especially those 
who are recipients of social aid from the German government 
for themselves and/or their families. In certain states such 
as Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, the rights that were being 
enjoyed by the foreigners such as the right to be elected to 
local parliaments, have been abolished. Turkish government 
calls for the protection of the rights of Turkish citizens 
residing in Germany and the liberalization of Germany's 
restrictive citizenship requirements have strained the 
relations between the two countries. The rise of deadly 
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attacks on Turkish citizens in this country by neo-Nazi German 
groups and the German governments' responses to this right- 
wing violence have been another grave source of strain in the 
bilateral relations. 
The reason for the deterioration of the relations between 
the two countries is not limited to the issue of immigration 
of Turkish workers to Germany. For several practical and 
ideological reasons, Germany has been actively involved in 
Turkey's Kurdish problem, and the stance that the German 
government took against Turkey has severely damaged their 
bilateral relations. Practically, the presence in Germany of 
more than 300,000 Turkish Kurds from among 1.8 million Turkish 
immigrants forces the German society and government to get 
involved in the problem. Ideologically, the principle of self- 
determination enjoys general support among Germans, and thus, 
Germany has been among the most sensitive in Europe on the 
issue of Turkey's human rights record and Kurdish problem. The 
German government's permissive attitude toward the PKK 
activities in Germany has given the PKK freedom to direct its 
terrorist operations against the Turkish government and 
business interests in Europe from this country. Germany's 
attitude toward the PKK was exemplified by the 15 October 1991 
statement of Gottfried Henning, a German defense ministry 
official, that if Turkey continued its cross border "hot 
pursuit" attacks against the PKK camps in northern Iraq, 
Germany would ask NATO to reconsider its supply of weapons to 
Turkey. [Ref 64:p. 18] German foreign ministry officials 
denied that Henning's statement represented official German 
policy. However, in April 1992 the German government 
temporarily suspended defense assistance to Turkey on charges 
that in the PKK-led violence in south-east Turkey, the Turkish 
security forces had employed against the civilian population 
weapons previously supplied by Germany. Even though the arms 
embargo was later lifted, Bonn announced that supposedly due 
to fiscal constraints associated with the unification, Germany 
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will end its long-standing military aid to Turkey by the end 
of 1995, giving a major damage to Turkish-German security 
relations. [Ref 47:p. 101] 
Following the Gottfried Henning*s statement of 15 October, 
the German Cologne Chamber of Commerce announced on 16 October 
1991 that German businesses and industries wishing to do 
business in south-east Turkey would have to apply for visas 
from the PKK offices in Germany. [Ref 64:p. 18] Turkey, 
interpreting this as a direct challenge to the sovereignty of 
Turkey and de facto recognition of the PKK, officially 
protested to Germany and increased its pressure on the German 
government for the banning of PKK activities in Germany. 
Despite Turkey's heavy pressure, the German government 
continued its permissive attitude toward PKK activities in 
Germany until November 26, 1993 when the Federal Interior 
Minister Manfred Kanther announced that the PKK was banned in 
Germany. [Ref 47:p. 101] 
The German government's hesitation to support Turkey 
during the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis has also left a negative 
impression on Turkish opinion. Germany has been the leading 
country in showing reluctance to provide the symbolic NATO 
support to Turkey in order to deter a potential Iraqi attack 
on Turkey during the crisis, fearing that a conflict between 
Turkey and Iraq could draw NATO "into a confrontation that 
would be peripheral to overall European interests." [Ref 47:p. 
15] Eighteen German Alpha jets were eventually deployed to 
south-east Turkey as a part of Allied Mobile Force-Air, but 
this has not been sufficient to erase the negative Turkish 
impressions about the German commitment to Turkey's security. 
In an interview broadcast on German television on January 24, 
1991, Turgut Ozal, then President, termed Germany "an 
unreliable NATO ally" that had been protected by the alliance 
for forty years and was "now unwilling to stand by Turkey in 
its time of need." [Ref 29:p. 134] Similarly, when asked about 
Turkish-German relations,  Suleyman Demirel,  then prime 
113 
ill   - i  ilit  i   ur e     
f 95, i i  ajor age  ur i a  urit  
l t s. ef : . 1] 
l i   o tfr  e ning's e ent f  ctober, 
 er a  ol e ha ber f o merce c    ct ber 
 t er a si s s  ustri  is i    
si s   t - ast ur  oul    l  r i  
o  f   er any. ef  : . ] urkey, 
 i   i t l    er i t  f 
r  nit  f  , ffi i l  
r t  er a   r r    er a
ent i  f ti it   er any. 
espit urkey' r re, er a ent 
t issi itu ar ti it
er a til ove ber , he ederal t r
inist r anfr ant er t as  
er any. f : . ]
e er ent' si o ort r
r ulf risi t at
r s r i i i . e a e
t i lU i boli
ort r r t t nti l i a
r r i , n t nfli t
r a l a  f t t t
oul r l erall r t . f -:p.
] i t l er t al
t - st  rt ll obil r - ir, t
t t at r i
r t h it ent r ey' rit .
nterview ast e io ,
, r t zal, h t, erm
r l  ly h lian
now ill an
tim . [ : . il rl , t
sh-Germ io , eym Ce irel, h im
minister, replied that "The smells coming from there 
[Germany] are not good," demonstrating the Turkish sense of 
frustration over German policy and attitudes. [Ref 64:p. 19] 
As it is seen, the Turkish desire to elevate relations 
with Western Europe to higher levels, in particular the wish 
to ultimately become an organic part in the process of 
European integration around the Maastricht Treaty, has 
remained far from realization. Furthermore, the end of the 
Cold War and of the divisions in Europe has resulted in West 
Europeans entering a process in which political and social 
tensions and incompatibilities between Turkey and these 
countries have been magnified and crystallized. In the words 
of Turkish political scientist Dr. Sezer Bazoglu: 
. . . the network of relations that Turkey had built 
with Western Europe at the height of the Cold War 
seems to have entered a state of paralysis, if not 
dissolution, at this historical moment when military 
and ideological security from the Soviet threat is no 
longer the determining influence in shaping Europeans' 
foreign and security policy choices and strategies. 
[Ref 47:p. 5] 
Despite all the political and social tensions, the 
economic and commercial ties between Turkey and the EU have 
remained undamaged. The EU continues to be both Turkey's main 
trading partner and the primary source that provides inflow of 
foreign funds into the country. The share of EU countries in 
Turkey's total imports, which reached 41.8 percent in 1990 
with $9.3 billion, has continued to increase and reached the 
level of $13 billion in 1993 accounting for 44 percent of 
Turkey's total exports. During the first 6 months of 1994, 
this number has reached 45.4 percent. [Ref 28:p. 27] The share 
of EU countries in Turkey's total exports, which reached 53.2 
percent in 1990, remained at the level of 51.8 percent in 
1991, 51.7 percent in 1992 and 49.5 percent in 1993, while 
increasing in nominal terms, from $6.9 billion in 1990 to $7.3 
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billion in 1993. The EU countries' share in the total amount 
of foreign direct investment in Turkey, which reached its peak 
level of $1.25 billion in 1990, dropped to $1 billion in 1991 
as the attention of European investors began to divert toward 
Eastern Europe. [Ref 30:p. 30] However, it has recovered 
quickly, reaching $1.12 billion in 1992 and $1.17 billion in 
1993. For the first six months of 1994, the total amount of 
direct investment by EU countries has amounted to $630 
million, accounting for 71 percent of the total foreign direct 
investment in Turkey for this period. [Ref 65:p. 30] 
Similarly, the work toward a customs union between Turkey 
and the EU, which was envisaged in the "package of 
cooperation" prepared in accordance with the directives of the 
EC Council of Ministers in 1990, has continued and the EU- 
Turkey Customs Union Agreement was signed on March 6, 1995, at 
the meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council in Brussels. 
According to the agreement, it has been decided that the EU 
countries and Turkey will completely eliminate the custom 
tariffs for industrial products in their trade with each other 
as of January 1, 1996.5 Within the framework of the agreement, 
which makes Turkey the only non-member country to achieve a 
customs union agreement with the EU, it has been also decided 
that the EU shall provide Turkey with financial assistance in 
order to compensate for the losses that the Turkish economy 
will incur as a result of the customs union. Although the 
amount of financial assistance to Turkey was not officially 
announced, the EU is expected to provide Turkey with more than 
$3.2 billion within five years following the effectivity of 
the agreement. [Ref 66:p. 1] 
5Turkey has been gradually reducing the customs tariffs 
in its trade with the EC/EU countries since 1973 within the 
framework of a timetable, set forth in the Additional 
Protocol (1970) to the EC-Turkey Association Agreement of 
1963. 
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Like the 198 "Opinion Report" of the Commission of the 
European Communities, the Customs Union Agreement has resulted 
in mixed interpretations in Turkey, leading to controversies 
over whether or not it gives Turkey an advantage over the 
Central and Eastern European countries with which the EU 
signed association agreements and increases its chance of 
being admitted to the EU. The EU's insistence on the 
ratification of the agreement by the European Parliament so 
that the agreement can go into effect has cast doubts on the 
willingness of the EU countries to take Turkey's membership 
issue into serious consideration in a reasonable time period, 
and exacerbated the Turkish concerns that once Turkey 
overcomes existing obstacles to EU membership, the EU will 
invent new ones to prevent Turkey's full membership. Statement 
by Michael Lake, the EU representative to Turkey, that 
"currently the European Parliament believes that the human 
rights issue in Turkey has become serious enough to prevent 
Turkey's custom union with EU," has resulted in pessimism in 
Turkey also about the future of the customs union agreement. 
[Ref 55:p. 3] 
2. Turkey and the Western European union 
Turkey's exclusion from the EU has enormous security 
implications as well. The increasing tendency among several 
West European countries to improve the coordination and 
cooperation of their security policies in institutions outside 
NATO, and to give greater energy to the process of 
"Europeanization of Europe's defense" by enhancing the West 
European Union's (WEU) operational capabilities, has given 
rise to the Turkish concerns that "these trends and moves may 
some day actually culminate in a Europe without the United 
States and a European security community, a kind of 'Fortress 
Europe' built around the EU and the WEU but without Turkey." 
[Ref 67:p. 51] 
The transformation process that NATO entered with the 
withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the military and 
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ideological competition with the West and the consequent 
demise of the Cold War has eventually led to the promulgation 
of "The Alliance New Strategic Concept" at NATO's Rome Summit 
in November 1991. The political impetus required for a greater 
military role for the WEU, which had been developing for some 
years, was also formalized at the same summit, and a few weeks 
later on with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union, it was decided that the WEU would continue to be 
developed simultaneously as the defense component of the EU 
and as a means of strengthening European pillar of NATO. 
Following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Foreign and Defense Ministers of the nine nations of the WEU 
had met at Petersberg near Bonn in June 1992 and the resulting 
"Petersberg Declaration," issued at the conclusion of that 
meeting, included a section on strengthening the WEU's 
operational role which envisaged the establishment of the WEU 
Planning Cell and "military units answerable to the WEU" in 
order to give a military reality to the concept of a European 
defense identity. [Ref 68:p. 8] The Petersberg declaration has 
also set out a three stage process for the WEU's development. 
The first stage makes the WEU "an integral part of the process 
of the development of the European Union and will enhance its 
contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance." A 
second stage will be "the eventual framing of an common 
European defense policy," which might in the third stage, 
"lead to a common defense." [Ref 69:p. 10] 
In January 1993, the WEU Council and its Secretariat were 
transferred from London to Brussels and the WEU Planning Cell 
became operational, as planned in the Petersberg Declaration, 
in April 1993, illustrating the will to make the WEU play a 
key role in constructing a common European defense. 
Furthermore, with the inauguration of the WEU Satellite Center 
in Torrejon, near Madrid on April 28, 1993, the WEU obtained 
autonomous satellite verification capability of monitoring 
compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe 
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enhancing the WEU's operational capabilities. [Ref 69:p. 11] 
Turkey, which applied to the WEU for membership in 1987, 
has recognized the rising importance of the WEU's role and 
place in the emerging European security architecture as the 
defense component of the European Union. The considerable 
progress that the WEU has achieved in enhancing its 
operational capabilities has given an additional impetus to 
Turkey to lobby hard for full membership in this organization. 
Despite the considerable efforts that Turkey has made toward 
gaining full membership status, it has been able to achieve 
only associate membership in the WEU. Turkey, together with 
Norway and Iceland, became associate members following the 
1992 Rome Summit of the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the 
WEU nations. [Ref 70:p. 29] 
Turkey's current associate status does not allow it to 
participate fully in discussions and in the voting process. 
This restriction, preventing Turkey from playing a role in the 
shaping of the evolving European defense identity, has caused 
dissatisfaction in Turkey as well as concerns of exclusion 
from European political and military processes which may 
culminate in "a kind of 'Fortress Europe' built around the EU 
and the WEU." [Ref 67:p. 51] Following the signing of the 
Turkey-WEU Association Agreement in November 1992, Hikmet 
Cetin, then Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted 
Ankara's dissatisfaction and remarked that "Turkey accepts its 
current status only as a temporary measure until it achieves 
full membership" in the WEU. [Ref 47:p. 12] Underscoring the 
importance of full membership for Turkey in the WEU, Ian 
Lesser of RAND has noted: 
. . . Turkish exclusion from full participation in 
these [European defense] arrangements, regardless of 
their precise form, would be understood in Ankara as 
a demonstration of Europe's unwillingness to grant 
Turkey a legitimate security role on the continent. 
[Ref 29:p. 107] 
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It is not only the limited role allocated for Turkey in 
the shaping of the evolving European defense identity that 
causes dissatisfaction and frustration in Turkey as to its 
associate member status. More important than this, the 
collective defense provisions of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, 
which are not tied to a specific geographic area unlike the 
NATO's collective defense provisions which are restricted to 
the area described in Article VI of the Washington Treaty, do 
not apply to Turkey because of its associate member status. In 
other words, the WEU is not required to invoke the defense 
clause of the Brussels Treaty and come to the Turkey's aid in 
case of an aggression against Turkish territory. 
Although European officials insist that associate 
membership is a "cast iron" security guarantee, their reaction 
to Turkey's request for the deployment of the AMF-A to eastern 
Turkey during the 1990-1991 Gulf War as a sign of solidity of 
NATO's security guarantee to Turkey in case of an armed attack 
by Iraq has demonstrated clearly the reluctance of some 
European allies to come to the aid of Turkey even in the 
absence of an Iraqi attack. Some European allies, led by 
Germany, have shown reluctance to provide this symbolic 
support, fearing that "a conflict between Turkey and one of 
its neighbors could result in Turkey invoking the defense 
clause of the Washington Treaty and drawing NATO into a 
confrontation that would be peripheral to overall European 
interests." [Ref 47:p. 15] In the face of heavy criticism by 
Turkey and the United States, the AMF-A was eventually 
deployed to Turkey, but the credibility of claims by European 
officials that Turkey's associate membership is a "cast iron" 
guarantee was severely damaged in the eyes of the Turkish 
people. It was obvious that NATO's European allies would have 
been extremely reluctant to come to the aid of Turkey if it 
had actually become the target of an Iraqi attack. 
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This event has demonstrated that the EU, which desires to 
move quickly toward a common foreign and security policy, 
will be increasingly unwilling to accept the additional burden 
of a direct exposure in the unstable and volatile regions of 
the world such as the Middle East and Transcaucasus, which 
Turkey's full membership in the EU and WEU would imply. [Ref 
29:p. 104] The WEU members try to justify their opposition to 
Turkey's full membership basically on the grounds that it is 
not a full member of the EU. In fact, Turkey's strong pro- 
Western stance during the Gulf War has resulted in its 
strategic role to be assessed in its Middle Eastern context 
rather than European, and thus, the prospect of Turkey's full 
membership in the WEU has diminished considerably on the 
contrary to Turkey's hopes that its pro-Western stance and 
contribution to the protection of the interests of the West 
would be appreciated by Europe and help Turkey become a full 
member of the WEU. 
3. Turkey and the united states 
Currently, the relations between the United States and 
Turkey are undergoing a period of reexamination in the light 
of changes that the end of Cold War brought onto international 
scene. Turkey knows that of all Western countries, the United 
States is the most sympathetic to Turkey's interests and most 
willing to go to work on its behalf. However, it is also a 
known fact that there are strong currents in the United States 
in favor of letting Europeans take care of their own defense. 
The size of American forces in Europe has already moved down 
from more than 300,000 troops to roughly 100,000. Despite 
President Clinton's pledge that the United States shall 
continue to maintain the size of its forces in Europe at this 
level, the increasing tendency among several West European 
countries to give greater energy to enhancing the WEU's 
operational capabilities has given rise to the Turkish 
concerns that "these trends and moves may some day actually 
culminate in a Europe without the United States and a European 
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security community, a kind of 'Fortress Europe' built around 
the EU and the WEU but without Turkey." [Ref 67:p. 51] 
Thus, increasingly greater numbers of people within the 
Turkish political and business elite as well as in the Turkish 
military have come to the opinion that over-reliance on the 
United States may not be in Turkey's long-term interests, and 
that, in the words of Turkish political scientist Dr. Sezer 
Bazoglu, "a bilateral military relationship with the United 
States would turn Turkey into a military outpost of Europe 
while Western Europe closed itself into a united Europe." [Ref 
47:p. 17} 
These concerns are not new. The relations between Turkey 
and the United States, which began with the Truman Doctrine in 
1947 and eventually led to Turkey's membership in NATO, have 
been periodically disturbed by the emergence of issues 
damaging the confidence and trust between the two countries. 
President Lyndon B. Johnson's letter of 1964, which led to the 
abandonment of initial Turkish plans of intervention in Cyprus 
and the Congressional arms embargo of 1975 which was imposed 
following Turkey's intervention in Cyprus during the summer of 
1974 placed considerable strain on bilateral relations and 
raised serious doubts in Turkey about the reliability of the 
United States as an ally of Turkey. Furthermore, geopolitical 
considerations which had dominated European attitudes toward 
Turkey during the 1950s and 1960s gradually lost their 
importance as Europe began prioritizing, during the 1980s, the 
promotion of democracy as a foreign policy issue, and 
distancing itself from the United States. [Ref 23:p. 31] This 
fact was apprehended by many Turkish policymakers, and it was 
argued that extensive reliance on the United States without 
developing political relations with Europeans, could leave 
Turkey out in the cold when bipolarity ended. This concern has 
been one of the reasons that led to the Turkey's 1987 
application to the EC for full membership. Turkey's 
rapproachment with the United States as a result of 
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developments that took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
in Iran and Afghanistan was a signal of its marginalization in 
Europe, and application to the EC was an attempt by Turkey to 
pull the country back into European mainstream. 
However, with the exclusionary signs that Turkey receives 
from the EU and the WEU, Turkey's relations with the United 
States have acquired greater significance, at least from 
Turkey's viewpoint, and are expected to become much more 
important in case Turkey continues to be excluded from the 
ongoing European processes toward greater economic, political 
and especially military integration. If the extend of European 
integration does not meet Turkey's expectations, particularly 
in terms of security arrangements, then Turkey will seek 
assistance from the United States to compensate for the lack 
support from the WEU or NATO. If Turkey fails to achieve full 
membership in the EU and the WEU, Ankara will desire continued 
economic and military assistance from the United States and 
look to it for measures that will increase marketing 
opportunities of Turkish goods and services in this country, 
and thus, will support the general development of Turkish 
industry and society. Ankara will also press the United States 
to support Turkey's position in Europe and ask its assistance 
to bring pressure on the Europeans to achieve Turkish goals of 
full membership in the EU and WEU. 
American interests may require that the United States 
provide such assistance and encourage Turkey's integration 
into the West so that Turkey maintains its pro-Western 
orientation. The United States recognizes the importance of 
Turkey, as President Clinton put it: 
... in helping to play a stabilizing role in a host 
of regional trouble spots ranging from the former 
Yugoslavia, through the Caucasus, into Central Asia, 
and, of course, toward the southeast, where Iraq and 
Iran both continue to pose problems for peace and 
stability in the world. [Ref 71:p. 767] 
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In the post-Cold War era, Turkey's strategic and political 
significance has acguired a new regional dimension considering 
the turbulence and instabilities in the Balkans, the 
Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. The United 
States wants a continued constructive Turkish approach to 
those areas and to ensure that Turkey does not add to the 
instability of these regions. In the words of Graham F. 
Fuller: 
. . . Turkey' growing importance today is much more 
powerfully defined by its centrality to regions of 
major instability in which long-range policies of 
Turkey could undergo significant and unprecedented 
change. The policies adopted by Turkey will have a 
great impact on many key problems, with Turkey serving 
either as a stabilizing force or as a complicating and 
exacerbating factor. [Ref 29:p. 165] 
It is also a fact that having a close ally such as Turkey, 
which has more or less parallel interests with the United 
States in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, 
offers the United States a measure of influence in those 
regions, and it can benefit from Turkey's insight, influence 
and access to these areas. 
However, the review of relations between the two countries 
comes at a time when the American policymakers are focusing 
more sharply on domestic issues and are spending less time on 
foreign affairs. The United States also faces economic 
problems which, when combined with the expectations of peace 
dividend, result in shrinking defense budgets and increasingly 
constrained foreign aid funds. Currently, these 
considerations, in the eyes of American policymakers, seem to 
have prevailed over the policy option that favors providing 
Turkey with the assistance that it expects to get from the 
United States. For instance, the security assistance to Turkey 
by the United States, long the centerpiece of the Turkish- 
American relations, had been raised, from $553.4 million to 
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$635. 4 million in 1991 appropriations, but the United States 
Congress reduced, in 1992 appropriations, the Bush 
administration's proposed budget allocation for military 
assistance to Turkey from $543 million to $450 million. [Ref 
72:p. 373] The amount of the United States security assistance 
provided to Turkey has continuously shrunk since then. 
According to the FY95 aid bill, H.R. 4426, that President 
Clinton signed into act in August 26, 1994, the Congress has 
determined the security assistance to Turkey as $3 64.5 
million. [Ref 73:p. 1] Furthermore, as of 1992, Congress has 
converted military assistance money from outright grants to 
loan credits, putting a further burden on Turkey's total 
foreign debt of approximately $65 billion. These actions have 
not been welcomed by Turkey, which is in the middle of a 
multi-year, multi-billion dollar defense modernization 
program, heavily suffering from the adverse effects of the 
economic crisis that the country fell into. 
Furthermore the timing of these actions has coincided with 
a period during which Turkey is incuring income loss of 
almost $500 million every year due to the closure of the 
Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline, one of the actions that Turkey 
took in support of the United States-led coalition during the 
Gulf War. After the Gulf War, Turkey stated its desire to 
diversify its relations with the United States, which are 
based predominantly on security assistance and defense 
cooperation. In this respect, Turkey has seen increased 
investment and trade with the United States, which would also 
help Turkey compensate for the losses it incurs due to the 
war, as the first important step in this direction. The United 
States under the Bush administration promised to review 
Turkey's textile quotas toward increasing Turkey's access to 
the American textile and apparel market, and to encourage 
American investors to invest in Turkey. However the volume of 
trade between the two countries, which stood at the level of 
$3.1 billion in 1991, has not shown any development in favor 
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of Turkey. The volume of trade increased in 1992 to only $3.4 
billion and to $4.3 billion in 1993, not because of increased 
Turkish exports but increased imports from the United States. 
[Ref 28:p. 26-27] Similarly, foreign direct investment coming 
to Turkey from the United States reduced from 456.3 million in 
1991 to 197.6 million in 1992 and has not increased to its 
1991 level since then. [Ref 74:p. 30] 
Consequently, Turkey, criticizing the United States for 
not adequately recognizing its support of coalition of forces 
against Iraq and especially the difficult economic sacrifices 
that it has made in support of the economic sanctions against 
Iraq, has called for revision of the United States-Turkish 
Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) of 1980. 
The DECA, which was originally intended to last 5 years 
but has been repeatedly extended, stipulates that "The United 
States will exert its best efforts to provide mutually agreed 
upon financial and technical assistance to Turkey's 
development efforts." [Ref 27:p. 16] Turkey, perceiving that 
the United States no longer exerts its "best efforts" has 
demanded that yearly military aid guarantees be included in 
the DECA. In response, the United States has pointed out that 
the executive branch can not make commitments binding Congress 
to appropriate any specified sum of aid. In the face of 
continued Turkish insistence on some form of guaranteed 
security assistance, the United States has stated that it 
would be forced to close down its bases in Turkey in case 
Ankara continues to insist that the military aid it receives 
from the United States should be guaranteed, negatively 
effecting the Turkish perceptions of the extend of the United 
States's commitment to Turkish security concerns. 
The relations between two countries have been further 
strained when the FY95 aid bill was signed by President 
Clinton in August 1994, stipulating that 10 percent of the 
$364.5 million in direct loans earmarked for Turkey will be 
withheld until the United States State Department,  in 
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consultation with Department of Defense, makes certain that 
Turkey makes progress in human rights and Cyprus issues. 
Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, on several occasions, 
made it clear that Turkey would not accept such a condition 
imposed by the United States. However, when it became clear 
that she refused to accept only 10 percent of the aid, i.e. 
only that part which was conditioned by the Congress, 
opposition parties severely criticized both the United States 
for its ill-treatment of Turkey and Premier Ciller for having 
ridiculed and embarrassed Turkey by rejecting 10 percent of 
the aid but accepting the rest. 
Furthermore, considering the fact that the Clinton 
administration will find it more difficult to generate the 
support that may be necessary to satisfy Turkish expectations 
in the 104th Congress with a Republican majority busy trying 
to comply with the terms and conditions of the "Contract with 
America," the Turkish hopes of support from the United States 
are not expected to find a fertile ground in the United 
States. 
Turkey believes that if the United States is interested in 
seeing Turkey continue as a stable, democratic, secular, 
economically dynamic state in the conflict-ridden regions of 
the world, it must do its part in promoting trade and 
investment in Turkey, providing Turkey with military and 
economic assistance so that economic disparities between 
Turkey and the Western European countries get narrower, and 
reducing impediments to Turkey's membership in the EU and the 
WEU. As Ambassador Morton Abramowitz put it, " the Turkish 
experiment is unique, and the United States has a major stake 
in its success. But preserving that stake will demand more 
concentrated and sympathetic attention than senior U.S. 
officials have usually been willing to devote to their long- 
time ally." [Ref 46:p. 181] 
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4. Turkey's Relations with NATO 
As indicated earlier, Turkey is a unique country in NATO 
because no other ally is surrounded by all three of the word's 
most unstable and conflict-ridden regions at the same time, 
i.e., the Balkans, the Transcaucasus and the Middle East. 
Under these circumstances, for Turkey which perceives itself 
to be surrounded by much instability and faced with the 
potential security challenges of great complexity and 
diversity, the Atlantic Alliance continue to form one of the 
basic principles of the Turkey's security policy. However, 
Turkey has also come to the realization that, due to economic 
problems and special security concerns that the country is 
confronted with, it faces with considerable difficulties in 
restructuring the Turkish armed forces along the lines of 
NATO's New Strategic Concept, adopted in November 1991 in the 
light of recent profound changes in East-West relations. 
Moreover, with the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, the realization of "peace dividend" has come to 
the fore in the agenda of NATO nations redefining their 
security interests, and the consequent erosion in NATO's 
solidarity and cohesion has emerged as an another reality of 
the post-Cold War era that Turkey has to adopt to. 
NATO entered a process of change when the 16 member 
countries' Heads of State and Government met in London in 
July 1990 to review the Allied military strategy of "Flexible 
Response and Forward Defense," which had served the Alliance 
successfully against its main enemy since its adoption in 
1967. The resulting London Declaration recognized that NATO 
should retain smaller, highly mobile, versatile, more flexible 
forces and the strategy of "Flexible Response and Forward 
Defense" should be transformed to one which, in the words of 
the London Declaration, "would move away from forward defense, 
where appropriate, and modify flexible response to reflect a 
reduced reliance on nuclear weapons." [Ref 75:p. 11] Following 
the completion of the review of the Alliance's military 
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strategy by the Strategy Review Group established in the 
aftermath of the London Summit, the Heads of State and 
Government had met once again in Rome in November 1991 and 
promulgated the "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept." [Ref 
75:p. 11] 
During the period the draft concept was being prepared, 
NATO members were faced with difficulty in the analysis of the 
possible future risks to Allied security due to rapidly 
changing political situation in the then Soviet Union. 
However, it was clear that the old massive and potentially 
immediate threat to NATO from the Soviet Union had 
disappeared. Instead, a situation in which many of the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe were faced with 
political, social and economic pressures, including ethnic 
rivalries and territorial disputes which could lead to crisis 
and in turn to possible conflicts, had taken place. 
Additionally, the southern region of the Alliance was 
identified as a region of security concern, particularly given 
the build-up of military power and proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. [Ref 25:p. 18] 
Based on these perceived threats, key features of the 
forces that will be fielded by NATO has been identified as 
smaller forces, many at lower states of readiness; increased 
reliance on multinational forces; greater ability to built-up 
forces through reinforcement, mobilization or reconstitution; 
and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. [Ref 19:p. 23-24] 
NATO's old static linear defense posture, the "layer cake" 
defense concept of dividing the potential battlefield between 
forces and assigning each nation its own territorial area of 
responsibility, has also been replaced with enhanced 
flexibility, giving way to a mobilizable and maneuver-based 
defense. [Ref 76:p. 8] 
In accordance with these key features, it has been decided 
that NATO will field three categories of conventional forces 
which would be underpinned by nuclear forces: 
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• Reaction Forces: Multi-national forces, mobile and 
flexible with employment options in all parts of the 
alliance. These are divided into Immediate Reaction 
forces which are available in seven days to deploy and 
Rapid Reaction Forces available on 15 days notice to 
move. The Reaction Forces were originally expected to 
comprise about 15 percent of the forces available to 
NATO. 
• Main Defense Forces: These are six multi-national 
corps, constituting the bulk of the ground forces 
needed to ensure the Alliance's territorial integrity 
and capable of being built-up as necessary by 
reinforcement, by mobilizing reserves or by 
reconstituting forces. They constitute 60 percent of 
forces available to NATO. 
• Augmentation Forces: These are essentially strategic 
reinforcements for existing forces in a particular 
region and constitute 25 percent of the total. [Ref 
77:p. 32] 
As it is seen, NATO, in its new concept of "Reduced 
Forward Presence, •• has extensively relied on multi-national 
formations. For example, Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid 
Reaction Forces, may have as many as 9 participants and ACE 
Immediate Reaction Forces may contain participants from as 
many as 13 different nations. [Ref 25:p 34] Furthermore, the 
old structure of static forces providing a linear defense, has 
given way to a mobilizable and maneuver-based defense and thus 
providing effective surveillance, intelligence, command and 
control to identify threats, and having logistic capabilities 
to match the required mobility have become vital for the 
implementation of the new concept, which moved from "forward 
defense" to "reduced forward presence." [Ref 77:p. 32] 
Unlike the issues of new force structure and nuclear 
policy, the issue of "out-of-area" has caused much controversy 
among the NATO members throughout the period the new Strategic 
Concept was being prepared. The "out-of-area" problem, which 
has been continuing to create coordination problem among the 
members of NATO since its inception, stems from the fact that 
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the Alliance's applicability is limited by the North Atlantic 
Treaty's reference to geographical boundaries as stated in 
Article 6. [Ref 76:p. 1] This problem has become associated 
particularly with the Middle East and the difficulty of 
coordination among NATO member states in response to an "out- 
of-area" crisis had become apparent several times in the past 
two decades. The August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait forced 
the Alliance to confront once again the problem of "out-of- 
area" conflict at a time when the Alliance was undergoing a 
period of major reconstructuring. Under these circumstances, 
member countries had found introducing such a divisive issue 
as "out-of-area" planning into the process of drafting the new 
Strategic Concept fruitless and counterproductive. Therefore, 
NATO's new Strategic Concept recognizes that Allied security 
must take account of the global context and that NATO's 
security interests can be effected by risks of a greater 
complexity and diversity; but it goes no further than 
acknowledging that arrangements exists within the Alliance for 
consultation regarding the responses to such risks. [Ref 75:p. 
13] 
The Alliance's New Strategic Concept has caused concerns 
in Turkey that the strategy of "reduced forward presence," 
combined with NATO's extensive reliance on multinational 
formations and the continuing debate on the issue of "out-of- 
area," may not provide Turkey with an effective defense 
umbrella in case it becomes involved in a confrontation 
requiring Turkey to invoke the defense clause of the 
Washington Treaty. Turkey has also come to the realization 
that preoccupation of NATO's European allies with their own 
problems such as German unification, the task of assisting the 
economic and political reconstruction of the newly liberated 
countries of Eastern Europe and implementation of Maastricht 
Treaty within the EU, has consequently resulted in an erosion 
of NATO's solidarity and cohesion. 
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As a result of profound changes in East-West relations, a 
buffer zone has been created in Central Europe and threat in 
that region has decreased to a risk. Conseguently, warning 
time has increased, allowing NATO, in its new military 
doctrine and force posture, to move from the concept of 
"forward defense" to the new concept of "reduced forward 
presence." Consequently, the countries in the Central Front of 
NATO have been able to reduce size, readiness and availability 
of their forces and place greater reliance on small, 
mobilizable units equipped with high technology and high 
fire-power weapons. However, since Turkey is surrounded by 
all three of the word's most unstable and conflict-ridden 
regions at the same time, there are no buffer zones around 
Turkey as there are in Central Europe. Combined with the fact 
that the Turkish armed forces are equipped with relatively 
out-moded equipment, the concept of "forward defense" still 
retains its validity for Turkey. Consequently, Turkey has 
decided to uphold the older concept of "forward defense," and 
continue to maintain a large army, the second largest in NATO. 
Although Turkey has been undergoing a large scale, multi- 
billion and multi-year defense modernization program since 
mid-1980s, this program has considerable slowed down since the 
early 1990s as the economic conditions of the country 
deteriorated and, thus, the reductions in the manpower levels 
that would be possible by the qualitative improvements in the 
military equipment, have remained below the planned levels. 
Secondly, NATO's old static defense posture, the "layer 
cake" defense concept, has been replaced with enhanced 
flexibility, giving way to a mobilizable and maneuver-based 
defense. With this change, greater strategic mobility, a 
modern command-control-communication network, providing 
effective surveillance and intelligence to identify threats, 
having logistic capabilities and the sufficient infrastructure 
to match the required mobility have become vital for the 
implementation of the new concept. However, the mobility of 
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the Turkish armed forces, and their command-control- 
communication capabilities still need to be increased, and 
the inadequate infrastructure in eastern and south-eastern 
Anatolia, the least developed parts of Turkey, requires heavy 
investment for improvement so that the maneuver-based defense 
can be applied effectively in these reqions borderinq the 
Transcaucasus and the Middle East. The difficulties that 
Turkey faced durinq the 1990-1991 Gulf War when it tried to 
mobilize 100,000 troops alonq the Iraqi border as a part of 
coalition strateqy have confirmed the Turkish armed forces' 
need for qreater strateqic mobility and the lack of 
sufficient infrastructure in the reqion. 
Furthermore, if we take a look at the economic indicators 
in Turkey, we can easily see that its financial ability to 
satisfy the modernization requirements of its armed forces and 
thus increase its mobility and command-control-communication 
capabilities, is severely limited. A foreiqn debt of $65 
billion, a public sector borrowinq requirement of almost $40 
billion and a triple-diqit inflation rate for 1994, clearly 
indicate that Turkey's ability to restructure its armed forces 
alonq the lines of the Alliance's New Strateqic Concept is 
heavily dependent on the military and economic assistance of 
the West. 
Finally, the key features of the forces that will be 
fielded by NATO have been identified as smaller forces, many 
at lower states of readiness, increased reliance on 
multinational forces, and qreater ability to built-up forces 
throuqh reinforcement, mobilization and reconstitution. This 
means heavy reliance by NATO on intrareqional (such as Allied 
Forces Europe, South -AFSOUTH), interreqional (such as the ACE 
Rapid Reaction Forces) as well as external reinforcements 
(such as the forces which would come from the United States) 
to preserve or restore the territorial inteqrity of its 
threatened members. [Ref 25:p. 38] Moreover, these 
reinforcements, which are predominantly multinational in 
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composition, will be necessary at least to demonstrate NATO's 
cohesion and solidarity against any potential aggressor, and 
at that point, the key question becomes whether or not these 
reinforcements can arrive in sufficient numbers and time to 
influence the outcome of events. [Ref 25:p. 37] Timely 
deployment of reinforcements also requires effective 
planning, coordination and, more important than these, 
solidarity and cohesion among the countries contributing to 
the multinational NATO forces. 
Unfortunately, Turkey has come to the frustrating 
realization that NATO members did not have this solidarity and 
cohesion when it requested the deployment of Allied Mobile 
Force-Air (AMF-A) to eastern Turkey during 1990-1991 Gulf War. 
Although AMF-A was designed to show NATO's unity as a 
deterrent force, due to the debate on whether the defense of 
Turkey's Middle Eastern borders by NATO is an "in-area" or 
"out-of-area" responsibility, it took Germany, Belgium and 
Italy more than three weeks to send their aircraft to Turkey. 
Furthermore, after serious debate on the need of for such a 
move, NATO's Defense Planning Council (DPC) required "highly 
specific rules of engagement to limit the possibility that the 
force might engage in combat in circumstances not explicitly 
envisaged by the political authorities." [Ref 78:p. 251] 
The emerging difficulties regarding the applicability of 
the Alliance's New Strategic Concept in Turkey and the erosion 
of NATO's solidarity and cohesion have severely complicated 
one of the pillars of Turkish security policy: "Taking part in 
collective defense organizations and carrying out the 
responsibilities entrusted to it in this context." [Ref 79:p. 
3] Turkey's concerns regarding the protection of its 
territorial integrity, its independence and the republican 
regime of the country were further exacerbated when its 
assumption that Europeans still consider Turkey to be a key 
ingredient in the defense of Europe proved to be wrong as can 
be inferred from the reluctance of the WEU to respond 
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positively to Turkey's drive toward full membership in that 
organization. 
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IV.  TÜRKEY IN THE REGIONS OF CRISIS 
A.  TURKEY'S STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE FORMER SOVIET 
UNION 
1. Central Asia 
Turkey's primary objective in Central Asia has been to 
foster the development of largely Muslim-Turkic republics of 
the former Soviet Union as independent, secular and democratic 
countries with market oriented, liberal economies. Toward this 
objective, with the backing of the West, particularly the 
United States, Turkey has promoted itself as an economic and 
political model for these newly independent republics with 
which it has historical, cultural and linguistic ties, and 
undertook interrelated political, cultural and economic 
initiatives in an attempt to build a zone of Turkish influence 
in Central Asia. 
Turkey, aiming at preventing the resurgence of Russian 
power and the spread of Iranian-type fundamentalism in the 
region, has seen the development and integration of the 
economies of these countries with the world economy, as vital 
factors that will affect their orientation in the long term. 
Thus, technological and economic assistance, bilateral and 
multilateral economic cooperation initiatives and various 
investment projects toward the development of infrastructure 
in the region have constituted the main thrust of Turkish 
policy toward the region. 
Turkey extended recognition to Central Asian republics - 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan- on December 16, 1991 and sent ambassadors to all 
five capitals. Despite the complete absence of ties between 
Turkey and these republics prior to their independence, 
immediately after the recognition of the republics high 
profile visits had taken place between Turkey and these 
countries. Heads of state of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
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Kyrgyzstan visited Turkey in December 1991, and by spring of 
1992, the leaders of all five republics had paid visits to 
Ankara. In response, the Turkish Foreign Minister visited 
these republics in February 1992 and his visit was followed by 
the visit of Suleyman Demirel, then prime minister, in May 
1992 with a 144 man delegation consisted of high level 
bureaucrats, businessmen and specialists. [Ref 23:p. 203] 
During these visits Turkey and the Central Asian republics 
expressed their desire to establish close relations and seek 
cooperation on a variety of  different issue. By February 
1993, Turkey and the Central Asian republics had signed more 
than 140 bilateral protocols and cooperation agreements on a 
variety of subjects ranging from banking to agriculture, 
trade, industry, aeronautics, education, publishing, academic 
and military training. [Ref 51:p. 112] 
In order to foster immediate ties, Turkey has initiated a 
series of economic assistance packages for these countries. 
Turkish Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has allocated between 
$1.1 and $1.2 billion in credits to Central Asian republics to 
stimulate their trade with Turkey, and an additional $975 
million in loans has been authorized by the Turkish government 
for the use of these countries. [Ref 47:p. 82] Turkey has also 
committed $350 million in food aid to Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan. [Ref 80:p. 608] Although these assistance 
funds remain far from meeting the immediate needs of Central 
Asian republics, they mean considerable commitments for Turkey 
and its economy. Indeed, these economic assistance packages 
have made Turkey the fourth largest provider of aid to these 
republics after Japan, the EU and the United States. [Ref 
80:p. 608] 
The Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Development (TACD) 
within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been 
assigned the responsibility of coordinating and supervising 
the assistance to Central Asian republics and initial studies 
made by the TACD have also revealed the need for technical 
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assistance in developing the infrastructure in the region. 
[Ref 47:p. 81] The Turkish General Directorate of Post, 
Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) has been assigned the task of 
developing a telecommunications network between Turkey and the 
countries of the region which will also provide these 
countries with access to the INTELSAT satellite for worldwide 
communication. 
PTT has supplied each of the five Central Asian republics 
with public exchanges (each 2,500-line capacity) and earth 
stations, and thus connected them to the INTELSAT, 
establishing direct communication links between these states, 
Turkey and other countries. [Ref 80:p. 606] Turkey has planned 
to widen this communication network with the installation of 
10,000-line exchanges in the main cities of the Central Asian 
republics, and in this direction, Turkish communication 
systems manufacturer NETAS has begun, through joint ventures, 
establishing factories in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan for the 
manufacture of digital switchboard systems. [Ref 80:p. 606] 
TACD also coordinates Turkish initiatives toward 
establishment of cultural ties with the Central Asian 
republics. It has arranged 10,000 scholarships at Turkish 
higher educational institutions for students from Azerbaijan 
and Central Asia and is planning for the establishment of 
regional university, like the Middle East Technical University 
in Ankara, that will provide education in areas of engineering 
and management primarily for Central Asian students. [Ref 
47:p. 81] Meanwhile, toward the development of close cultural 
relations, General Directorate of Turkish Radio and Television 
has established a new special channel, named Avrasya (Euro- 
Asia) , and has begun broadcasting television programs beamed 
to these republics via INTELSAT. To create a common linguistic 
and educational base, Turkey has also encouraged the Central 
Asian republics to replace the Cyrillic alphabet with the 
Latin alphabet and committed to provide them with textbooks, 
publications and financial assistance in case they decide to 
137 
ta l i .
f : . ] r i eneral ir ct r t f ost,
el l ) g f
l elecom unicati r r
ntri hi ill i
ntri it N t ll orl i
munication.
l entral si bli
it bli , -l acit ) r
s, ect he T,
s i t municati in ,
r r ntri s. f : . ] r
i municati r it io f
, 0-l ai i f entral si
bli s, i t , ur i municati
e anufacturer . n, o i t t res,
s zerbaij azakhst
anufact r i it l i r s. f : . ]
r i at r i a iv o r
a ishm t l r l it entral si
bli s. an ,  l r i t ur i
r cati al tu io t rom zerbaij
entral si ish t f
l i ersit , ik iddl ast echnical niversit
nkara, t ill i cat f i r
ana ent ari entral si nts. f
: . ] eanwhile, o r ent f lt r l
s, eneral ir ct r t ur i adi el i
sh ci l nel, vras r -
sia) cast o s
li i N T. t n ist
cati al s , r r entral
si li c rill et it
ati et mi t i he it s,
bli t n i l a i
adopt the Latin alphabet rather than the Arabic alphabet, as 
favored by Iran and Saudi Arabia. The programs broadcast by 
Avrasya channel via satellite carry subtitles in Latin script 
to familiarize the Central Asian viewers with the characters. 
[Ref 81:p. 72] 
Turkey also recognizes Central Asia's potential to become 
a major supplier of energy in the next century and sees the 
development of oil and gas industries around the Caspian Sea 
and in Central Asia as vital for the economic independence of 
the Central Asian states from the Russian Federation. 
Hydrocarbon resources of the Central Asian republics also 
present opportunities for the development of Turkey's own 
economy which would, in turn, help Turkey to overcome the 
financial obstacles that limit its initiatives in Central 
Asia. Therefore, Turkey has been very active in developing 
plans that envisage construction of oil and gas pipelines to 
become an energy bridge between the Central Asian republics 
and Europe. While these energy resources present Turkey with 
an opportunity to reduce its dependence on Middle East oil, 
various project activities, such as engineering, excavation, 
and pipe manufacture, which will be undertaken within the 
framework of pipeline projects present Turkish construction 
companies with substantial job opportunities. Once 
constructed, these pipelines will also provide Turkey with 
considerable income in the form of transit fees. More 
important than these, Turkey hopes that the export of energy 
resources to the West will provide the Central Asian republics 
with fresh money necessary for the socio-economic development 
of these countries, which in turn will create new marketing 
opportunities in Central Asia for the Turkish exports. In 
this direction, Turkey has offered Turkmenistan, which has one 
of the largest gas reserves in the world, the construction of 
a gas pipeline that will carry the Turkmen natural gas to 
Turkey and then to Europe through Turkish outlets on the 
Mediterranean. The accord for the construction of the pipeline 
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was by the two countries in November 1992, and initial 
feasibility studies were completed by the Turkish pipeline 
company BOTAS on three different routes in March 1993. [Ref 
82:p. 30] Among the proposed alternative routes, the route 
that goes from Turkmenistan to Iran and then to Turkey has 
been adopted and at the January 1995 meeting of President 
Saparmurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan and Turkish President 
Suleyman Demirel, both countries expressed their desire to 
initiate construction of the project as soon as possible. [Ref 
83:p. 2] The construction of the 2,500 kilometer long gas 
pipeline, which will have a total capacity of 15 billion cubic 
meters/year, is expected to be completed within five years at 
an estimated project cost of $6 billion. [Ref 83:p. 2] 
Turkey strongly believes in those republics' development 
potential if they can successfully exploit their energy 
resources and wants to tie them Turkish-led economic system so 
that it has leverage over their future economic policies. 
Toward this objective it has promoted membership of the 
Central Asian republics in the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO) founded earlier by Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan, and has pressed for a kind of common market among 
Turkic countries at the October 1992 "Summit of Turkic 
Countries" in Ankara. [Ref 84:p. 74] 
Toward the integration of economies of the Central Asian 
republics with the world economy, Turkey has placed great 
emphasis on the ECO, which was enlarged in February 1992 to 
include Azerbaijan and Central Asian republics, with the 
exception of Kazakhstan. [Ref 7:p. 66] The first and second 
summit meetings of the reactivated ECO were held in Ankara and 
Istanbul in October 1992 and July 1993 respectively. [Ref 
85:p. 10] The ECO which was further enlarged to include 
Kazakhstan and Afghanistan, aims at easing trade barriers and 
promoting cooperation in areas such as agriculture, 
communications, banking, culture and transportation among the 
member states. However, foreign exchange problems that the 
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Central Asian republics face and their insistence on entering 
counter-trade agreements or paying their trade debts through 
barter rather than hard currency have emerged as important 
factors preventing Turkey from establishing close commercial 
relations with these republics. The lack of a legal framework 
and the absence of appropriate private sector partners in the 
Central Asian republics have also been sources of concern for 
Turkish businessmen who look for business opportunities in 
this region. [Ref 80:p. 603] Thus, Turkey's current trade 
with the Central Asian republics remains very limited. 
Turkey's total exports to all Turkic republics of former 
Soviet Union, including Azerbaijan, totalled only $164.6 
million in 1992 (1.1 percent of Turkey's total exports in 
1992), and $455 million in 1993 (3 percent of Turkey's total 
exports in 1993). For the first four months of 1994, Turkey's 
exports to the Turkic republics amount to $147.9 million (3 
percent of Turkey's total exports in the same period). [Ref 
86:p. 25] Turkey's imports from the Turkic republics of former 
Soviet Union account for less that 1 percent of its total 
imports. Turkish imports from these countries totalled $97 
million in 1992 (0.4 percent of Turkey's total imports in 
1992) and $196.8 million in 199*3 (0.7 percent of Turkey's 
total imports in 1993). For the first four months of 1994, the 
imports from the Turkic republics amount to $38.5 million, 
accounting for 0.5 percent of Turkey's total imports for the 
same period. [Ref 86:p. 26] 
While Turkey's commercial relations with the Central Asian 
republics remain limited, a variety of factors, both internal 
and external, prevent Turkey from also establishing a zone of 
Turkish influence in Central Asia to the extent desired, and 
successfully playing the role that it initially hoped to play 
in that part of the world. 
Turkish drives to build a zone of influence have met an 
increasingly greater Russian resistance that aims at 
preventing the Central Asian republics from diversifying their 
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relations with countries other than the Russian Federation and 
to halt the spread of Turkish influence in the region. For 
instance, Russia has been disturbed by the reactivation of the 
ECO and the decision of Central Asian republics to join this 
organization for regional cooperation with Turkey and Iran, 
and clearly forced the Central Asian republics to choose 
between the ECO and a Russian-dominated close economic union 
which, in July 1993, Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian 
Federation decided to form. [Ref 85:p. 10] The Russian 
Federation Vice Premier Alexander Shokhin has characterized 
the reactivated ECO as an attempt to organize a common market 
with customs union and the beginning of a "different political 
alignment,"  and stated that: 
Our friends from the CIS who, looking for better 
fortunes, are turning to the south, should choose 
between closer economic integration with Russia and 
with their southern neighbors. [Ref 85:p. 10] 
The pressure on the Central Asian republics by the Russian 
Federation has been successful to a certain extent and caused 
these republics to adopt a cautious policy toward Turkey 
despite their gratefulness for Turkish assistance toward 
socio-economic development of their countries. The Russian 
military doctrine that appeared in mid-1992 and focused on 
Russia's strategic interests in the near abroad has been an 
important factor behind such a cautious approach by the 
Central Asian republics. The draft doctrine included the 
defense of the rights of Russian citizens and "people 
ethnically and culturally identifying themselves with Russia 
in the former republics of the USSR" as one of the basic tasks 
of the Russian military. [Ref 87:p. 73] The draft doctrine's 
assertion of Russian ethnic interests in the near abroad has 
not only revealed the vulnerability of the former republics of 
the Soviet Union, but also made these republics highly 
sensitive to the protection of Russian interests. For example, 
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Kazakhstan, highly vulnerable to Russian pressure because of 
its Russian population which makes up 40 percent of its total 
population, stated at the October 1992 Turkic Summit in Ankara 
that it would develop ties with Turkey and the other Turkic 
republics only on the condition that this would not harm its 
commitments to other Commonwealth of Independent State 
members. [Ref 80:p. 599] Similarly, the Central Asian 
republics have resisted Turkey's offer of establishing a kind 
of Turkic common market at the same summit, indicating their 
cautious policies toward Turkey. [Ref 84:p. 74] 
It is also a fact that after more that 70 years of Soviet 
rule and centralized economic planning, the external financial 
aid that the Central Asian republics received from the 
international community, including Turkey, has remained far 
from ending the dependence of the economies of these countries 
on the Russian Federation. Not only Turkey, but also the 
Central Asian republics have recognized that neither the 
Turkish economy nor the technological capabilities of the 
Turkish industry are sufficient to satisfy the needs of these 
countries and give Turkey leverage over their future economic 
policies. With the recent economic crisis that Turkey fell 
into, its ability to continue economic assistance to the 
Central Asian republics, and thus to spread its influence over 
the region, becomes increasingly guestionable. 
It is not only the economic dependence of the Central 
Asian republics on the Russian Federation or the continued 
commitment of Russia to protect its interest in the near 
abroad that force these republics to pursue a cautious policy 
toward Turkey. The Central Asian republics, with the exception 
of Kyrgyzstan, have only limited democracies and are run by 
former Communist leaders who want to keep their opposition 
from coming to power. These leaders depend on the Russian 
Federation and its military for both maintaining their power 
and the security of their countries against external threats. 
Therefore, rather than rapidly developing close relations with 
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Turkey, they have preferred not to antagonize the Russian 
Federation. Turkey's pressure on the leaders and the ruling 
elite of the Central Asian republics for the initiation of 
democratic reforms in their countries has been another factor 
leading to a cautious policy by these countries toward Turkey. 
Furthermore, at a time when Turkey promotes itself as an 
economic and political model for the Westernization and 
integration of the Central Asian republics with the world 
economy, its inability to obtain full membership in the EU 
despite it 3 0-year-old membership struggle, not only undercuts 
its claim to be a fully western state, but also makes Turkey 
less attractive to these countries. Turkey, believing that if 
it can not fully enter the EU, its value to Central Asia as a 
western state and model will greatly decline, has repeatedly 
told the EU countries that its full membership will greatly 
improve its ability to play a stabilizing role in the region 
and prevent the spread of Iranian-type fundamentalism both 
directly and indirectly. In the face of continued rejection by 
the EU, Turkey's hopes of becoming a bridge country that will 
link the EU with the ECO have also diminished. 
Today, Turkey recognizes that Central Asia's ties to 
Russia cannot be easily replaced and that the needs of the 
countries of the region are far more than Turkey can provide. 
Turkey's domestic economic constraints, Russian resistance, 
internal instabilities of the countries of the region, their 
economic, military and political dependence on Russia, other 
states' economic and political rivalries with Turkey for 
influence over the region have greatly restricted the ability 
of Turkey to establish a zone of influence in Central Asia. 
Turkey has won many points of influence and obtained some 
leverage in the region despite all its shortcomings. However, 
these remain far from what Turkey initially hoped to achieve. 
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2. The Transcaucasus 
Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union has 
removed the threat of a massive Soviet invasion of Turkey, the 
newly-independent republics in the Transcaucasus region— 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan—represent considerable 
instability on Turkey's eastern borders. Turkey's primary 
objectives in the Transcaucasus have been to form a zone of 
Turkish influence in the region that will prevent the return 
of a Russian military presence to its borders and play a 
leading role in the exploration, extraction, and refining of 
Azeri oil and transportation of it to Europe. Turkey has also 
recognized the importance of the Transcaucasus, particularly 
Azerbaijan, in spreading Turkish influence over Central Asia 
and reorienting their economies from Russia to Turkey. 
However, the Armeno-Azerbaijani war over the Nagorno- 
Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKOR) which began in 1988 as 
struggle of that province's largely Armenian population for 
autonomy and then independence from Azerbaijan toward 
unification with Armenia, has become the main barrier 
preventing Turkey from achieving its policy objectives 
regarding the Transcaucasus. 
Turkey was the first country to extend recognition to 
Azerbaijan, which proclaimed its independence in September 
1991. Turkey, recognizing Azerbaijan on November 9, 1991, has 
developed close relations with this country particularly after 
the election as president of relatively pro-Turkish Abulfaz 
Elchibey of Azerbaijan's Popular Front in May 1992. [Ref 80:p. 
602] Despite all historical, cultural and linguistic ties 
between the two countries, Turkey has refrained from directly 
intervening in the war over the NKOR on the side of 
Azerbaijan, fearing that this kind of involvement would 
irreparably set back Turkey's integration with Europe and 
severely damage its relations with the United States. With the 
intensification of the war in early 1992 as Karabakh Armenians 
attempted to establish a link between the NKOR and Armenia, 
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Turkey co-authored UN resolution 882 with Russia and the 
United States authorizing a cease-fire in NKOR and became one 
of the ten members the CSCE's Minsk Group that was set up to 
bring an end to the war through negotiation. [Ref 26:p. 31] 
From early 1992 until early 1993 Turkey actively participated 
in negotiations conducted by the Minsk Group which did not 
yield any positive result toward the settlement of the 
conflict. Despite its reluctance to enter the war, Turkey felt 
compelled to heighten its forces' readiness on the border with 
Armenia in May 1992 and then in April 1993, intensified aerial 
reconnaissance along the border and has repeatedly warned 
Karabakh Armenians to withdraw from the Azerbaijani 
territories that they have occupied since the breakout of the 
war. 
When Turkey heightened its forces' readiness in May 1992 
upon the shelling of Nakhichevan, an Azerbaijani controlled 
autonomous region in Armenia, by Armenian forces, and 
threatened to send Turkish forces into the enclave, Marshal 
Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, then the Commander of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) Joint Forces, in turn, warned 
Turkey that its direct involvement in the in the war could 
place the two parties, in the words of Shaposhnikov, "on the 
edge of World War III." [Ref 25:p. 23] The Turkish-Soviet 
Treaty, signed in 1921 in Moscow, describes Nakhichevan, with 
which Turkey has an 11 kilometer border, as an autonomous 
region under the control of Azarbaijan on the condition that 
Azerbaijan does not relinquish this right to a third party. 
[Ref 23:p. 206] In accordance with the treaty, Turkey believes 
it has responsibility of protecting Nakhichevan against 
attacks threatening the borders and status of the region. 
Meanwhile, Turkey's active involvement in the mediation 
process, the anti-Russian stance of President Abulfaz Elchibey 
who continuously rejected the idea of joining the CIS and the 
close relations that Turkey established with Azerbaijan, have 
been the source of serious concern for the Russian Federation, 
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which wants to protect its strong influence over   the 
Transcaucasus. 
Russia's concerns were exacerbated when Turkey proposed a 
territorial exchange to end the war in the spring of 1992. 
Turkey, with the support of the United States, offered a 
post-war settlement creating a purely Armenian state 
incorporating the NKOR, and a purely Turkic Azarbaijan state 
incorporating the Nakhichevan Autonomous region which is 
separated from the Azerbaijani territory by the Armenian 
territory. [Ref 88:p. 5] This plan, which would give Turkey a 
direct link with Azerbaijan and make possible the construction 
of pipelines, that will carry the energy resources of 
Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics directly to Turkey 
through the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan, has been source of a 
grave concern for Russia since it would make Turkey, not 
Russia, a major player in the energy game, protect Turkey's 
energy sources from any interruption by Armenia, Iran and the 
Russian Federation, and thus give Turkey a greater voice and 
leverage in both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. Three 
months after Turkey and Azarbaijan signed, on March 9, 1993, 
an accord for the construction of an oil pipeline between Baku 
in Azerbaijan and Turkey's Mediterranean port of Yumartalik 
for the pumping of Azeri crude oil to be extracted from Azeri 
and Chyrag oil fields in the Caspian Sea, in June 1993 
military leader Suret Huseinov launched a military coup, 
reportedly with the backing of the Russian Federation, against 
Azerbaijan's pro-Turkish President Elchibey. [Ref 26:p. 31] 
Following the military coup which replaced Elchibey with the 
former first secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party 
Geidar Aliev as president, Russia has increased its pressure 
on Azarbaijan for the return of Russian troops to this 
country, and forced Baku to give 20 percent of the profits of 
oil exploration to Russia and bring the Russian oil company 
LUKOIL into British Petroleum-led international consortium 
(SOCAR) that had been formed to develop Azerbaijan's Chyrag 
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and Azeri oil fields in the Caspian Sea, in return for 
assuring Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and helping it to 
regain control over Nagorno-Karabakh [Ref 88:p. 11] Russia has 
increased its pressure on Geidar Aliev also to continue 
operating the ballistic-missile early-warning radar system at 
Lyaki in Azerbaijan in return for restoring peace in the 
region. [Ref 87:p. 77] Furthermore, in order to prevent Turkey 
from playing a leading role in the transportation of the 
Azeri and Central Asian oil, it has opposed the March 1993 
Turkish-Azeri agreement that envisages construction of an oil 
pipeline between Baku and Turkey's Mediterranean port of 
Yumurtalik through Georgia or Iran and Nakhichevan, and 
pressured Azerbaijan to suspend the pipeline negotiations with 
Turkey and to accept the transportation of Azeri oil by a 
pipeline that will be built between Baku and the Russian oil 
export terminal at Novorossiysk on the Black Sea by the 
Russian-Kazakh-Omani Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). [Ref 
89:p. 17] Turkey has placed great importance on the Baku- 
Yumurtalik oil pipeline because it would make possible the 
transportation of not only the Azeri oil, but also the oil 
that will be extracted from the Tengiz oil field in 
Kazakhstan. Therefore, the March 1993 agreement between Turkey 
and Azerbaijan allows Kazakhstan to join the project later, 
and envisages a transportation capacity of 40 million tons per 
year, almost double the amount of Azeri oil production 
capacity. [Ref 88:p. 5] The extra capacity has been 
incorporated into the pipeline to attract transportation 
demand from Central Asian countries, mainly from Kazakhstan. 
This project which would reorient the Central Asian energy 
economy from Russia to Turkey has been a source of serious 
concern for Russia, which became highly sensitive to Turkish 
efforts at establishing a zone of Turkish influence in Central 
Asia. 
While trying to exploit the war over NKOR for the 
stationing of Russian forces in Azerbaijan, obtaining a share 
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a Azerbaijan's oil economy, and preventing Turkey from playing 
a leading role in the energy game, Russia has also tried to 
distance itself from the CSCE's mediation process through the 
Minsk Group, and began bilateral consultations with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Karabakh Armenians toward the settlement of the 
conflict. In an attempt to monopolize the mediation process, 
the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev also reguested at 
the CSCE foreign ministers' meeting in Rome in 1993 that 
Russia be formally granted a special role as peacekeeper in 
the former Soviet Union. [Ref 26:p. 33] Turkey has strongly 
opposed Kozyrev's request and insisted on international 
mediation through CSCE or the tripartite mediation effort that 
Turkey, the United States and Russia initiated in the spring 
of 1993 before the military coup against Elchibey. 
Meanwhile the poor performance of Azerbaijani forces 
against the Karabakh Armenians continued, resulting in the 
occupation of Kelbadzhar corridor, linking the NKOR to 
Armenia, in April 1993 and of large Azerbaijani territory 
along the Azerbaijani-Iranian border in September 1993 by the 
Karabakh Armenians. [Ref 47:p. 64] In the face of continuous 
set-backs against Armenian forces and Russian pressure, 
Azerbaijan felt compelled to join the CIS in late September 
1993. The mediation efforts of the CSCE to end the fighting, 
which again intensified in December 1993 with the counter- 
attack of Azerbaijani forces to recover the occupied 
territories, have not produced a lasting solution to the 
conflict and various proposals of cease-fire have been 
rejected either by Azerbaijan, which insists on the condition 
that any cease-fire should be preceded by the withdrawal of 
Armenian forces from the occupied territories, or by Armenia 
and the Karabakh Armenians on the grounds that they did not 
provide security guarantees for the Karabakh Armenians. 
Meanwhile, in the absence of progress in the CSCE's mediation 
process, both Armenia and Azerbaijan, under President Aliev, 
addressed formal requests to Iran in December 1993 to 
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participate in the mediation process. [Ref 26:p. 34] Iran's 
involvement in the mediation process has been supported by 
Russia as a counterweight to Turkey. Russia has also believed 
that only Tehran is in position to persuade Afghan Prime 
Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to bring  Afghan Mujahidin, 
fighting in the war over the NKOR on the side of Azerbaijan, 
back to Afghanistan. [Ref 26:p. 36] Iran, for its part, has 
found it expedient to become involved in the mediation 
process. The development of close relations between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan, particularly under the leadership of Azerbaijan's 
pro-Turkish President Elchibey, has been source of concern for 
Iran. Other than pursuing pro-Turkish, anti-Russian policies, 
Elchibey also pursued a policy that aimed at the unification 
of Iranian Azeris and of what he called Southern Azerbaijan, 
i.e., northern parts of Iran, with Azerbaijan. Iran, seeking 
to limit any kind of development that will encourage 
separatist sentiments among its Azeri population, believed 
that Turkey, by siding with Elchibey and helping him establish 
a strong nationalist government, was encouraging the break-up 
of Iran. Today, Russia and Iran, on one side, Turkey and 
Azerbaijan, on the other side, have been engaged in a 
deadlocked and dangerous rivalry over the mediation process. 
The military coup against pro-Turkish Elchibey and the 
decision of the Azerbaijan National Assembly to join the CIS, 
followed by Geidar Aliev's decision to draw Iran into the 
mediation process, initially resulted in cooling of Turkey's 
relations  with  Azerbaijan.  However,  in  the  face  of 
increasingly greater Russian pressure on Azerbaijan for the 
stationing of Russian troops and border guards on its 
territory and for obtaining a share of Azerbaijan's oil 
economy, Geidar Aliev has found it expedient to restore 
relations with Turkey. In his visits to Turkey in February and 
May 1994, Aliev stated that he would accept the deployment of 
Russian troops in Azerbaijan only within the framework of the 
CSCE and together with military units from other countries, 
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and called on Turkey to supply Azerbaijan with weapons to 
counteract weapon deliveries made to Armenia. [Ref 88:p. 22] 
In his February visit to Turkey, Aliev also stated that the 
March 1993 agreement between Turkey and Azerbaijan on the 
construction of Baku-Yumurtalik oil pipeline could be 
finalized "in the immediate future." [Ref 26:p. 36] Azerbaijan 
had reported, on January 27, 1994, that it had postponed 
indefinitely joint plans with Turkey o build the Baku- 
Yumurtalik oil pipeline because of its domestic political and 
economic problems caused by the war over the NKOR. [Ref 90:p. 
108] As a sign of goodwill, Geider Aliev has also accepted 
Turkish requests to increase the share of the Turkish state 
oil company Turkish Petroleum Incorporated in SOCAR from 1.75 
percent to 6.75 percent. [Ref 91:p. 4] 
Today, Turkey still tries to prevent, together with 
Azerbaijan, the deployment of exclusively Russian peacekeeping 
forces in Azerbaijan, and insists on international mediation 
either by the CSCE or through the tripartite initiative with 
Russia and the United States. However, it should also be 
stated that prolonged war over the NKOR, the military coup 
against pro-Turkish Elchibey, and the inability of Turkey to 
intervene in the war in support of Azerbaijan, combined with 
the Russian efforts of excluding Turkey and the United States 
from the mediation' process, have greatly helped the Russian 
Federation to control the mediation process, and spread its 
influence over the Transcaucasus. Other than forcing 
Azerbaijan to join the CIS, it has secured an agreement with 
Armenia that allows Russia to maintain military bases in this 
country. 
Armenia has historically depended on Russia and seen 
Russia's military presence in the country as a security 
guarantee against Turkey. Even after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union , some Russian forces have remained this country, 
and during the Tashkent Summit in May 1992 Armenia joined a 
common defense system, similar to NATO, with Russia and 
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Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. [Ref 
27:p. 3] In the face of prolonged war over the NKOR, Armenia 
also views the Russian forces as a guarantee against possible 
Turkish intervention in the war over the NKOR on the side of 
Azerbaijan. 
Russia has also succeeded in obtaining a considerable 
part of Azerbaijan's oil economy by compelling Baku to 
transfer 10 percent of the profits of oil exploration to 
Russia by reducing the share of SOCAR, British Petroleum-led 
international consortium that had been formed to develop 
Azerbaijan's Chyrag and Azeri oil fields in the Caspian Sea, 
from 30 percent to 20 percent. [Ref 88:p. 16] The war over the 
NKOR has also delayed finalization of plans for the 
construction of the Baku-Yumurtalik oil pipeline, and forced 
Turkey to come up with routes alternative to the optimum route 
which links Azerbaijan to Turkey through the NKOR, Armenia and 
Nakhichevan. Turkey has proposed alternatives routes which 
bypass Armenia and the NKOR, linking it to Azerbaijan through 
Georgia or Nakhichevan and Iran. [Ref 92:p. 24] However, 
Turkey has faced difficulty in obtaining the support of the 
West for these alternative routes which increase the project 
cost considerably, and in the case of the second alternative, 
passes through Iran. Under these circumstances Russia has 
successfully promoted its alternative route of Baku- 
Novorossiyk and seriously challenged Turkey's desire of 
playing a leading role in the transportation of Azeri and the 
Central Asian oil to Europe, which would help Turkey form a 
zone of influence in both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. 
Russia's attempts to gain influence in the Transcaucasus 
have not remained limited to Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia 
has also exploited the instability in Georgia and pressured 
this country into joining the CIS and accepting the Russian 
demands of maintaining military bases in the country. After 
the takeover of Abkhazia by Abkhazian forces in September 
1993, Georgia felt compelled to accede to Russian demands and 
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joined the CIS in the autumn of 1993. [Ref 87:p. 76] Following 
the agreement signed between Georgia and Russia in February 
1994 allowing Russia to maintain three bases in this country, 
Russian troops were deployed in Georgia as a peacekeeping 
force between Georgian and Abkhazian forces in June 1994. 
[Ref 85:p. 10] 
Turkish concerns of increasing Russian military presence 
in the neighboring countries have been exacerbated by Russian 
attempts toward the upward revision of the quantities of 
troops and armored vehicles it may station in the Caucasus 
under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Russia, 
claiming that the treaty limits agreed upon in the Cold War no 
longer meet its security needs, asked NATO and the Eastern 
European signatories of the CFE treaty to agree to reconsider 
or lift the flank limits in October 1993. [Ref 89:p. 17] 
Although this request was rejected by NATO, Russia continued 
to raise the issue and has increased its pressure on the 
Caucasus states to allocate part of their respective quotas 
for Russia. This method, which would help Russia increase its 
military presence in the region without exceeding the sub- 
limits assigned to the CIS members, has raised serious 
concerns in Turkey, and caused Turkey to lobby hard within 
NATO to prevent such reallocation. Consequently, NATO foreign 
ministers meeting in Istanbul in June 1994 released a 
statement affirming the sovereignty of the Caucasus states and 
expressing NATO's concern over the pressure that Russia exerts 
on these countries for the revision of sub-limits. [Ref 87:p. 
83] 
NATO's rejection of revision of CFE Treaty limits has not 
alleviated Turkey's concern which about Russia. While Dogan 
Gures, former Chief of Turkish General Staff, described the 
Russian Federation as a "very serious threat to Turkey" in the 
pursuit of an "expansionist policy, acting today out of 
ambitions inherited from the tsarist regime," Turkish Prime 
Minister Tansu Ciller has accused the Russian Federation of 
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trying to avoid the responsibilities it has undertaken within 
the framework of the agreement on conventional arms reduction, 
and stated that "Russia is determined to assert itself as a 
superpower and is working to change the principles of the 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty to suit its own interests 
in the Caucasus." [Ref 93:p. 18] Turkey, which views the 
Russian attempts to restart discussions on the treaty's terms 
as the beginning of a significant arms race in Europe, has 
stated, on various occasions, that Russia will be in open 
violation of the treaty when the limits take effect after the 
completion of the reduction period of 40 months which began in 
November 1992. [Ref 27:p. 14] 
3. A Regional Cooperation Scheme: The Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation Zone (BSECZ) 
The BSECZ is a project conceived by the former Turkish 
Ambassador to the United States Sukru Elekdag in 1989. The 
necessary political impetus was given to the project by former 
President Turgut Ozal, who in 1990 formally proposed the 
creation of the BSECZ, comprising Turkey, the former Soviet 
Union, Bulgaria and Romania. Turkey's offer had been supported 
by the countries mentioned above, and the initial plans which 
would lay down foundations of the project were developed by 
the representatives of the four countries in 1991. Rejection 
of Turkey's membership application by the EC, the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and ensuing instability in the regions 
surrounding Turkey have given Turkey additional impetus to 
turn these plans into reality in order to promote regional 
cooperation, economic growth, stability and peace within the 
Blacks Sea zone and its surroundings. 
In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
the number of countries that want to join the project has 
increased, and on June 25, 1992, the BSECZ was formally 
established with the Bosphorus Declaration. [Ref 94:p. 61] The 
eleven signatories of the declaration are Albania, Armenia, 
153 
  i   onsibiliti   as dert  it i  
 am or  f  ent  nventi nal s cti n, 
  t ussi   t i   ssert l   
er   orki   e  ri i l s f  
onventional or es  ur e reat   it  t st  
  aucasus.  ef : . ] urkey, hi  i s  
, ussi  e pt   t rt i    t '  s 
  i i  f i t s   urope, s 
,  r  casi ns, t ussi  ill    
i l f he it   t ft   
pleti  f t r  f onths hi    
ove ber 2. ef : . ] 
.  eqi al c erati e: e l   c ic 
c erati e B )
r j t i   er ur i  
ba sador nit s r l 9.  
lit l et as r j t er
r t r t zal,  all
ion, Z, prisi ur ey, er s i t
ni n, ul ari ania. r ey' rt
ntri enti e, i l hi
oul at j t er
t t ntri . ej t
r ey' e bershi l o , o
vi t ni il
ro r r it l et
u h l ot l
erati , i t , i it
l o i s.
h term h io h i t ni ,
h ber ntr a t h j t
n , , , h  a al
a ishe i h s r eclarati .  : .
ev ig h l io l ani , r enia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, 
Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
The BSECZ's main goals and areas of activity are set forth 
in its eighteen-point Charter which envisages the development 
of specific cooperation projects among the member countries in 
ten areas: transportation and communications; information 
exchange; economic, commercial and statistical standardization 
and certification of products; energy; mining and raw material 
processing; tourism; agriculture and agricultural industries; 
veterinary and sanitary protection; health care; and science 
and technology. [Ref 95:p. 33] The establishment of a Europe- 
wide economic area, the achievement of a higher degree of 
integration of the participating states into the world, and 
the development of economic cooperation as a contribution to 
the CSCE process have been expressed, in the Charter, as the 
main goals of the BSECZ. [Ref 95:p. 32-33] 
Turkey has seen the BSECZ as a very important tool that 
will help it promote stability and peace in a region 
stretching from eastern and south-eastern Europe to the 
Transcaucasus, and believes that by bringing the member 
countries into economic cooperation and thus increasing their 
chances of integrating with the world economy, particularly 
establishing trade relationships with the EU, it could promote 
political cooperation among the member countries vital for the 
welfare, prosperity and stability of the whole region. Turkey 
has also seen the BSECZ and its leading position in this 
organization as a tool that will help it to promote itself as 
a regional power and further its international reputation as 
a country contributing to stability, and as an economic 
opportunity that will help Turkey reach the Black Sea market 
through Turkish contractors and manufacturers with its 
relatively developed industrial and technological base and 
export-oriented economy. In turn, all of these, Turkey hopes, 
will enhance its chance of achieving full membership in the 
EU. Turkey believes that, in the words of President Suleyman 
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Demirel, "if a united Europe is going to work it must 
establish strong ties with the cooperative schemes around it." 
[Ref 7:p. 68] In this direction, Turkey has seen the BSECZ, 
incorporating the economies of eastern and south-eastern 
Europe, the Transcaucasus, and Turkey, as a major economic 
scheme that can develop essential ties between Europe and the 
newly developing regions around the Black Sea. 
Turkey has provided the funds for the establishment of a 
coordinating unit in Istanbul, and the necessary institutions, 
namely the BSECZ Parliamentary Assembly (PABSEC) and the BSCEZ 
Council made up of the foreign ministers of the member 
countries,were set up in 1992. At the December 1992 meeting of 
the BSECZ foreign ministers in Antalya/Turkey, the Black Sea 
Foreign Trade and Development Bank was established as a 
vehicle for member countries to organize financial resources 
and implement regional development projects, possibly with a 
Japanese contribution. [Ref 23:p. 210] After an internal 
debate over the location of the bank, at the December 1993 
meeting of the BSECZ Council in Sofia, the location was chosen 
as Thessaloniki/Greece and it share capital was fixed at 1 
billion Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), a major milestone in 
the BSECZ's development. [Ref 95:p. 35] Despite its initial 
success in establishing an organizational, the BSECZ faces 
considerable obstacles that it must overcome to transform 
itself into a dynamic organization. Except for Greece and 
Turkey, the economies of the members of the BSECZ are in a 
major transformation. They are characterized by, in general 
terms, extremely high rates of inflation, insufficient 
industrial bases, low levesl of capital investment, and very 
low or negative growth rates. Furthermore, internal 
instabilities of the member countries and territorial and 
ethnic disputes among its members also prevent intensive 
regional cooperation. The Armeno-Azerbaijani war over the 
NKOR, the Dniester conflict in Moldova, Abkhazian separatism 
in Georgia and the civil war in this country between the 
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forces loyal to former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the 
Georgian government forces, the ongoing crisis in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina which may quickly escalate to region-wide war in 
the Balkan Peninsula with the direct involvement of Greece, 
Bulgaria, Albania and Turkey, tense Turkish-Greek and Turkish- 
Armenian relations, the rivalry between Turkey and the Russian 
Federation over forming a zone of influence in the 
Transcaucasus and Central Asia and the control of energy 
resources in these regions are only some of the existing 
sources of tension that contribute to regional instability and 
cast a shadow over the future evolution of the BSECZ. 
Turkey, aware of these problems, has pursued a cautious 
policy toward the security roles that the BSECZ can play in 
the region, fearing that this kind of role may create regional 
opposition and further complicate the BSECZ's development. 
However, Ukraine and Georgia have strongly advocated a 
security role for the BSECZ from the very beginning. At the 
November 1993 meeting of the PABSEC in Kiev, Ukrainian 
President Leonid Kravchuk proposed that the BSECZ include 
regional security affairs as one of its responsibilities, and 
recommended that the BSECZ ban the use of Black Sea navies for 
offensive actions; ban naval and other military exercises 
from the Bosphorus; limit the frequency of naval exercises in 
the Black Sea; and draft a declaration of the inviolability of 
the borders along the Black Sea. [Ref 95:p. 35] Similarly, 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, has proposed on 
various occasions that the BSECZ should have a crisis 
management and disarmament dimension in the Black Sea region. 
[Ref 96:p. 14] Both Ukraraine and Georgia have seen the BSECZ 
as a platform to impose some sort of control over the Russian 
attempts to increase its influence over the former republics 
of the Soviet Union, and limit Russia's ability to engage in 
special peacemaking and/or peacekeeping missions in these 
republics. 
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At this point it should be stated that prospect of the 
BSECZ assuming an additional security dimension remains low 
largely because of Russia's membership in the organization. 
Russia, aware of growing uneasiness among the former republics 
of the Soviet Union about its attempts to extend its influence 
throughout the former Soviet Union, has tried, from the very 
beginning, to prevent discussion of political and security 
issues within the BSECZ. Russia has also shown resistance to 
the BSECZ's falling under Turkish leadership. For instance, it 
rejected the Turkish proposal to locate the Black Sea Foreign 
Trade and Development Bank in Istanbul, and supported Greece 
in securing BSECZ Council decision to locate the bank in 
Thessaloniki/Greece. As Izvestiya  puts it: 
. . . people in the Kremlin and on Smolenskaya 
Square do not want the BSECZ, which was created on 
Turkey's initiative, to be turned into a tool for 
the expansion of Ankara's political influence in 
the region. [Ref 47:p. 78] 
Before the BSECZ can be truly effective, ethnic, national 
and territorial disputes among and within its member states, 
which continually prevent the BSECZ's decision-making 
mechanism from taking and enforcing actions that will enhance 
regional cooperation, must be settled. Furthermore, its 
members should achieve significant economic growth on their 
own. Considering these facts, it appears that the development 
of the BSECZ along the lines desired by Turkey will take 
longer than Turkey expected. 
It should also be stated that increased cooperation 
between the BSECZ and the EU, and the promotion of trade and 
investment between the member countries of these two 
organization are of great importance for the future of the 
BSECZ. Poorer countries of the BSECZ, which face difficulty in 
competing in international markets, view the BSECZ as an 
mechanism that allows them to expand trade relations among 
themselves, which in turn, will enhance their chance of 
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establishing trade relations with the EU countries in the long 
run. Therefore increased cooperation between the EU and the 
BSECZ is of real importance in encouraging these countries to 
accelerate their economic development, and to settle the 
existing disputes among and within themselves peacefully for 
an accelerated development. In this direction the first 
concrete step was taken in May 1994, when the EU and BSECZ 
countries came together at an international conference, held 
by the EU's Council of Ministers, to initiate energy 
cooperation between the two organizations. [Ref 95:p. 36] If 
similar initiatives yield concrete cooperation projects, the 
chance of BSECZ to achieve its objectives and contribute to 
the regional stability considerably increases. 
B.  TURKEY AMD THE MIDDLE EAST 
1. Problematic Relations with Neighbors 
In its relations with the Middle Eastern countries, Turkey 
has traditionally pursued a policy of strict adherence to the 
principle of non-interference in the domestic politics and 
interstate conflicts of these countries. As Turkey's relations 
with the West were weakened following a series of developments 
such as the unilateral decision by the United States to remove 
Jupiter missiles from Turkey in 1963, and the Cyprus dispute 
in 1964, Turkey began to place greater emphasis on developing 
its relations with the Arab and other Muslim countries of the 
region. While Turkish policymakers felt compelled to take a 
far greater account of regional considerations with the 
deterioration of relations with the West, the second Cyprus 
crisis of 1974 and the ensuing American arms embargo against 
Turkey, consolidated their decision to further relations with 
the Muslim world. With the sharp increases in oil prices in 
1973-1974 and again in 1979, the development of economic 
relations with the countries of the Middle East had become as 
important as gaining their support with respect to the Cyprus 
problem. Therefore, particularly since the second half of the 
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1960s, Turkey has distanced its foreign policy toward the 
Middle East from that of the West, particularly the United 
states, and begun separating itself from the disputes that 
emerged between the West and the countries of the region by 
taking a more neutral stance. 
The Gulf War of 1990-1991, which brought the danger of war 
immediately to Turkey's doorstep, forced Turkey to depart from 
its traditional policy of non-involvement in the inter-Arab 
conflicts. While no other NATO ally faced the threat so 
frontally, Turkey was a frontline state during the war as it 
took a firm stance on the side of the allied coalition 
against Iraq in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Turgut Ozal, 
then President, played a major role in Turkey's policy 
formulation toward the 1990-1991 Gulf War. He regarded the 
crisis as an opportunity to assert Turkey's strategic 
importance and to prove to the West that, in the words of 
Ozal, "Turkey is a country that can be trusted." [Ref 32:p. 
687] 
It should also be stated that the deterioration of the 
relations between Turkey and Iraq during the years preceding 
the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait also played an important role 
in Turkey's taking a firm stance on the side of the coalition. 
Following the ceasefire in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, 
during which both Iran and Iraq benefited from Turkey's 
neutrality, Iraq had toughened its stance toward Turkey. 
During the war years Iraq had preferred to keep a low profile 
while criticizing Turkey's increased exploitation of the 
Euphrates waters for the GAP project. However, when Turkey 
announced, in November 1989, that it would reduce the flow of 
the Euphrates as of January 13, 1990, for one month to 
partially fill the reservoir behind the Ataturk Dam, Iraq did 
not refrain from harshly criticizing Turkey. Iraqi petroleum 
minister Issam Al-Jalabi told the Arabic Alif Ba magazine that 
"Turkey is deliberately trying to stop the flow of the 
Euphrates," and that Iraq would try to get other Arab 
159 
960s, ur e  as i   f r i  oli  t ar  t  
iddle ast o  t f t  est, arti l rl  t  unit  
t t s,   arati  lf f  t  i t s t at 
erge  et ee  t  est  t  untri s f t  r i  y 
 ore eutral ce. 
he ulf ar f 90- 991, hic  r ght t  a ger f ar 
ediatel   urkey's orst p,  ur e   epart o  
 i l li  f n-i ent   -  
nflicts. hile  t r l    t  
tall , ur  as tl  t  ri   ar   
 rm     f  l  alit  
ai st   perati  I / . urgut zal, 
 r si ent, l  ajor l   urkey's li  
ulat ar -  ulf ar. e   
ri i  port nit  rt urkey's i  
port est t, or s f 
zal, r t t   . ef : . 
] 
l t t r f
io r r r
i at u ait port t
r ey' a  irm a ali .
l o fi ar,
 hi t a   rom r ey'
trali , ra ou a o r .
uri h ar ra  o fi
hil icizin r ey' n e l it o
hrat at r h  j t. o ever,
, ber , oul e h low
h hrat , , ont
rt h i h t rn, ra
n from ticizin r . ra roleum
i i t Issam I- to d th r i liI agazi
i tryin o to h low h
hrat s, th Iraq l try to r
1
countries to boycott Turkish goods. [Ref 20:p. 84] Apart from 
the "water problem," there was also a growing uneasiness in 
Turkey because of increasing threat of the use of non- 
conventional weapons by Iraq. Turkey was also alarmed at the 
stockpiling by Iraq of long-range missiles which might carry 
conventional and non-conventional warheads, and these concerns 
were exacerbated when the components of Iraq's planned "super 
gun" were seizedat the Turkish border town of Edirne in May 
1990. [Ref 3:p. 63] 
With the occupation of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Iraq's 
bid for regional hegemony with its well-equipped armed forces, 
missile technology and non-conventional weapons capability, 
became a serious threat. Following the UN security Council 
Resolution 661, dated August 6, 1990, Turkey announced on 
August 8, that the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline between Kirkuk 
(Iraq) and Yumurtalik (Turkey) was closed, and all other 
commercial links with Iraq and occupied Kuwait were suspended. 
The closure of the pipeline and the ending of all trade with 
Iraq, which were vital for the success of economic sanctions 
against Iraq, presented Turkey with substantial costs. Turkey 
was dependent on the pipeline for 50 percent of its oil 
imports and for an income of $500 million per year in the form 
of transit fees. [Ref 97:p. 315] Turgut Ozal was aware of the 
costs that Turkey would incur due to the closure of the 
pipeline and the suspension of commercial links with Iraq. 
However, he was also aware that Turkey would come under 
immediate pressure of its Western allies to act against Iraq 
and prevent it from exporting crude oil. So, rather than 
waiting for the West to exert pressure on Turkey, he swiftly 
decided to give full support for the implementation of 
economic sanctions against Iraq. 
Ozal was also in favor of Turkey's active military 
involvement in the war. He had urged the government to ask for 
war powers from the Turkish parliament, and send Turkish 
troops and naval ships to the Gulf. Ozal's call for active 
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military involvement resulted in mixed interpretations both in 
Turkey and abroad leading to controversies over whether or not 
Turkey would open a "northern front" and send troops to 
northern Iraq. The parliament, political parties and public 
opinion were divided over the issue of Turkey's direct 
involvement in the war, which would imply the end of Turkey's 
traditional foreign policy toward the Middle East, i.e., 
strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in the 
domestic politics and interstate conflicts of the countries of 
the region. As a compromise between those in favor of 
traditional policy of neutrality and the advocates of active 
involvement of Turkish military, the Turkish parliament 
passed, on August 12, a bill that allowed the government to 
send troops abroad only in case Turkey was attacked and to 
receive foreign troops on Turkish soil. [Ref 32:p. 686] 
In the absence of a physical attack by Iraq on Turkey, the 
involvement of the Turkish military in the war remained 
limited to raising the prospect of opening a "northern front" 
by the deployment of over 100,000 troops along the Iraqi 
border which forced Iraq to deploy substantial troops to the 
north. 
Meanwhile, Ozal's ambitious plans that envisaged an active 
role for Turkey and his determination to use every political 
and military opportunity to enhance Turkey's relations with 
the United States had strained the relations between him and 
foreign policy establishment as well as the military. On 
October 11, 1990 both Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali 
Bozer and Defense Minister Safa Giray resigned. [Ref 97:p. 
315] Three weeks later on, on December 3, 1990, the Chief of 
the Turkish General Staff, General Necip Torumtay, also 
announced his resignation. [Ref 13:p. 36] While the 
resignation of Foreign Minister Bozer was connected with 
Ozal's attempts to formulate Turkish foreign policy without 
adequate consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
General Torumtay's resignation was believed to have stemmed 
161 
ilit  ent l   ixe  r t t s t   
ur   r    ntr versi s er hether r ot 
ur  oul   rt r  t    s  
rt  . he arl ent, oliti l arti   bli  
i i  er  i  er   f urkey's i t 
ent   ar, hi  oul  pl    f urkey's 
i l li  ar   iddle ast, L ., 
t r    ri i l  f n-i t r    
esti lit    nfli t  f  untri  f 
i . s pr is     r f 
i o l l  f utrali   ocat s f t  
ent f ur i  ilit r ,  urki  r a ent 
s , ugust , ill t low ent 
ro l r  as ac
ro ur i  il. ef : . ] 
 ysi al a ur ey,
n ve ent r i ili ar ai
i i n ct i  r t
o ent r ,  ro i
r r hi Ubstanti l ro
rt .
eanwhile, zal'  bit t i t
r i t lit l
ili ort i r ey' io it
nit s rain io
g l a ishm t ell ilit .
ct r , r i inist r ffai li
zer ef inist i g . : .
] r e , e ber , , hi f
h r i ener l t ff, eneral eci r ta ,
g t . : . hil h
ig io inist zer a t i
zal' tem t o l r i g l i t
t SUlt t i h inist ffair ,
ener l r tay's e ig io iev tem
from Ozal's pressure on the government to open Incirlik 
Airbase to the use of the United States Air Force for military- 
missions against Iraq. However, following the decision of the 
Turkish parliament, after a long internal debate, to allow the 
use of Incirlik and other military bases by the coalition 
forces, the first allied air attack was launched on January 
18, 1991, against Iraq. [Ref 32:p. 687] Bombing sorties from 
Incirlik Airbase by coalition planes continued until the time 
of ceasefire in the Gulf. 
The resignations of Ali Bozer, Safa Giray and General 
Torumtay, long debates in the Turkish parliament over the 
government's request for war powers, and the use of Turkish 
soil and air space by the coalition forces against Iraq had 
not only resulted in Ozal dropping his ambitious plans in the 
face of heavy criticism, but also indicated the large scale 
domestic opposition to Turkey's direct involvement in 
interstate conflicts of the Middle Eastern countries. 
In response to his critics Ozal stated that: 
As I have always reiterated, my conviction is that 
Turkey should leave its former passive arid hesitant 
policies and engage in an active foreign policy. The 
reason I made this call is because we are a powerful 
country in the region. . . . There are conservatives 
who prefer that no change should be made to these 
passive policies. The reason these circles accuse us 
of dragging the country into an adventure is because 
I generally prefer to pursue a more dynamic policy for 
our country. [Ref 32:p. 691] 
However, it should also be stated that the developments in 
the Gulf War quickly showed Turkey the difficulties of 
pursuing a dynamic policy. First of all, Turkey has come to 
the frustrating realization that NATO's protective umbrella 
may not work as effectively as it worked during the Cold War 
years, as can be inferred from the internal debate that 
emerged among NATO members when Turkey officially asked for 
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the defensive deployment of NATO AMF-A in southeast Turkey. 
Second, international compensation from the Western powers and 
oil-producing countries for the financial losses that Turkey 
has been incurring has remained far from compensating these 
losses. The financial support of the West has continually 
shrunk and eventually Turkey has been left on its own with a 
continuing income loss of $500 million dollar every year due 
to closure of the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline. Third, Turkish 
calculations that Turkey's pro-Western stance and the 
assistance that it provided in the Gulf War would consolidate 
Turkey's strategic importance in the eyes of Europeans and 
thus help it overcome the barriers to Turkey's full membership 
in the EU have backfired. Turkey's active involvement in 
Middle Eastern politics has resulted in the definition of its 
strategic importance largely in Middle Eastern terms rather 
than European, and the European countries have become 
increasingly reluctant to carry the borders of the EU to the 
volatile and unstable Middle East, which Turkey's full 
membership in this organization would imply. Turkey's 
problematic relations with Syria and Iran have reinforced the 
European belief that Turkey's membership in the EU would 
expose the EU to this unstable region in an undesirable manner 
as conflicts between Turkey and its southern neighbors 
emerged. 
While these considerations have strengthened the position 
of those who advocated the adoption of a more neutralistic 
approach by the Turkish government during the war, the death 
of Ozal, a visionary politician, and the election as president 
of Suleyman Demirel famous for his pragmatism and emphasis on 
domestic issues, has signaled the beginning of a period of a 
more cautious Turkish policy toward the Middle East. Combined 
with the fact that Tansu Ciller's government has become 
largely occupied with the country's deteriorating economic 
condition and the domestic instability stemming from the 
prolonged Kurdish problem, it is expected that Turkey's future 
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policies toward the Middle East will most probably be 
formulated in line with its conventional approach to the 
region rather than an approach that envisages active Turkish 
involvement in the Middle Eastern politics. 
Turkey continues to provide bases for the enforcement of 
the "no-fly" zone over northern Iraq (Operation POISED HAMMER) 
and to enforce economic sanctions against Baghdad. Today, the 
highly armed and authoritarian regimes of Iraq, Iran and 
Syria, which have been long disturbed by Turkey's traditional 
pro-Western orientation and its democratic, secular regime, 
also look on Turkey as a Trojan Horse which serves the United 
States and NATO in the establishment of a permanent Western 
presence in the region. Although the Iraqi quest for hegemony 
has been defeated, elimination of Iraq from the regional 
military balance has opened the door to another rivalry for 
hegemony in the region, between Syria and Iran, with whom 
Turkey has problematic relations. 
Turkey's relations with Syria have long been adversely 
affected by the historical dispute over Turkey's Hatay 
province. Ideological differences between the two countries 
have further strained the bilateral relations throughout the 
Cold War years. However, Syrian support of political movements 
hostile to Turkey has been the main source of concern for 
Turkey. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Syria had provided 
support to the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of 
Armenia (ASALA) and the Turkish Marxist-Leninist terror 
organization DEVRIMCI GENC (Revolutionary Youth) which carried 
out subversive operations and terrorist attacks against the 
Turkish state. In the aftermath of the 1980 military 
intervention which almost completely ended terrorist 
activities by these two groups, Syrian support of anti-Turkish 
organizations has continued, particularly with the PKK which 
fled to Syria in the face of purge operations of the Turkish 
security forces. While PKK recruits were given Syrian identity 
documents and taken to the training camps in the Syrian- 
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controlled Beka'a Valley in eastern Lebanon, Abdullah Ocalan, 
leader of the PKK, was allowed to reside in Damascus. Despite 
all diplomatic visits and warnings by Turkey, Syrian support 
of the PKK has continued as the main instrument used by this 
country to weaken the Turkish state. 
As the construction activity in Turkey's South Anatolia 
Project (GAP) was accelerated by the government in the second 
half of 1980s, the tension in the bilateral relations has been 
further exacerbated with the emergence of the "water problem." 
The GAP, which includes 13 sub-projects (seven on the 
Euphrates River and six on the Tigris River), has become a 
serious concern for Syria which is highly dependent on the 
Euphrates River for drinking water, irrigation, industrial 
uses, and hydroelectricity. The $32 billion dollar GAP project 
with its 19 hydroelectric dams that will produce 26 billion 
KWH of electricity, and 22 irrigations dams that will irrigate 
1.7 million hectares of land, gives Turkey the ability to 
reduce the flow of the Euphrates to Syria by up to 40 percent. 
[Ref 98:p. 9] 
When Turkey reduced the flow of the Euphrates on January 
13, 1990, for one month to partially fill the reservoir behind 
the Ataturk Dam, Syrian-Turkish relations had became very 
tense. Although Turkey offered to compensate Syria and Iraq 
for the month-long loss of Euphrates water by boosting the 
river's flow between November and January, and gave assurance 
that it will remain loyal to the accord that Turkey and Syria 
signed in 1987, by which Turkey guarantees not to reduce the 
flow of the Euphrates to Syria below the average of 500 cubic 
meters a second, these have not been sufficient to alleviate 
Syrian concerns and suspicions that Turkey will use water as 
an instrument of pressure on Syria to prevent it from giving 
support to the PKK. 
Turkey, while stating that it will not restrict water flow 
to Syria to force it to withdraw support for the PKK, has 
continued to exert pressure on Syria through diplomatic means. 
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However, in the face of continuing Syrian support for the PKK, 
the use of water as an instrument of pressure on Syria has 
come to be discussed in an increasingly greater manner in 
Turkish political and military circles. After the 1990-1991 
Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Syria 
reportedly set certain limitations on the activities of the 
PKK operating out of Syrian-controlled Beka'a Valley in 
eastern Lebanon, including cross border operations into Turkey 
from Syria. [Ref 29:p. 56] The Arab-Israeli peace process 
initiated in October 1991 has also put pressure on Syria, and 
forced it to ask the PKK in 1992 to vacate the training camps 
in the Beka'a Valley in response to the pressures exerted by 
Turkey and the United States. Rather than being perceived as 
a country supporting terrorism while the peace talks with 
Israel were taking place, Syria has preferred to keep a low 
profile and reduce its support for the PKK. Aware of 
increasing pressure on Syria to join the Middle East peace 
process, Turkey has increased its pressure on Syria to 
withdraw its support for the PKK completely. However, Turkish 
efforts remain far from yielding tangible results. This become 
particularly apparent when it was revealed that PKK leader 
Abdullah Ocalan had fled from northern Iraq to Syria on March 
19, 1995, only 24 hours before Turkey launched a military 
campaign against the PKK camps in northern Iraq. [Ref 60:p. 1] 
Turkish Foreign Minister Erdal Inonu, in his visit to 
Washington to give information to the United States 
administration about the military operation launched by Turkey 
in northern Iraq, expressed Turkish concerns about the 
continuing Syrian support for the PKK, and asked for the 
assistance of the United States in exerting pressure on Syria. 
[Ref 99:p. 1] Today, Syria, while trying not to be seen to be 
openly supporting the PKK, keeps the channels with this group 
open. As Graham Fuller puts it: 
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. . . Syria will continue to gauge the positive and 
negative values of maintaining this instrument of 
pressure against Turkey—including the broader costs 
or enhancements to its image, interests, and relations 
with the United States and Turkey. It can always 
resuscitate support to the PKK . . . [Ref 29:p. 56] 
While ideological differences between Syria and Turkey 
are expected to be resolved or put into the background with 
the end of Cold War, the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and the events 
in its aftermath have shown that Syria continues to see Turkey 
as a hostile, anti-Syrian and pro-Western presence in the 
region. Turkey's pro-Western stance in the Gulf War, and 
particularly its continuing support for Operation PROVIDE 
COMFORT/ POISED HAMMER have raised Syrian concerns that Turkey 
is helping the West, particularly the United States, in 
establishing a military presence in the Middle East. Operation 
PROVIDE COMFORT/POISED HAMMER is seen by Syria, in the words 
of Stephan Blank of the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), "as 
a thinly contrived effort on the part of Turkey and the United 
States to establish a permanent NATO military presence in the 
region, targeted on the Gulf." [Ref 47:p. 32] 
If the Arab-Israeli peace process, which started to give 
its first fruits with the limited autonomy agreement between 
PLO leader Yasir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin in 1993, and the peace accord signed between King 
Hussein of Jordan and Yitzhak Rabin in 1994, yields an 
agreement between Syria and Israel as a first step toward a 
long-term settlement of the standing disputes between the two 
countries, particularly of the dispute over the Golan Heights 
occupied by Israel, Syria may adopt a much more moderate 
stance in its relations with the pro-Western countries of the 
region, including Turkey. However, in the absence of a Syrian 
moderation, Turkey's relations with this country seem to 
continue to depend largely on the evolution of the "water 
problem" and the "Kurdish problem." 
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Turkey's relations with Iran were adversely affected when 
the Islamic revolution took place in Iran in 1979. Before the 
Islamic revolution that led to the fall of Shah Muhammad Reza 
Pahlavi, the two countries had developed close relations, the 
foundations of which were laid by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and 
Reza Shah Pahlavi, father of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. Iran and 
Turkey had joined in various Northern Tier security 
arrangements such as the Baghdad Pact and CENTO against the 
threat of spread of Soviet influence over the Middle East. 
The Islamic revolution in 1979 created strains in Turkey's 
relations with Iran because of new regime's efforts at 
"exporting the Islamic revolution" to Turkey. The regime of 
Ayatollah Khomeini opened a disturbing campaign against the 
secular and democratic regime of Turkey, while declaring 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk "godless" and an "enemy of Islam." 
The 1980-1988 war between Iran and Iraq prevented further 
deterioration of relations between Iran and Turkey, which 
pursued a careful policy of neutrality. Both Iran and Iraq 
needed Turkey as an economic lifeline and transportation link 
to the world, and refrained from taking actions that would 
lead to a change in Turkish policy of neutrality. However, 
when Turkey entered into the "hot pursuit" accord with Baghdad 
with which Saddam Hussein gave permission to Turkey to enter 
Iraq in order to launch military operation against the PKK 
camps in northern Iraq, Iran protested the agreement and 
accused Turkey of siding with Iraq. For Iran, Turkey was 
helping Iraq to police the northern parts of the country and 
defend both Iraqi territory and the Turkish-Iraqi oil 
pipeline, vital for the export of Iraqi oil to the world 
markets, against Iraqi Kurdish groups backed by Iran in an 
attempt to weaken the regime in Baghdad. Iran's suspicion 
about Turkey grew when Turkey notified Tehran that if Iraq 
were defeated by Iran and the state were to disintegrate, it 
would demand the return of Mosul-Kirkuk-a claim which dates 
back to Turkey's loss of the region in 1926. [Ref 13:p. 45] 
168 
urkey's r l t s it  I  ere adversel  aff t  hen 
t  I ic r ol ti  t  l e i  I  i  979. efore t  
I ic r ol ti  t at l  t  t  f ll f hah uha ad eza 
ahlavi, t  t o untri s a  evel e  l s  r l t s, t  
f dati s f hic  ere l i  y ustafa emal tat r   
eza ha  ahlavi, t r f uha ad eza ahlavi.   
ur e   j   ari s orther  ier curit  
ents  s  aghdad act   ainst t  
t f  f oviet  er  iddle ast. 
he +sl i  l t    r t    urkey's 
 it   s  f i e's f rt  t 
ort   a i  l t   urkey. he  f 
yatoll  homeini  i  pai  ai st  
l r ocrati  f ur ey, hil  cl  
ustaf  e al tat dl ss     f a .  
 ar t  
t r f io  ur ey, hi
l l utralit . ot
r i fe in a rt in
orl , ain rom t oul
e a r i l utralit . o ever,
r t rs it it
i hi am uss i is r t
ra au ili r t i st
a , ra h ee t
idin i . , a
n ra l h r h t
en ra te ritory h r i -I i
l , th rt ra o h or
arkets, Ira r i o ra in
ttem to  th regim in a . r ' o
a   rew   t ied th i Iraq
 ed b  Iran an  the sta  to n e i
 dem  the return  osul i  claim i  
b c  to '  los  o  the region in 1 . [R  1 4  
16  
It was during this period that Iran reportedly stepped up 
its assistance to the various anti-Turkish groups. For 
example, Iran offered to provide the PKK with a base along the 
Iranian-Turkish border at Urmia while allowing the ASALA to 
open an office in Tehran. [Ref 47:p. 37] 
Following the end of the war between Iran and Iraq, with 
the ceasefire of August 1988, the relations between Turkey and 
Iran further deteriorated. While the Iranian embassy refused 
to lower the Iranian flag to half-mast to commemorate the 50th 
anniversary of Ataturk's death in November 1988, Iranian 
insults comparing Kenan Evren, then President of Turkey, with 
Salman Rushdie, caused additional offense, especially to the 
army. [Ref 3:p. 55] The Iranian regime also provided support 
to Turkey's own radical Islamist groups. When the Turkish 
Constitutional Court ruled, in 1989, against the wearing of 
the headscarfs by woman students on university campuses, the 
extreme religious groups organized mass demonstrations which 
are believed to have been largely provoked and funded by Iran. 
[Ref 100:p. 178] While marches of support were held also in 
Tehran, the Iranian ambassador to Ankara, Manoushehr Mottaki, 
gave very provocative speeches on the issue, and declared that 
Iran was considering economic sanctions against Turkey. [Ref 
3:p. 56] 
While the death of Khomeini in 1989 considerably slowed 
down "the export of Islamic revolution" to Turkey, the 
election of moderate Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as president 
provided an opportunity for the normalization of the relations 
between the two countries. However, with the Gulf War of 1990- 
1991 and developments in its aftermath, the two countries have 
entered a period of mistrust, preventing normalization of 
relations. 
Turkey's active involvement in Operation DESERT 
SHIELD/STORM had resulted in growing Iranian concerns that 
Turkey might take advantage of the defeat of Iraq by the 
coalition forces to seize the oil-rich northern parts of Iraq, 
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including the Mosul-Kirkuk region. Iranian concerns were also 
heightened by Turkey's suggestion that the UN should take over 
territory in northern Iraq to provide a "safe heaven" for the 
Kurdish refugees trying to escape operations of Iraqi military 
toward the establishment of the state authority in northern 
parts of the country. Iran waited for Operation PROVIDE 
COMFORT to end, but when this did not happen and the operation 
dragged out under the name of Operation POISED HAMMER, it 
accused Turkey of serving the Western powers, particularly the 
United States, to spread their influence throughout the 
region. In parallel to these developments, a considerable 
increase in Islamic violence was observed throughout Turkey. 
Prominent authors, journalists and university professors 
recognized for their loyalty to the Kemalist ideology and the 
struggle that they launched with their pens against Islamic 
fundamentalism were assassinated in 1992-1993. The 
responsibility for the attacks was assumed by radical Islamist 
groups operating in Turkey and believed to get clandestine 
support from Iran. Following the murder in January 1993 of 
Turkey's well-known anti-fundamentalist journalist, Ugur 
Mumcu, mass demonstrations were organized throughout Turkey as 
a symbolic defense of secularism, and in all of these 
demonstrations Iran was held responsible for the Islamic 
violence in Turkey and the assassination of Turkey's 
secularist intelligentsia. 
The Use of Iranian territory by PKK for hit-and-run 
attacks against Turkey has been another source of tension 
between the two countries. Following the military campaign 
that Turkey launched in October-November 1992 in northern 
Iraq, one of the six military operations launched by the 
Turkish armed forces under the "hot pursuit" accord of 1984 
with Iraq, a considerable number of PKK militants moved to 
Iran and began using Iranian territory for incursions into 
Turkey. [Ref 101:p. 13] The use of Iranian territory for hit- 
and-run attacks by the PKK, in addition to incursions by this 
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group into Turkey from northern Iraq, has exacerbated Turkish 
concerns about escalating PKK violence and the security of 
Turkish border towns and villages. In the face of increased 
Turkish pressure on Iran against the use of Iranian territory 
by the PKK, Iran accepted the establishment of the bilateral 
Security Commission in September 1992 and agreed to cooperate 
with Turkey over border security. [Ref 101:p. 14] Although 
both countries expressed a desire for increasing cooperation 
on the issue of terrorism, and a committment to ensure that 
their lands will not be used by groups working against the 
other country, the use of Iranian territory by the PKK has 
continued. 
In the aftermath of attacks by the PKK against 29 Turkish 
embassies and missions throughout Europe on June 24, 1993, 
Turkey formally accused Iran of supporting the PKK to weaken 
the Turkish state. [Ref 47:p. 32] The attacks came only one 
day before the Turkish parliament voted to extend permission 
of the United States to use Incirlik Airbase for overflights 
of Iraq in connection with the Operation POISED HAMMER. 
Although Iran has continually asked Turkey not to extend the 
mandate for the operation, it has been repeatedly renewed by 
the Turkish parliament in six-month installments since June 
1991. [Ref 32:p 688] The scope of the PKK attack of June 24 
against the Turkish embassies and intelligence reports have 
also contributed to the Turkish belief that Iran was behind 
these attacks. In this regard, Dr. Stephen Pelletiere of SSI 
states that: 
It is not possible that the PKK could have performed 
an operation like this on its own. . . There would 
have had to have been an infrastructure on which the 
protestors could have relied, and the PKK does not 
have such a network. Moreover, the operation would 
have required considerable funding. . . Iran has the 
infrastructure in place throughout Europe to assist in 
attacks of this nature. . . In crude terms, Tehran has 
the modus operandi for a job like this. [Ref 47:p. 50] 
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Among the factors that prevent normalization of relations 
between the two countries, the rivalry over establishing a 
zone of influence in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, the 
ideological contradiction that exists between Iran, an Islamic 
state, and Turkey, a secular democratic state with a pro- 
Western orientation, and the support that Iran gives to 
Turkey's radical religious groups and the PKK remain the most 
important ones. 
In his recent visit of June 1994 to Iran, Turkish 
President Suleyman Demirel made clear that mutual respect for 
each others' differing social and political systems and close 
cooperation between the two countries on matters of terrorism 
and border security are the two a priori conditions for 
improved and enhanced relations between the two countries. 
Iranian officials, on their part, have stated that Turkey 
attaches too much emphasis to security issues and not enough 
on cooperation in the political, cultural, social and economic 
fields. [Ref 101:p. 13-14] Demirel stated that he could not 
characterize the results of his talks with Rafsanjani and 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's spiritual leader who took over 
from Ayatollah Khomeini, as having paved the way for a "new 
chapter" in Turkish-Iranian ties. [Ref 101:p. 13] 
2. Turkey Between the Arabs and Israel 
For the last three decades, Turkish policy toward the 
Arab-Israeli conflict has been centered on maintaining a 
balance between two objectives: (1) maintaining diplomatic 
relations with Israel and (2) politically supporting the 
Palestinian cause and developing relations with the Arab 
countries. Turkey sees the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza 
Strip as a condition for stability in the Middle East. On the 
other hand, its support for the Arab countries in this regard 
has not developed to the point that will severely harm its 
relations with Israel and the West, particularly the United 
States,  because  of  its  overall  policy  objective  of 
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establishing all kinds of relations with the democracies of 
the West. 
During the late 1940s and 1950s, Turkey's relations with 
the Middle Eastern countries were approached from the 
unidimensional perspective of East-West tension as the Soviet 
threat represented, during this period, the exclusive concern 
that Turkish strategy was designed to contain. Thus, as a part 
of its pro-Western foreign policy aiming at establishing all 
kinds of alliances with the West against this threat, Turkey 
recognized the state of Israel on March 28, 1949, and 
established diplomatic relations with this country in January 
1950 by sending its charge d'affaires to Tel-Aviv. [Ref 102:p. 
92] During this period Turkey's relations with the Arab 
countries remained subordinate to its commitments to the West, 
particularly the United States. 
As Turkey's relations with the West were weakened in the 
1960s, Turkey began distancing its Middle Eastren policy away 
from that of the United States. Although, Turkey did not let 
these developments immediately affect its relations with 
Israel, Turkish attempts at developing close economic and 
political relations with the Arab and other Muslim countries 
in the 1970s in order to overwhelm the economic crisis that it 
fell into with the 1973-1974 oil crisis, and to gain their 
support with respect to the Cyprus problem particularly in the 
aftermath of its military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and 
the ensuing arms embargo on Turkey by the United States, paved 
the way for a greater pressure by the Arab and other Muslim 
countries on Turkey to sever its ties with Israel. Therefore, 
the 1970s and the early 1980s witnessed a change in Turkish 
foreign policy in the direction of support for the Arab cause 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
During the October War of 1973, Turkey did not allow 
American use of Turkish bases to resupply Israel while Soviet 
overflights of Turkish airspace were being tolerated. Turkey 
also supported Arab resolutions at the UN General Assembly, 
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including the resolution of November 1975 that declared 
Zionism a form of racism. [Ref 20:p. 80] Turkey established 
bilateral relations with the PLO in 1975, and at the seventh 
meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 
May 1976, Turkey declared that its government had decided to 
approve the charter of the OIC to become a full member and 
permit the opening of a PLO office in Ankara. [Ref 20:p. 79- 
80] 
However, the general principles of Turkish foreign policy 
have put a certain limitation on these political concessions, 
which, in turn, prevented the development of Turkey's 
relations with the Arab countries fully at the expense of its 
relations with Israel and the West. Turkey added a reservation 
to the 1976 declaration of the OIC that Turkish approval of 
the OIC charter would extend only to those points that remain 
in conformity with secularist principles of the Turkish 
constitution. Turkey also added a reservation that its 
approval of the final declarations of the OIC would be 
conditional on their conformity with the general principles of 
Turkish foreign policy [Ref 102:p. 99] The PLO office was not 
opened in Turkey until 1979, more than three years after 
Turkey announced for the first time at the 1976 summit of the 
OIC that permission would be given. Furthermore, when the 
office was opened in Ankara in October 1979, Turkey decided 
that the head of the PLO office would have, not the rank of 
ambassador, but the same rank as the Israeli representative 
had in Ankara, i.e., charge d'affaires. [Ref 20:p. 80] It was 
only after July 1980, when Israel declared that "Jerusalem is 
the united and permanent capital of Israel," Turkey, 
protesting the Israeli declaration, withdrew its charge 
d'affaires in Tel Aviv and reduced its representation to the 
level of second secretary in August 1980. [Ref 3:p. 79] 
Relations between Turkey and Israel had grown closer once 
more by the middle of the 1980s. As a result of the 
improvement in European-Turkish relations following the 
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gradual release of limitations on political activity, imposed 
by the military junta in 1980; the decline of the Middle East 
markets in Turkey's trade as a result of the decrease in the 
oil prices, the prolonged war between Iran and Iraq, and the 
reorientation of Turkish marketing efforts toward Europe; 
Turgut Ozal's government's economic policies which helped the 
country to recover from the economic crisis that it fell into 
in the second half of 1970s, Turkey's dependence on the 
economic and political cooperation of the Middle Eastern 
countries had largely reduced which, in turn, paved the way 
for closer relations between Turkey and Israel. By 1986, 
Israel and Turkey had restored the diplomatic relations to the 
level it had been before 1980. Turkish-Israeli trade jumped 
from $29 million in 1986 to $140 million in 1990. [Ref 20:p. 
81] While the economic activity between the two countries was 
increasing, Turkey and Israel also began cooperation in the 
area of intelligence, particularly on Turkey's initiatives due 
to increased PKK activity in Syrian-controlled Beka'a Valley 
in Lebanon. With the development of close relations with 
Israel, Turkey began pursuing a much more balanced policy in 
the Middle East with respect to Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Although it recognized the new Palestinian state declared in 
November 1988, it avoided raising the status of its diplomatic 
relations with the PLO to the ambassadorial level. Turkey also 
abstained in the UN General Assembly vote of December 16, 1991 
which repealed the UN General Assembly resolution of November 
1975 describing Zionism as a form of racism. [Ref 102:p. 107] 
With the beginning of negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinians for the first time at the Middle East Peace 
Conference convened in Madrid in October 1991, Turkey upgraded 
its diplomatic relations with both the PLO and Israel 
simultaneously on December 19, 1991 to ambassadorial level. 
[Ref 20:p. 81] 
Turkey views the Arab-Israeli peace process initiated in 
Madrid in October 1991 as a very important opportunity that 
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will contribute to the stabilization of the Middle East. The 
importance of the peace process for Turkey also stems from the 
fact that, as the number Middle Eastern countries that are at 
peace with Israel increases, this simultaneously frees Turkey 
to further develop its economic and political ties with the 
West while preventing deterioration of Turkey 's relations 
with the Middle Eastern countries because of its relations 
with Israel and its pro-Western orientation. Despite the 
considerable decline in the share of the^ Middle Eastern 
countries in Turkey's total trade since 1982, the Middle East 
continues to be an important trade partner for Turkey. Turkish 
exports to the Middle Eastern countries still account for 17- 
19 percent of its total exports, while the imports from the 
Middle Eastern countries make up 13-15 percent of Turkey's 
total imports. [Ref 28:p. 26-27] This trade volume, when 
combined with the substantial construction and service 
contracts that Turkish businesses undertook throughout the 
region, demonstrate the continuing necessity for Turkey of 
maintaining good relations with the countries of the region. 
Using the opportunity that arosed with the first fruits of 
Arab-Israeli peace process, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu 
Ciller paid a visit to Israel in November 1994, and became the 
first Turkish prime minister visiting Israel since its 
establishment in 1948. During her visit to Israel, Turkish- 
Israeli cooperation in the area of intelligence was formalized 
with the signing of Turco-Israeli accord on cooperation 
against terrorism. [Ref 31:p. 13] During the visit, Ciller 
and Yitzhak Rabin also agreed to the finalization of the 
negotiations toward a free trade agreement between the two 
countries as soon as possible, and to the exploration of other 
areas of cooperation, particularly the sale of drinking water 
from Turkey to Israel. [Ref 31:p. 15] This is a highly 
sensitive issue in Turkey's relations with the Arab countries 
and Israel. Israel has long been interested in buying water 
from Turkey, and with the rapprochement between the two 
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countries in the second half of 1980s, they had began 
exploring the technical aspects of the transportation of water 
from Turkey's under-utilized rivers emptying into 
Mediterranean to Israel. In 1990 the technical aspects of the 
sale were completed, and the transportation of the water by 
tanker ships or in large floating bags to be hauled by ships 
was determined to be feasible. [Ref 103 :p. 9] However, the 
water deal between Turkey and Israel had met with Arab 
resistance. While Libya reneged on its promises to service its 
debts to Turkish contractors and held up payments to Turkish 
workers employed in Libya to prevent realization of the sale, 
Iraq had resorted to holding up Turkish lorries at the 
northern border, resulting in Turkey and Israel shelving the 
project.  [Ref 3:p. 82] 
Aware of the growing importance of water in the Middle 
East, Turkey, the only country in the region which enjoys 
abundant groundwater resources, has seen water both as a 
marketable commodity and a strategic resource that has the 
potential of greatly affecting the interstate tensions in the 
Middle East. These considerations have resulted in Turkey 
drawing up a water pipeline scheme, envisaging the 
transportation of Turkey's water to eight Arab countries. 
This pipeline scheme, which became known as the "Peace 
Pipeline," was brought up by Ozal for the first time in 1987. 
Ozal had seen the free exchange of goods, capital, services 
and labor as essential to the economic order in the Middle 
East, and offered the project as an economic and political 
cooperation mechanism that would contribute to the stability 
and development of the region as a whole. 
The "Peace Pipeline" project, feasibility studies of which 
were performed by an American consulting firm, Brown and Root, 
at a cost of $2.7 million, envisages exploitation of two of 
Turkey's medium-sized rivers, the Seyhan and Ceyhan, which 
empty into the Mediterranean, and the transportation of water 
southward through Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to the Gulf. 
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[Ref 104:p. 28] The Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers carry about 3 9 
million cubic meters (cum) of clean water per day, and Turkey 
has offered to export 6 million cum/day southward through two 
massive water pipelines that will be constructed within the 
framework of the project. [Ref 105:p. 13] The first and 
largest pipeline, known as "Western Pipeline," would supply 
water from Turkey to Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and have 
a daily capacity of 3.5 million cum. [Ref 3:p. 97] The smaller 
and second pipeline, known as "Gulf Pipeline," would have to 
cross Iraq then move down the west side of the Gulf, supplying 
water to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates and Oman, with a daily capacity of 2.5 million cum of 
water. [Ref 3:p. 97] Altogether the project could bring 
drinkable water to more than 15 million people at a 
construction cost of $20 billion. [Ref 104:p. 29] Although 
Israel does not appear in the blueprints, Israeli and American 
water consultants have made plans to extend to Israel a spur 
from Amman. [Ref 105:p. 13] 
Philip Robins explains the notion behind the project as 
follows: 
. . . by the end of the century pressure on water 
resources will be so acute in the region that 
conflicts may .erupt as states seek to expand and 
secure their own supplies. The construction of 
extensive pipelines which supply large volumes of 
cheap water on a reliable basis, regardless of the 
season, to all the needy states of the region will . 
. . lessen the pressures on existing natural water 
resources, and hence head off any possible conflicts. 
[Ref 3:p. 98] 
The Gulf states have shown reluctance to commit themselves 
to the project for a variety of reasons. First, Arab states, 
particularly Syria, have feared increasing their dependence on 
Turkey. Second, the countries located toward the end of the 
pipelines have expressed their concerns that states upline 
would have greater leverage over them, and might exert 
178 
[ ef 04:p. 28] he s an a d eyhan ri ers carr  about 3  
i li  ubic eters ( ) f l  ater per day, a d urkey 
as ff r  t  port  i li  c /day s t ard t  t o 
a si e ater i eli s t at i l e nstr ct  it i  t  
f a or  f t  roject. ef 05:p. 3] he i t  
est i eli e, n s ester  ipeli e," ould pl  
ater o  ur e  t  s ria, r   audi rabia,  a e 
ail  acit  f .  ill  . ef : . 7] he a ler 
  i eli e,  s ulf i eli e," oul  a e t  
ss   ove  est  f  ulf, pl i  
ater ' ait, a di rabia, ahrain, atar,  nit  ra  
irates  an, it  ail  acit  f .  ill  f 
ater. ef : . ] lt et er  r j ct l  r  
r l  ater  ore   ill  pl  t 
st t  st f il . ef 4:p. ] lt  
l t ar l eprints, li  meric  
ater sult t a l  t  l r 
rom man. f : . ]




fli t ay, er t
i  pli s. st t
l hi l a u
at  ia si , l h
, h h o ill .
lesse h in t l at
e , i fli t .
[ .  
l a e show eluctan it the s l
to th fo  a e . i t r
c y s  ~ incre in th
. , th t loc e tow th th
in  e se  th c th state n
  leverag  the , an  i  
17  
political pressure or extract concessions by preventing the 
flow of water downstream. The reluctance of the Arab countries 
to commit themselves to the project resulted in the 
cancellation of a Middle East Water Summit which Turkey 
planned, in cooperation with the World Bank and the UN 
Development Program (UNDP), to convene in November 1991. [Ref 
104:p. 33] Turkey's desire to have Israel participate in the 
conference and Israel's acceptance of Turkey's invitation had 
also contributed to the Arab countries' decision not to 
participate in the conference. 
Turkey has not given up promoting the project as a 
mechanism that will create a new regional economic order in 
the Middle East, and contribute to the prevention of possible 
conflicts between the countries of the region over this 
valuable and scarce resource. The Arab-Israeli peace process 
initiated in Madrid in October 1991, and the signing of Oslo 
accords in September 1993 by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin and PLO leader Yasir Arafat, have given Turkey an 
opportunity to revive the "Peace Pipeline" project which 
became dormant, particularly after the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. At an international water conference in Ankara in 
September 1993, the importance of the project as a stimulus to 
the Arab-Israeli peace process was emphasized by Turkey in the 
hope of bringing the project back to life. As Turkish Minister 
of State Mehmet Golhan states: 
As Israel and Palestine bury their swords, Turkey 
believes that a reassessment of the Peace Pipeline 
project should be made by all the countries it would 
serve. The true meaning of the project is to prove 
that water can be an element of cooperation by 
creating a mutual dependence on water, thus 
contributing to peace and stability.[Ref 106:p. 31] 
The future of Turkey's "Peace Pipeline" project remains 
uncertain. However, it is a fact that water is becoming an 
essential component of political power in the Middle East and 
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an object of increasing competition. Although Turkey has 
repeatedly stated to the countries of the region that water 
will not be used as a political weapon, today water has become 
a powerful leverage to which Turkey can resort in foreign 
policy implementation. 
C.  TURKEY AMD THE BALKANS 
Peace and stability in the Balkans are of great importance 
for Turkey for a variety of reasons. The ongoing crisis in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina which threatens the territorial integrity 
and of the Muslim population of this country has been a source 
of grave concern for Turkey. Furthermore, if the aggression by 
Serbs spreads to the Kosovo region of Serbia or to Macedonia, 
the entire Balkan Peninsula may find itself in a conflict 
which may quickly escalate to a region-wide war. Greece, 
Bulgaria and Albania may feel compelled to become directly 
involved in the conflict to protect their national interests 
and this may result in Turkey's direct involvement in support 
ethnic Turks and Muslims living in the region despite all 
possible adverse effects of this kind of Turkish involvement 
on Turkey's integration with Europe. 
The importance of the Balkans for Turkey stems from both 
historical and contemporary reasons. First, Turkey is the 
successor state to the Ottoman Empire which dominated the 
Balkans from the end of 14th century until the beginning of 
the 18th century. The Ottoman Empire had continually retreated 
from the Balkans throughout the 18th. and 19th. centuries, and 
finally as a result of its defeats in the two Balkan Wars 
(1911-1912 and 1913-1914), its Balkan territory was restricted 
to a small area in Thrace. Thus, Turkey is a Balkan country 
both historically and geographically. Second, the Balkans 
constitute a link between Turkey and Western Europe, which has 
vital importance for Turkey. Considering the fact that over 
2.5 million Turkish citizens live in West Europe, and that 
West European countries account for more than 50 percent of 
180 
an object of i r asi  competition. lt ugh Turkey has 
r eatedl  st t  t  t e countries of t e r i  t at ater 
i l not be used as a oliti al eapon, t a  ater has be e 
a powerful l r e t  hich urkey can r sort i  f r i  
oli  i plementation. 
. KEY N   L S 
eace  t ili  i  t  al ans r  f reat i port ce 
r ur e  r  ari t  f ns. he goi  ri i  i  
osnia- erce ovi a hic  t s  rri ri l t rit  
 f  usli  pulati  f i  ntr  as  r  
f r  cer  r urkey. urt ore,   r ssi   
er s s   os   f er i  r  acedonia, 
 ti  al  eni s l  a l   nfli t 
hi  a i l l t  i ar. reece, 
ulgari  l ani  a l pe l  e i t
nfli t r t t i t l t
a lt ur ey' i t n v ent ort
i r usl s ivin it l
ssi l r t r i n ve e t
r ey' e o it r e.
rt al tem rom
e r s. i t,
h o tom pir i i at h
l rom h ti h nning" 
th . o tom pir t l reate
from th l throu t th t . t . t ri ,
fin ly  l it in th tw  ar  
(1911-191  an  1 4), its territory  re ricted
to a s al  are  in    is a  c  
 o c ly an  r hicall  , th   
c st  a link b tw   and est    h  
 im an  fo  T  si ng the fa  th  o  
2.5 i ion T sh citizen  live in es  E  and th  
es  E o an c t e  acco  for  than. 50 p c  o  
180 
Turkey's total exports and over 40 percents of its imports, 
the Balkans acquire a strategic importance for Turkey. 
Furthermore, according to Turkish sources, the number of 
people of Turkish ethnicity living in the Balkans exceeds two 
million while the total number of Muslims living in the region 
is exceeds seven million. [Ref 107:p. 92] 
When Yugoslavia began disintegrating in a civil war in the 
middle of 1991, Turkey originally adopted a low-key stance and 
favored keeping Yugoslavia's federal structure intact. Turkey 
even criticized Germany's decision to recognize the republics 
of Slovenia and Croatia, on the grounds that such a move would 
only hasten Yugoslavia's disintegration and result in the 
intensification of violence. Once the disintegration further 
continued and seemed irreversible, the Turkish position began 
to change. Turkey extended diplomatic recognition to the 
republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia- 
Hercegovina on February 6, 1992, in the belief that their 
integration with the international community would help 
restoration of peace and stability in the region. [Ref 62:p. 
84] As the aggression by Serbs intensified in the spring of 
1992 and the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina began suffering 
heavy casualties accompanied by large losses of territory in 
the face of Serb attacks, Turkey hardened its stance and moved 
to try to raise the consciousness of the international 
community for the protection of the independence of Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, and of the lives of Bosnian Muslims from the 
"ethnic cleansing" campaign of Serbs. 
In the spring of 1992, a Bosnian Muslim delegation, 
consisting of high-level representatives of the Muslim-based 
Democratic Action Party (Stranka Demokratske Akcije -SDA), one 
of the three big parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina's National 
Assembly, paid a visit to Ankara and requested Turkey to 
activate the Council of Europe, the CSCE and the UN Security 
Council to take action. The delegation also suggested that if 
such measures failed to stop the Serbs, Turkey should 
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intervene militarily or send arms and financial aid. [Ref 
23 :p. 214] Following the visit of the SDA delegation, on 
August 7, 1992, Turkey elaborated the details of an Action 
Plan to be implemented by the UN Security Council, which 
called for a series of non-military measures and, in the event 
that these measures failed to stop Serbian aggression, 
proposed stricter measures such as limited military 
involvement by the international community in order to enforce 
the UN sanctions and strike the Serbian military targets. [Ref 
48:p. 69] 
On August 25, 1992, the Turkish General National Assembly 
(TGNA) noted that it would not accept any forcible changes to 
the borders of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and stated that: 
The TGNA will consider it a humanitarian duty to take 
every kind of step to stop the Serbian attacks for the 
protection of the people and territorial integrity of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina in base the international use of 
force is delayed. [Ref 47:p. 19] 
At this point it should be stated that Turkey has 
refrained from unilateral use of force from the very 
beginning, and persistently declared that bringing the war in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina to an end was the responsibility of the UN. 
While refraining from unilateral action, Turkey has also 
stated that it would make every kind of contribution to 
enforcement actions mandated by the international community to 
end Serbian aggression. In this spirit, in April 20, 1993, 
Turkey joined NATO, with 18 F-16s, in the implementation of 
the UN Resolution 816 prohibiting overflying of Bosnian 
airspace. [Ref 62:p. 87] Turkey has also sent two MEKO-200 
class frigates to the Adriatic Sea to join the Operation SHARP 
GUARD, enforcing UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro in 
accordance with the UN Resolution 820. [Ref 47:p. 19] After 
lengthy negotiations, Turkey and the UN have agreed on the 
participation of Turkey in the UNPROFOR, and 1,500 Turkish 
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troops were finally deployed in Bosnia-Hercegovina in July 
1994. [Ref 48:p. 69] 
At the multilateral level, Turkey called the OIC to an 
extraordinary session in Istanbul in June 1992 and tried to 
form a pressure group among its 52 members to act in the UN on 
the side of Bosnian Muslims. [Ref 62:p. 87] At the Fifth 
Extraordinary Session of the OIC held on 17-18 June 1992 in 
Istanbul, a nine-member Contact Group was formed to speak for 
the OIC in the UN, and an overall strategy to be pursued by 
the OIC in the UN regarding the question of Bosnia-Hercegovina 
was determined: the repeal of the arms embargo against Bosnian 
government and the use of force under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the UN to stop Serbian aggression. [Ref 48:p. 70] 
In various OIC meeting that have been held since 1992, member 
countries have reaffirmed the wish for the deployment of 
troops from OIC states to protect the "safe areas," renewed 
their call for air strikes by NATO on Serbian military 
targets, and issued threat of economic sanctions against 
countries backing the partitioning of Bosnia-Hercegovina. [Ref 
48:p. 70-72] 
While the high-level diplomatic activity conducted under 
the OIC has remained far from achieving success, even Turkey, 
one of the most active countries within the OIC and Contact 
Group, has been constrained from direct intervention in 
support of the Muslim population in Bosnia-Hercegovina despite 
all kinds of close ties between Turkey and this country. 
Turkey has refrained from unilateral action largely because of 
concerns that this kind of involvement would irreparably set 
back Turkey's integration with Europe and severely damage its 
relations with Washington. Furthermore, possible repercussions 
of any kind of Turkish return to the Balkans, over which the 
Ottoman Empire had absolute control between the end of 14th 
century and the beginning of the 18th century, such as a 
region-wide Slav-Muslim confrontation, have also constrained 
Turkey's direct involvement. 
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Direct intervention aside, Turkey's return to the Balkans 
even as part of a multilateral force has created suspicion 
among many Balkan and European countries. For example, 
Turkey's desire to participate in the enforcement of the "no- 
fly" zone over Bosnia-Hercegovina created serious debate 
within NATO, and particularly Greece objected any kind of 
Turkish involvement in the war between Bosnian Serbs and 
Muslims. Because of Greek opposition, Turkey was prevented 
from active participation in the operation and Turkish F-16s 
were transferred to Italy as an operational reserve. [Ref 
108:p. 33] Similarly, the deployment of 1,500 Turkish soldiers 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina under the command of the UNPROFOR was 
approved only after a lengthy debate within the UN, and 
Turkish soldiers were deployed to Zenica without any specific 
mission. [Ref 109:p. 9] 
Apart from participating in the UN enforcement missions, 
Turkey has actively encouraged a Muslim-Croat dialogue. Fran jo 
Tudjman of Croatia paid a visit to Turkey in April 1993 and 
the Turkish Foreign Minister was invited to witness the 
signing of the Sarajevo Joint Declaration, of November 12, 
1993, between Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, on the cessation 
of the fighting between Muslim and Croat forces in Bosnia. 
[Ref 48:p. 70] Turkey also actively supported the dialogue 
between Muslims and Croats that led to the Washington 
Agreement of March 1994, bringing Bosnian Muslims and Croats 
together under a federation. Four months after the March 
agreement, a tripartite meeting between Turkish President 
Suleyman Demirel, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, and 
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, was held on the Adriatic 
resort island of Brioni at which the three countries expressed 
their desire to consolidate the relationship and cooperate 
among themselves. [Ref 109:p. 9] 
However, the inability of the Turkish government to pursue 
a policy of active involvement in the war, the ineffectiveness 
of the UN, NATO and the EU in stopping Serbian aggression 
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which resulted in heavy Bosnian Muslims casualties, and the 
occupation of more than 70 percent of the territory of Bosnia- 
Hercegovina by Serbs, have been sources of grave concern for 
the Turkish people. In addition to the resentment among the 
Turkish public against Serbian aggression, the situation in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina has also resulted in Turkish frustrations 
over the lack of UN and European action to protect Bosnian 
Muslims. As indicated earlier, today there is a growing 
perception among the Turkish people that the West Europeans 
see no place for Muslim Turkey within Europe, and that its 
application for membership in the EU is being denied because 
of racial, religious and cultural differences between the 
Turkish people and the Europeans. The inaction of the West in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina in the face of Serbia's "ethnic cleansing" 
campaign, has added a new dimension to this perception. 
Particularly Islamist groups, aware of collective concern 
and frustration in Turkish society, have successfully used the 
tragedy in Bosnia-Hercegovina to discredit the West. Necmettin 
Erbakan of the WP, has also used the war in Bosnia to 
discredit Turkey's Western-oriented regime and accused the 
government of having left the case of Bosnian Muslims in the 
hands of Western-dominated institutions such as the UN, NATO 
and the EU. While trying to mobilize public support by 
emphasizing the religious aspects of the situation in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, i.e., the Slav versus Muslim confrontation, 
Erbakan has demanded a more active approach, including direct 
military intervention, from the government. The public appeal 
by the Bosnian government and Muslim leadership for Turkish 
support, and the daily coverage by the mass media of the 
Serbian aggression, have contributed to the mobilization of 
public opinion, and the rallies organized by the WP in 
Istanbul and Ankara to show Islamic solidarity on the side of 
Bosnian Muslims have turned into anti-Western demonstrations 
where the Western governments and institutions are accused of 
applying double standards regarding the respect for human 
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rights, and openly allowing Serbs to continue their aggression 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
It is a fact that Turkish frustrations over lack of 
European and UN action to protect the Bosnian Muslims have 
been building, and should the war spread to the Serbian- 
controlled autonomous region of Kosovo, or Republic of 
Macedonia, and this, in turn, results in the escalation of the 
conflict, engulfing other countries of the region, such as 
Albania, Greece or Bulgaria, Turkey may be drawn into the war 
in order to protect its national interests. 
Despite the withdrawal of Serb-dominated Yugoslav People's 
Army from Macedonian territory in April 1992, and the 
positioning in Macedonia of various CSCE and EU monitoring 
missions as well as over 1,200 UN peacekeepers, including 320 
American troops, Macedonia continues to be threatened by 
Serbia, which has historical claims on that country as 
Southern Serbia. [Ref 110:p. 34] Greece is strongly against a 
Macedonian political entity because of its serious concerns 
over the possible effects on Macedonian independence on its 
own Macedonian minority. Greece, which claims that the name 
"Macedonia" implies territorial claims on its own northern 
region, has warned Turkey and Bulgaria that recognition of 
Macedonia would adversely affect stability in the Balkans and 
their relations with Athens. Bulgaria, on its part, considers 
itself to be Macedonia's guardian from Serbia and Greece. 
Indeed, Bulgaria participated in four wars in the last century 
(the Balkan Wars of 1911-1912 and 1913-1914, World War I and 
World War II) in failed attempts to incorporate Macedonia into 
"Greater Bulgaria." Turkey has supported the independence of 
Macedonia, and had extended recognition to the republic on 
February 6, 1992. One third of Macedonia's population is 
Muslim, and has close ties with Turkey. Shortly before his 
death, Ozal visited Skopje in February 1993 and gave 
assurances that Turkey would remain committed to the protec- 
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tion of the territorial  integrity of the Republic of 
Macedonia. [Ref 47:p. 20] 
The situation in the province of Kosovo, an autonomous 
province of the republic of Serbia, is potentially more 
explosive. Nearly two million Muslim Albanians who make up 90 
percent of the total population in Kosovo have been put under 
oppressive martial law with the occupation of the province by 
the Serbian Army following the 1990 decision of Belgrade to 
place both Kosovo and Serbia's other autonomous province, 
Vojvodina, directly under central control. [Ref 29:p. 146] 
Following the declaration of Republic of Kosovo on October 19, 
1991 by an ad hoc provincial legislative body, and the 
recognition of the republic by Albania have further 
exacerbated the tensions between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. 
Even should the Serbs not initiate an action similar to one 
against Bosnian Muslims, the Albanian majority has become so 
oppressed and the secessionist demand toward amalgamation of 
Kosovo with Albania among them has grown so strong that, 
Kosovar Albanians may take actions which, in turn, could 
precipitate Serbian action. This Serbian action may bring 
responses from other Balkan countries, especially Albania, and 
trigger a region-wide war. 
In the words of Daniel Nelson of Old Dominion University: 
... it will take only one or two deaths, Albanian or 
Moslem, in Kosovo or Macedonia to precipitate the 
endgame of the Yugoslav wars: a far wider conflict in 
the south. If fighting envelops Kosovo and Macedonia, 
neighboring states will become involved in the 
fighting. Such a final step-a true Balkan War-can be 
expected in the next decade or so. [Ref lll:p. 36] 
At this point, Turkey's relations with Bulgaria and 
Albania deserve brief comment. Turkey's relation with Bulgaria 
were severely strained when a campaign of forced assimilation 
of Bulgaria's Turkish minority began in the mid-1980s. Under 
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the Todor Zhivkov's forced assimilation campaign, 900,000 
ethnic Turks, comprising approximately 10 percent of the 
Bulgarian population, were forced to change their Turkish or 
Muslim names to Bulgarian or Christian ones, to end all 
Islamic religious teaching and practice, and to migrate to 
Turkey within the framework of an overall Bulgarian policy of 
securing "ethnic prufication" of Bulgaria. [Ref l:p. 299] It 
was estimated that toward the end of 1989, more than 3 00,000 
ethnic Turks had migrated to Turkey in the face of harsh anti- 
Turkish measures of the Bulgarian government, which brought 
Turkey's • relations with this country to the verge of a 
complete breakdown. It was also during this period that 
Bulgaria had established a close alliance with Greece, 
motivated largely by common fear of, and hostility toward, 
Turkey and Turks. 
Only after the fall of Todor Zhivkov in November 1989 and 
the official rescinding of anti-Turkish measures, did Turkey's 
relations with Bulgaria begin to improve. While the change of 
regime brought over 150,000 ethnics Turks who sought asylum in 
Turkey back to Bulgaria, the two countries initiated attempts 
that aimed at improving mutual trust. In addition to the Sofia 
Agreement signed in 1991 on confidence-building measures, the 
Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, Cooperation and 
Security was also signed by the prime ministers of both 
countries in May 6, 1992. With the treaty, which stipulates 
multidimensional collaboration and confidence building 
measures, the two countries pledged to discuss all security 
problems and solve them without resort to force. [Ref 23 :p. 
213] Meanwhile, economic activity between the two countries 
has shown similar improvement as the trade volume increased 
from $46 million in 1990 to $329 million in 1993. [Ref 28:p. 
27] 
However, the improvements in the bilateral relations have 
not been sufficient to eliminate the deep-rooted anti-Turkish 
bias in Bulgarian society. The rapid growth rate among the 
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ethnic Turks continues to be a source of concern for the 
Bulgarian government. While attacks by Bulgarian nationalists 
against the election campaigns organized by the Turkish-based 
Movements for Rights and Freedoms Party (MRF) have 
demonstrated the continuing ethnic tensions, the success that 
the MRF achieved in the 1991 general elections has exacerbated 
the concerns of some Bulgarians, i.e., the extreme right- 
wingers and some of the socialists, about the growing strength 
of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. [Ref 23:p. 213] Turkey, 
on its part, continues to treat Bulgaria with suspicion that 
it will renew its alliance with Greece if its interests so 
dictate. Although Bulgaria's relations with Greece began 
deteriorating following the recognition of Republic of 
Macedonia by this country in January 1992 and Turkish- 
Bulgarian rapprochement, both Bulgaria and Greece do not want 
the spread of Turkish influence in the Balkans. [Ref 112:p. 
36] In the words of James Brown, "Turkey [is] likely to remain 
the big problem for both countries, ensuring, therefore, that 
they would not move too far apart." [Ref 29:p. 150] 
Turkey's relations with Albania have developed in a 
remarkable way within the last a few years. Albania's 
rapprochement with Turkey is an important part of Albanian 
President Sali Berisha's foreign policy of attracting as many 
allies as possible. Because of its geographical position and 
the historical ties between the two countries, Turkey has 
found it expedient to develop bilateral relations as well. 
Especially when Albanian's relations with Greece began 
deteriorating following the forced repatriation of Albanian 
migrants in Greece in late 1991 and the expulsion of a Greek 
Orthodox cleric from Albania in the summer of 1992, close ties 
with Turkey have acquired greater importance for Albania. [Ref 
113:p. 30] The current situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the 
prospect of the spread of violence to Kosovo, and tense 
Serbian-Albanian relations have further contributed to 
Albanian efforts at developing close relations with Turkey. 
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Aware of the threat of conflict with Serbia over the issue of 
Kosovo, Albania has applied for membership in NATO, and asked 
Turkish assistance in establishing link with NATO. 
The June 1992 visit by Suleyman Demirel, then the prime 
minister of Turkey, to Albania, and the February 1993 visit by 
Turgut Ozal, then the president of Turkey, have shown Turkey's 
determination to develop close relations with Albania. Turkey 
provided Albania with humanitarian aid amounting to $22 
million, the highest foreign contribution after Italy's, 
between January 1991 and December 1992. [Ref 114:p. 31] Turkey 
has also provided scholarships to Albanian students for higher 
education in Turkey, both civilian and military. The number of 
Albanian military cadets sent to study in Turkey, is 
reportedly twice as large as the combined number of Albanian 
military students studying in Italy, Germany, the United 
States, France and other countries. [Ref 114:p. 31] 
The first high-level meeting between Turkey and Albania 
has taken place in Ankara in July 1992, and a military 
cooperation agreement was signed between the countries on July 
29, 1992. [Ref 114:p. 30] The agreement calls for bilateral 
cooperation in the production of military and technical 
equipment, the exchange of military delegations, and the 
participation of each country's military in maneuvers in the 
other's country. 
Turkish-Bulgarian rapprochement and the strengthening of 
relations between Turkey and Albania are viewed with alarm in 
Greece and Serbia. While Greece, which does not want to see 
any kind of Turkish return to the Balkans, views these 
developments as Turkish attempts to isolate Greece in the 
Balkans, Serbia is particularly worried about the military 
cooperation between Turkey and Albania. Following the January 
1993 visit of Albanian Defense Minister Safet Zhuhali, the 
Serbian media quickly spread the rumor that Albania had 
requested tanks from Turkey and that Ankara had proposed 
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sending two armed brigades to Albania to defend Kosovo. [Ref 
114:p. 32] 
It is true that Turkey seeks alliances in the Balkans to 
protect its national interests, and thus wants to develop 
close relations with as many Balkan countries as possible. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that in case the war 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina spreads to the Kosovo autonomous region, 
or Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia find themselves in a conflict 
over Macedonia, Turkey will become directly involved in the 
conflict in order to protect its national interests. As in the 
case of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Turkey has displayed tremendous 
patience and refrained from taking unilateral action. However, 
it should also be stated Turkey did not hesitate to intervene 
in Cyprus in 1974 despite the opposition of its Western 
allies. Similarly, at a very critical stage in the integration 
process with the EU, Turkey launched, in March 1995, a 
military operation in northern Iraq, which is almost equal in 
size to the military intervention in Cyprus, risking the 
ratification the EU-Turkish Customs Union Agreement by the 
European Parliament. For the time being, rather than taking 
unilateral action in the Balkans and jeopardizing its overall 
goal of integration into Europe, Turkey seems to prefer to 
adopt a low-key stance. In case the war expands beyond 
Bosnia-Hercegovina into Kosovo or Macedonia, drawing other 
countries of the region into conflict, Turkey may be forced to 
weigh its options again and feel compelled to intervene, 
whatever the political costs. 
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With the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, Turkey's strategic importance as a bulwark against the 
military and ideological threat of communism has been greatly 
reduced in the security calculations of the West. However, in 
the post-Cold War era, Turkey's strategic and political 
significance has acquired a new regional dimension, 
considering the turbulence and instabilities in the Balkans, 
the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. The 
turmoil • and uncertainty that exist in these regions 
surrounding Turkey have created a vacuum that has the 
potential of drawing Turkey into itself. The policies that 
will be pursued by Turkey toward these regions may act as 
destabilizing force or a force for moderation depending on 
whether or not Turkey sufficiently restrains itself from 
getting involved in regional conflicts. The whole 
international system benefits if Turkey continues to pursue a 
constructive approach to those areas and does not add to the 
instability of these regions. 
While Turkey expected that such a redefinition of its 
political-strategic importance might provide a fresh incentive 
to correct the underlying tensions in its relations with its 
Western allies, it has become clear that the end of the Cold 
War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have largely 
deprived Turkey of its chance to become an organic part of the 
Western Europe. The profound changes in East-West relations 
have forced the members of the European Community to focus on 
these historical changes, and gave an additional impetus to 
the Community to take control over the social, economic and 
political affairs of Europe. In this atmosphere, the West 
Europeans—who became preoccupied with issues such as German 
unification, the task of assisting the economic and political 
reconstruction of the newly liberated countries of Eastern 
Europe, the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty within the 
193 
v. CLUSI  
wit    f  ol  ar  i l t  f  s viet 
nion, urkey's i  port   l ar  ai st  
ilit   l i al t f uni  as  r atl  
   rit  l l t  f  est. owever,  
 st l  ar r , urkey's i   oliti l 
i c  s i   i al i ension, 
si r     t bilit    alkans, 
r s aucasus, entral si   iddl  ast. e 
oil ·  cert i t t ist    
i  r    t s  
t nti l f i r lf.  li i  t
ill r r o ar a t
st il r oderati i  
het er r t r f t  l ro
t n n l nflicts. hol
l tem efit r t r
st t t
il s.
hil r t t  fi i o
li ra e ort i ht i  t
r t erl e io it
est r , o t l
ar o s i t u
r o i rt
est r e. o - est io
c h e ber h munit
h l es, it l et
h munit a t l i l, i
li r e. s here, h est
peans-- a i i ssu
i , h a in h i li l
e t io h l ibe a e ntr st
r , h im l entat h astri t it h
EU, and domestic economic problems that stem from the 
prolonged recession in Europe—have given less attention to 
the issue of Turkey's membership, and found it expedient to 
defer this problematic issue without giving a specific date. 
Furthermore, the European countries have become increasingly 
reluctant to accept Turkey's membership in the EU, which would 
mean carrying the borders of the union to the volatile and 
unstable regions of the world such as the Middle East and 
Transcaucasus, fearing that they could become entangled in 
regional disputes in an undesirable manner as conflicts 
between Turkey and its neighbors emerged. At a moment when 
Europe was moving toward union, Turkey has remained excluded 
from the European political and economic processes and 
interactions. Today, Turkey perceives that as soon as the 
common enemy, i.e., Soviet Communism, disappeared, it was 
pushed aside by its Western allies and excluded from the 
political and economic processes and interactions that are 
shaping the new Europe. 
However, even though the feeling of frustration over the 
attitudes of the West is widespread among the Turkish people, 
Turkey cannot push aside the West as easily as its Western 
allies pushed aside Turkey. Turkey had made the political 
decision to become a part of the West at the foundation of the 
republic more than 70 years ago. Since then, all of the 
mainstream parties that came to power have pursued a pro- 
Western policy aimed at establishing all kinds of economic, 
military and political ties with the democracies in the West 
to promote Turkey's economic and social modernization. These 
parties have always been able to mobilize Turkish society 
along Western ideas and ideals, and received more than 70 
percent of votes collectively in all of the general elections 
that have been held since the beginning of the multi-party 
politics in Turkey. Membership in the Council of Europe, the 
OECD, NATO, and the continuous struggle to gain full 
membership in the EU and WEU exemplify the conviction and 
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determination of Turkey to become fully integrated into the 
Western world, and to be seen and perceived as being European. 
In parallel with the socio-economic development of the 
country, in which the political and economic assistance of the 
West has had a great share, Turkey's exposure to and its 
interactions with the West have gradually increased within the 
past seven decades. Today, more than 50 percent of Turkey's 
total trade is with the Western markets, the EU and the United 
States in particular. The investment by the United States and 
the EU countries make up more than 75 percent of the total 
foreign direct investment coming to Turkey every year. While 
in 1970s Turkish industrialists were divided over the issue of 
Turkey's membership in the EC, today they see the EU-Turkey 
Customs Union Agreement as an historic opportunity for 
Turkey's drive toward an industrial economy despite all kinds 
of difficulties that they.are expected to face in the short- 
run due to the increased competition with the European firms. 
Turkey continues to depend on the West not only economically, 
but also militarily. Because of its geostrategic location and 
centrality to the regions of crisis, Turkey still needs the 
security guarantee of the West as well as its military 
assistance. Considering the financial difficulties that Turkey 
faces in the modernization of its armed forces, the military 
assistance of the West and the security umbrella of NATO and 
the WEU acquire additional importance for Turkey. 
Mainly because of these reasons, Turkey does not see the 
Middle East and Central Asia as real alternatives to the West 
despite its marginalization in the Western calculations. It's 
true that with the recent profound changes in the East-West 
relations Turkey's security and foreign policies have evolved 
to take a far greater account of regional considerations. In 
order to limit the damage that regional conflicts might 
eventually inflict on its own domestic stability and welfare, 
Turkey has undertaken broadly linked political, cultural and 
economic initiatives to spread Turkish influence and win many 
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points of influence or leverage in the conflict-ridden regions 
stretching from eastern and southern Europe through the Black 
Sea region to Central Asia. However, these have not aimed at 
shifting Turkey's pro-Western orientation, but rather at 
enhancing its security by increasing political interaction 
with the countries of the region, and to find alternative 
sources of economic cooperation. Its primary objective has 
remained preserving and further strengthening the old ties 
that it built with the West during the Cold War years. 
Central Asia remains far from generating the visions, 
values and hopes that the Western alternative has provided 
Turkey since the foundation of the republic. Furthermore, it 
has also become clear that Turkey's economic, political, and 
military ways and means are not sufficient to realize its 
policy objective of establishing a zone of influence in 
Central Asia. Turkish drives to build a zone of influence have 
met an increasingly greater Russian resistance that aims at 
preventing the Central Asian republics from diversifying their 
relations with countries other than the Russian Federation, 
and halting the spread of Turkish influence in the region. The 
pressure on the Central Asian republics by the Russian 
Federation has been successful to a certain extent and 
resulted in these republics adopting a cautious policy toward 
Turkey. Turkey has also recognized that neither the Turkish 
economy nor the technological capabilities of Turkish industry 
are sufficient to satisfy needs of these countries. After more 
that 70 years of Soviet rule and centralized economic 
planning, the external financial aid that the Central Asian 
republics received from Turkey remains far from ending the 
dependence of the economies of these countries on the Russian 
Federation. Today, Turkey recognizes that Central Asia's 
economic, political and military ties to Russia cannot be 
replaced easily and that the needs of countries of the region 
are far more than Turkey can provide. 
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In the long run, Turkey may look to Central Asia and its 
natural resources as a commercial ground. If the Central Asian 
republics can successfully exploit their hydrocarbon resources 
and, in turn, achieve socio-economic development, this may 
create new marketing opportunities in Central Asia for the 
Turkish exports. 
Particularly in the Transcaucasus, vital for the spread 
of Turkish influence over Central Asia and the reorientation 
of the Central Asian republics' economies from Russia to 
Turkey, Turkish policies have failed. Russia, through overt 
and covert efforts, has compelled all three Transcaucasian 
states to join the CIS, and secured agreements to maintain 
military bases in Armenia and Georgia. The fall of Ebulfaz 
Elchibey, the pro-Turkish president of Azerbaijan, and the 
subsequent decision of Azerbaijan to join the CIS, has been a 
big blow for Turkish policies and brought its ability to 
realize its policy objectives in both the Transcaucasus and 
Central Asia under question. 
The war over the NKOR, increased Russian influence and 
pressure on Azerbaijan have also made it almost impossible for 
Turkey to realize its vital economic and energy goals and 
investments in Azerbaijan. While the finalization of plans for 
the construction of the Baku-Yumurtalik oil pipeline has been 
delayed, Russia has succeeded in obtaining a considerable 
part of Azerbaijan's oil economy by compelling Baku to 
transfer 10 percent of the profits of oil exploration in the 
Caspian Sea. Moreover, Russia has successfully promoted its 
alternative route of Baku-Novorossiysk and seriously 
challenged Turkey's desire to play a leading role in the 
transportation of Azeri and Central Asian oil to Europe. 
Considering Russia's proximity to Turkey, the increased 
presence of the Russian military in the Transcaucasus, and 
Russian attempts toward the upward revision of the quantities 
of troops and armored vehicles it may station in the Caucasus 
under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Turkey 
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needs to pursue a controlled policy toward the Transcaucasus 
and Central Asia and refrain from taking actions that will 
bring it into a open confrontation with Russia. The erosion in 
the cohesion and solidarity of NATO, and unwillingness of the 
Europeans to extend the security umbrella of the WEU to Turkey 
also put pressure on Turkey to defend its sovereignty rather 
than undertake actions that will antagonize Russia. It is 
clear that this situation will not be conducive to allowing 
Turkey to freely develop its economic, cultural, political 
relations with the Turkic republics of the former Soviet 
Union, and to pursue policies that aim at preventing the 
resurgence of Russian power in the Transcaucasus and Central 
Asia. 
Similarly, Turkey does not see the Middle Eastern 
dimension of its foreign policy as an alternative to its 
relations with Europe, but rather a complementary factor to 
further its national interests. Despite the geographical 
proximity and decades of coexistence with the independent 
states of the region, Turkey has not built a solid, working 
relationship with any of the Middle Eastern countries. 
Turkey's pro-Western orientation, its secular, democratic 
regime, Ottoman past, and the problematic relations with 
Syria, Iran and Iraq stand as barriers between Turkey and the 
Middle East. Turkey's membership in NATO, its association with 
security schemes such as Baghdad Pact and CENTO have alienated 
Turkey from most of the Arab states, which perceived Turkey as 
serving interests hostile to many of the general interests of 
the Arabs. Turkey has learned that it cannot be both a part of 
the European and Western state systems and an active 
participant in Middle Eastern politics with close relations 
with the countries of the region. Its attempts at developing 
close relations with the Arab countries of the region in order 
to gain their support with respect to the Cyprus problem and 
to overcome the economic crisis that it fell into with the two 
oil crisis of the 1970s, paved the way for a greater Arab 
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political pressure on Turkey to distance its Middle Eastern 
policy from that of the West, particularly on the issue of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, presenting Turkey with an uneasy 
situation. During the 1970s and early 1980s Turkey responded 
to these pressures positively only to the extent required for 
the protection of its national interests while paying 
attention not to severely damage its relations with West 
severely. In the second half of the 1980s, with the 
improvement in European-Turkish relations, the decline of the 
Middle East markets in Turkey's trade, and the general 
recovery of the Turkish economy from its economic crisis, 
Turkey's dependence on the economic and political cooperation 
of the Middle Eastern countries had largely been reduced. 
Until the Gulf War of 1990-1991, Turkey has preferred not 
to be involved in the domestic politics and interstate 
conflicts of the countries of the region. This policy has both 
helped Turkey prevent escalation of existing problems with its 
Middle Eastern neighbors, and served Turkey's economic 
interests. The Gulf War of 1990-1991, during which Turkey 
departed from its traditional policy of non-involvement in the 
interstate conflicts of the region, has increased suspicion 
and hostility in Syria, Iran and Iraq toward Turkey, 
reinforcing the Turkish belief that its economic involvement 
in the region would be less provocative to its neighbors than 
its military involvement. Combined with the fact that Turkey's 
pro-Western stance in the war and the assistance that it 
provided the coalition forces have remained far from elevating 
its relations with the Europeans, and that the initial 
momentum that Turkey's pro-Western involvement in the war gave 
to Turkish-American relations has quickly faded as the 
relations between the two countries became strained, in the 
aftermath of the ceasefire in the Gulf, over the issues of 
military and economic aid to Turkey by the United States and 
Turkey's human rights record, particularly in relation to the 
Kurdish problem, it can be said that Turkish involvement in 
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the Gulf War created more problems for Turkey than it solved. 
Today, it is expected that Turkey's future policies toward the 
Middle East will most probably be formulated in line with its 
conventional approach to the region rather than an approach 
that envisages active Turkish involvement in the Middle 
Eastern politics. 
Furthermore, considering Turkey's determination to fully 
develop the South Anatolia Project (GAP) and the consequent 
reduction in the flow of the Euphrates, which has already been 
reduced, the "water problem" is expected to continue 
destabilizing Turkey's relation with Syria and Iraq in 
particular and other countries of the region in general. After 
having spent more than ten years and investing $11 billion in 
the project, Turkey is determined to complete the project as 
soon as possible. The intensification of violence in the 
south-east in relation to the Kurdish problem has given Turkey 
an additional impetus to accelerate the construction work in 
the project in order to transform the proposed benefits of the 
project into reality. As the flow of the Euphrates lessens in 
parallel to the development of the project, the tension in 
Turkey's relations with Syria and Iraq will be further 
exacerbated. Syrian and Iraqi attempts to mobilize the support 
of the Arab states on the water issue have already resulted in 
a growing perception among the Middle Eastern countries that 
Turkey is utilizing water as a political pressure tool on 
these two countries. When combined with the Turkish attempts 
of selling drinking water to Israel, Turkey's rich water 
resources have increasingly become a source of friction 
between Turkey and the Arab states of the region as can be 
inferred from the opposition of the Arab states to Turkey's 
"Peace Pipeline" project. 
The Arab-Israeli peace process initiated in Madrid in 
October 1991 is an important opportunity for the improvement 
of Turkey's relations with the countries of the region in 
general. It may even help Turkey to improve its relations with 
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Syria if this country participates in the process and thus 
feels compelled to further moderate its stance. However, it 
seems that this will take time. Furthermore, the positive 
effects of these developments on Turkey's relations with the 
countries of the region may be felt much more later. Even if 
the Arab-Israeli peace process results in Syrian moderation 
and has a positive impact on the general climate of the Middle 
East, Turkey's problematic relations with Iran and Iraq may 
continue to stand as a barrier between Turkey and the Middle 
East. Today, Iran perceives Turkey as an American-sponsored 
competitor seeking to limit its influence among the newly 
independent Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union. Iran 
is also suspicious that Turkey is helping Azerbaijan to break 
up Iran. Iraq, on the other hand, may seek revenge for 
Turkey's role in the Gulf War and its continuing support for 
Operation POISED HAMMER, which automatically contributed to 
Iraq's losing state authority over the northern parts of the 
country. 
The Middle East will remain for Turkey a market deserving 
continued attention. Even here, many Turkish businessmen have 
reservations about developing long-term business relation- 
ships. Volatile and unpredictable politics of the region 
adversely affect Turkish business activities while making 
long-term planning a difficult task. Dependence of the 
economies of the Middle Eastern countries on a single 
commodity, i.e., oil has always been a complicating factor in 
Turkey's trade relations with these countries as the amount of 
money available for them has fluctuated with the change in oil 
prices. These factors have gradually driven Turkish 
businessmen toward the more stable markets of Europe, 
resulting in a considerable decrease in the share of the 
Middle East markets in Turkey's total trade since the mid- 
1980s. 
Unable to achieve both of its policy objectives in the 
post-Cold War era, i.e., elevating its relations with the West 
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and spreading its influence in the regions surrounding itself, 
Turkey today finds itself politically and militarily alone. 
The most important challenge awaiting Turkey in the next 
decade is to maintain its people's commitment to the Western 
ideas and ideals at a time when Turkey receives exclusionary 
signs from Europe. And this challenge comes at a time when the 
country faces severe economic problems and its whole stability 
is threatened by the Kurdish problem. 
Turkey should take measures that will remedy the 
structural difficulties of its economy and put the economy on 
a stable track that will help reduce the existing socio- 
economic disparities between Turkey and the Western societies 
in the long run. The announcement of April 5 Austerity 
Measures constitutes an important step in this direction. 
Particularly, the government's decision to reactivate the 
privatization program is the most important element of the 
package. Although the program is not popular, the government 
should transfer the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) which 
became "money eating monsters" to private hands as soon as 
possible to eliminate their financial burden on the state 
budget. The SEEs, which account for almost 75 percent of the 
country's budget deficit, are continuously fueling the public- 
sector borrowing requirement, and have become the main reason 
behind the persistently high rate of inflation. Considering 
the employment opportunities that SEEs create, the 
privatization program is politically unpopular for every 
ruling party and, thus, requires wholehearted commitment by 
the government. Every government that has come to power has 
promised to reactivate the program, but then has forgotten 
about it. The same mistake should not be repeated. 
Furthermore, the Turkish tax system, which puts the burden 
on wage and salary earners should be reformed in a manner that 
will prevent the growth of income differences which 
continuously fuel social unrest among Turkish society. The 
controls are lax and the tax evasion is widespread. Rather 
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than reforming the system, all the governments that came to 
power have preferred the easy way, i.e., collecting the tax 
from the wage and salary earners. 
Another issue that no ruling party has ever thought of 
giving serious consideration to is Turkey's extremely high 
rate population growth, which stands at almost 2.5 percent 
annually, ten times the EU average. Although Turkey has shown 
that its GNP can grow at 6 to 9 percent a year, the high rate 
of population growth has consumed substantial portions of 
these growth rates, leaving very little or none for 
improvement in the living standards of the Turkish people. 
These are not easy steps, but should be taken to save the 
Turkish economy from further deterioration, which is one the 
most important barriers to the realization of Turkish 
objectives and initiatives both at home and abroad. 
Deterioration of the economy also threatens the domestic 
stability of the country, fuels social unrest, and helps the 
Islamist forces to establish closer relations with the poor 
population groups at an increasingly greater speed and scale. 
The West's economic and political assistance are of great 
importance for Turkey in fighting these problems. It is a fact 
that the EU's rejection of Turkey's request for accession to 
the union has been a big blow to Turkey's secularist 
mainstream parties, which have aimed at establishing all kinds 
of economic, military and political ties between Turkey and 
the democracies in the West, and played into the hands of the 
Islamist forces, which pose the greatest threat to Turkey's 
pro-Western orientation. Although the majority of the Turkish 
people still remain loyal to the basic goals of modernization 
and have a westward orientation, frustration over European 
attitudes toward Turkey have been building. The realization 
that Turkey does not have a chance to become a part of the 
evolving Europe around the Maastricht Treaty within a 
meaningful time period is likely to result in increased anti- 
Western, particularly anti-European, feelings in Turkey, and, 
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thus, provide the Islamist forces with a tremendous 
opportunity to mobilize greater portions of Turkish society 
against Western ideas. The Welfare Party, led by Necmettin 
Erbakan, has already stepped up its anti-Western attitude in 
such a climate and used every opportunity available to it, 
such as the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, to discredit both the 
West and Turkey's secularist mainstream parties in an attempt 
to enlarge its support base. 
On this point the ratification of the EU-Turkey Customs 
Union Agreement by the European Parliament is of great 
importance in terms of both the release of assistance funds 
allocated to Turkey by the EU and defusing the growing 
perception among the Turkish people that Turkey has no chance 
to become a full member of the EU. At a time when Turkey is 
receiving exclusionary signs from Europe, ratification of the 
agreement would provide Turkey with new hopes that there may 
be a revitalization of EU-Turkey relations. 
Turkey proves that a predominantly Muslim country can 
preserve a secular, parliamentary democracy where Islam is 
integrated into competitive politics without destabilizing the 
state, and can achieve substantial technological, industrial 
and economic growth with a free-market economy. It is true 
that neither democracy nor secularism in Turkey are complete 
by Western standards. However, it is also true that there are 
few examples of Muslim countries that have shown continuous 
commitment to the principles and institutions of a secular, 
democratic state for decades and proudly defended its choice 
of Western liberalism, capitalism and democracy. At a time 
when the international system is in need of a pro-Western, 
relatively developed Muslim state with a democratic and 
secular regime and a market oriented, liberal economy to be 
shown as a model and proof that the Muslim East does not 
necessarily "clash" with the Christian West, the spread of 
anti-Western sentiment in Turkey is not a good sign. 
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Apart from the threat to the secular Turkish state from 
resurgent Islam, today Turkey's once dormant Kurdish problem 
has come to threaten the territorial integrity of Turkey as 
well as the stability of the whole state. The problem does not 
only threaten the territorial integrity of the state, but also 
adversely affects Turkey's relations with its Western allies. 
As a result of heavy pressure exerted on Turkey by the United 
States and its European allies with respect to the Kurdish 
problem, the Turkish people has come to perceive a serious 
conflict between Turkey's national interest and the interests 
of its Western allies. In case this perception grows in 
Turkey, it may become much more difficult for the Turkish 
government to develop policies that are more acceptable to the 
West in the handling of the problem. Intensification of 
violence threatens Turkey's domestic stability and socio- 
economic development, while increasing Turkey's prospect of 
getting involved in a conflict with its Middle Eastern 
neighbors, particularly with Syria which exploits the problem 
to weaken the Turkish state. More important, it threatens to 
mobilize Turkish nationalism against that of the Kurds. The 
PKK-led violence has not exacerbated tension between Turks and 
Kurds in the cities, as many feared. However, the polarization 
of society along the ethnic lines has begun and may get worse. 
If the West wants to see a domestically stable Turkey and does 
not want Turkey to embrace more nationalistic policies or get 
involved in a regional conflict with Syria or Iran over the 
Kurdish problem, it should help Turkey to deal with that 
problem. However, before asking the cooperation of the West, 
Turkey should restart attempts at finding a political middle 
ground for the problem and take measures that are currently 
available to it, such as reforms that will provide the Kurdish 
population with increased cultural and educational rights. If 
these measures are delayed, their effectiveness in preventing 
the alienation of Turkey's Kurdish population from the state 
is greatly diminished. 
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Turkey needs the West's assistance not only for its 
domestic stability but also for the protection of its 
territorial integrity and independence against external 
threats. Because of its geostrategic location and 
instabilities in the regions surrounding it, Turkey continues 
to place great importance on collective security 
organizations, i.e., NATO and the WEU. Particularly erosion in 
the solidarity of NATO has emerged as a very disturbing fact 
for Turkey, as some Europeans allies have expressed, in the 
wake of the Gulf War, concerns over involvement in "out-of- 
area" operations. Growth of the debate about "out-of-area" 
operations and whether or not Turkey's Middle Eastern borders 
are "in-area" responsibility has potential for both increasing 
the instability in the Middle East and undermining Turkey's 
commitment to NATO. First of all, the "out-of-area" debate 
increases Turkey's vulnerability, and, thus, may lead Turkey 
to transfer greater portions of its financial resources to 
defense spending in order to increase its self-sufficiency in 
defending its territories. Considering the fact that 
particularly Syria and Iran have already become highly armed, 
and do not have smooth relations with Turkey, the 
participation of Turkey in the arms race, even for a defensive 
posture, adversely affects the general climate in the Middle 
East. Second, the developments during and in the aftermath of 
the Gulf War have strengthened the position of those who 
advocate the adoption of a more neutralistic approach by the 
Turkish government toward the Middle East. If Turkey perceives 
that it cannot benefit from NATO's solid security guarantee 
even though it fulfills its responsibilities, it may show 
reluctance to provide assistance to NATO in a future conflict 
in the Middle East. 
Like the growing debate over "out-of-area" operations, the 
WEU's hesitation to accept Turkey into the organization has 
emerged as an another disturbing reality for Turkey. As 
indicated earlier, Turkish calculations that its pro-Western 
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stance and the assistance that it provided in the Gulf War 
would consolidate its strategic importance in the eyes of 
Europeans and thus help it overcome the barriers to full 
membership in the EU and WEU have backfired. Turkey's strong 
pro-Western stance during the Gulf War has resulted in its 
strategic importance being assessed largely in its Middle 
Eastern rather than European context, and the European 
countries have become increasingly reluctant to carry the 
borders of the EU to the volatile and unstable Middle East, 
which Turkey's full membership in this organization would 
imply. Turkey's problematic relations with Syria and Iran, the 
Kurdish problem that has the potential to draw Turkey, Syria, 
Iran and Iraq into a regional conflict, regional rivalry with 
Russia, the Armeno-Azerbaijani war over the NKOR and Turkey's 
involvement in the mediation process have reinforced the 
European belief that Turkey's membership in the EU would 
expose the EU to these unstable regions of the world in an 
undesirable manner as conflicts between Turkey and its 
neighbors emerged. 
However, if Turkey continues to be excluded from European 
processes and interactions toward economic, political and 
military integration under the EU and WEU, the chance of 
Turkey being pulled into regional crisis and disputes 
gradually increases. Turkey's direct involvement in a crisis 
carries the instability much more closer to Europe. First of 
all, an important restraint on Turkey's policy formulation 
— i.e., not to take actions that will give damage to Turkey's 
relations with its Western allies and, thus, set back its 
integration into Europe—gradually disappears as it becomes 
increasingly clear that Turkey will not be given the chance to 
become a member of the EU irrespective of whether it limits 
its actions to those approved by its Western allies. Thus, 
Turkey may show less reluctance to get involved in conflicts 
where its national interests are at stake. 
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If Turkey perceives itself isolated and concludes that the 
support that it expects to get from the West is not coming, it 
may take stronger, more independent positions than its Western 
allies have been accustomed to. As Turkey begins to act on its 
own and pursues a more independent policy, the actions that it 
took may not be always consistent with the interests of its 
Western allies. Throughout the Black Sea region, Transcaucasus 
and Central Asia, Turkey has pursued policies that are largely 
complementary, or at least not contradictory, to the interests 
of its Western allies. Through regional cooperation schemes 
such as the BSECZ and ECO, Turkey has attempted not only to 
limit the damage that regional poverty and conflict might 
inflict on its domestic stability and welfare, but also to 
increase the chance of the East European countries and the 
former republics of the Soviet Union to integrate into the 
world economy, which, in the long-run, could translate into 
greater overall instability in these regions. In Central Asia, 
with limited financial resources Turkey has done its best to 
prevent the resurgence of Russian power and the spread of 
Iranian-type fundamentalism. In the Balkans, Turkish interests 
seem to be contradictory to those of its Western allies as 
Serbian aggression threatening the existence of the Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, continues in the absence of a strong UN, NATO or 
EU action. However, even here Turkey continues to act as a 
positive force for moderation by restraining itself from 
direct involvement in the conflict. For Turkey to continue to 
act as a positive force for moderation and modernization and 
to successfully coordinate regional cooperation schemes, it 
needs to know that it can count on the support of its Western 
allies. 
Moreover, as in the case of the erosion of the solidarity 
and cohesion of NATO, the exclusion of Turkey from the WEU 
increases its vulnerability and thus the prospect of Turkey 
getting involved in a conflict. Turkey's membership in the 
WEU, combined with its membership in NATO would play a 
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deterrent role and force potential aggressors to think twice 
before attacking Turkey. In the absence of such a collective 
security guarantee, even in a symbolic form, Turkey becomes 
vulnerable, increasing the prospect of Turkish involvement in 
a conflict. The repercussions of such a conflict will probably 
be much more severe for the overall stability of Europe than 
the destabilizing effects of the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
As this study has tried to explain, Turkey today still 
needs the political, economic and military assistance of the 
West in order to preserve its domestic stability and continue 
its socio-economic development. Irrespective of whether the 
West provides Turkey with the cooperation and assistance that 
it seeks, Turkey shall try to overcome its economic crisis, 
protect its territorial integrity and independence, develop 
its industrial and technological base, and improve the living 
standards of its people. In the absence of Western assistance, 
Turkey's ability to achieve these goals remain questionable. 
Keeping Turkey at arm's length and leaving it on its own in 
dealing with all of these difficulties would be a shortsighted 
and easy option for the West. It is based on the assumption 
that the West, particularly Western Europe, can limit the 
damage that a domestically unstable Turkey in the pursuit of 
new policies different from its traditional moderate, pro- 
Western ones can inflict on Europe's own stability and 
welfare. Turkey may have failed the test in the eyes of the 
West. But if the West continues to push Turkey aside, the West 
will soon understand that it also has failed a test—the test 
of a broader vision. 
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